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I. INTRODUCTION
The international community has worked toward a global law of
contracts for the last century. These efforts include the Uniform Law
on the International Sale of Goods, the Uniform Law on the
Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, the
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, the
Principles of European Contract Law, and the Vienna Convention for
the International Sales of Goods (CISG). These texts are all
tremendous achievements in their own right. The CISG, especially,
is a monumental achievement, testifying to the increasing willingness
of modem nations to cooperate toward a unification of commercial
law.' However, they reflect a delicate juxtaposition of the two
1. See John E. Murray, Jr., The Neglect of CISG: A Workable Solution, 17 J.
L. & Corn. 365, 373 (1998).
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primary legal systems of the world-the civil law and the common
law. A consequence of this tension has been that the texts are full of
compromises between the two systems. The excessiveness of these
compromises has resulted in confusion and lessened effectiveness of
the resultant provisions.2 The hybridized legislation is devoid of
interpretational methodologies which accompany statutes in the
common law and civil law systems, respectively. The international
effort at a unifying law of contracts is therefore at a relative impasse
because of this tension between the two systems.3 A solution is
needed.
Suggesting the solution to this tension is the purpose of this
article. That is, this article seeks to determine, between the two great
and dominant legal systems of the world-the common law and the
civil law-which of the two is more workable as the model on which
any future regime of international contracts law should be based. The
purpose is not to argue for the superiority of one system or another
in the abstract sense, or in the sense of superiority as applied to a
single nation's domestic system of laws. Rather, this article's
narrow focus is to decide whether a common law or civil law model
is more efficacious in implementing any future effort at such a
sophisticated system of international contracts law. For reasons I
shall expound, I believe that in this narrow sense, the civil law may
prove a more pragmatic and politically expedient solution to this
dilemma.
2. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 1; Monica Kilian, CISG and the Problem with
Common Law Jurisdictions, 10 J. Transnat'l L. & Pol'y 217 (2001); Franco Ferrari,
CISG Case Law: A New Challenge for Interpreters?, 17 J. L. & Com. 245 (1998);
Larry A. Dimatteo, The CISG and the Presumption of Enforceability: Unintended
Contractual Liability in International Business Dealings, 22 Yale J. Int'l L. 111
(1997); V. Susanne Cook, The UN Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods: A Mandate to Abandon Legal Ethnocentricity, 16 J. L. & Com. 257
(1997); Joanne M. Darkey, A US. Court's Interpretation of Damage Provisions
Under the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: A
Preliminary Step Towards an International Jurisprudence of CISG or a Missed
Opportunity, 15 J. L. & Com. 139 (1995); Johan Erauw & Harry M. Flechtner,
Remedies Under the CISG and Limits to Their Uniform Character, in The
International Sale of Goods Revisited 35, 73 (Petar Sarcevic & Paul Volken eds.,
2001).
3. See generally Murray, supra note 1.
4. "The question of superiority is really beside the point. Sophisticated
comparative lawyers within both traditions long ago abandoned discussions of
relative superiority or inferiority." John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law
Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin
America 3 (2d ed. 1985). Moreover, I am explicitly avoiding any discussion or
suggestion of whether a particular nation should codify its own contract law in a
civilian sense. Such an undertaking would seem vastly more radical than the
proposal suggested herein.
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Section II demonstrates that the common law and the civil law are
easily the most widely practiced legal systems in the world. It will
also provide a comprehensive historical overview and basic
description of both the common law system and the civil law system.
Particular emphasis is placed on the civil law. Section III describes
the perceived need for an international law of contracts, the history
of the efforts to attain such a regime, and the problem of uniform
international interpretation of the current such law, the Convention
for the International Sale of Goods (CISG). The effects of having
participating nations from both legal systems is also discussed.
Section IV asserts that a civil law model would provide a more
pragmatic and efficacious solution for a future international contracts
code, for the following reasons: (1) the civil law would be more
distinctly unifying of the international law of contracts, (2) the civil
law would minimize the surrender of nations' sovereignty to an
international regime of contract law, primarily by promulgating a
comprehensive code and eliminating stare decisis, (3) the
characteristics of the international contract law-in excess of one
thousand years old, and simultaneously a new supranational regime
in the embryonic stages-are such that codification is especially
appropriate for immediate implementation of any such regime, (4)
common law jurisdictions have evidenced increasing amenability to
codification of existing law and have also revealed an observable
trend away from strict adherence to stare decisis, whereas there is no
discernible converse trend in civilian jurisdictions, and (5) other
considerations-including the sheer population numbers which weigh
in favor of the civil law-point toward implementing a civilian
international contracts code as the logical and pragmatic solution.
Section V presents a brief conclusion. Section V, therefore,
concludes by recommending that any future attempt at promulgation
of a comprehensive international commercial code be done in the
form of a civil code.
II. THE TWO DOMINANT LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD:
COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW
A. The Pervasive Reach of the Two Systems
Today's world is comprised of approximately 190 individual
nation states.' There are a host of differing legal systems in such
nations. Included among these systems are very regionalized,
5. According to the United Nations (U.N.) website, there are 191 member
nations in the U.N. See United Nations, List of Member States, at
http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html (last visited May 2, 2005).
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indigenous systems of customary law, and also various types of
religious law.6 At first glance, it would appear that today's nations
have decentralized into a veritable potpourri of legal systems, as
scattered and irreconcilable as were the peoples in the aftermath of
the biblical account of the Tower of Babel.7 In some respects this is
doubtlessly true. In another important respect, however, there have
really developed only two major, dominant systems of legal
structure-the civil law and the common law.
That the civil law and the common law are the dominant world
legal systems is immediately apparent from an observation of the
statistics of the number of nations adhering to each of the respective
systems. The Universit of Ottawa has assembled helpful
information in this regard 8 Specifically, the jurisdictions in the
world have been catalogued according to the following legal system
categories: Civil law,9 Common law,'"Customary lawI and Muslim
6. See University of Ottawa, World Legal Systems, at
http://www.droitcivil.uottawa.calworld-legal-systems/eng-monde.htn (last visited
May 2, 2005) [hereinafter Ottawa Website]. The dominant religious legal system
in use today is Muslim law, practiced in whole or in part by a number of nations in
North Africa and the Middle East. See id,
7. The account of the Tower of Babel is found in the book of Genesis, reading
as follows:
As men moved eastward, they found a plain in Shinar and settled there.
They said to each other, "Come, let's make bricks and bake them
thoroughly." They used brick instead of stone, and tar for mortar. Then
they said, "Come, let us build ourselves a city, with a tower that reaches
to the heavens, so that we may make a name for ourselves and not be
scattered over the face of the whole earth."
But the LORD came down to see the city and the tower that the men
were building. The LoRD said, "If as one people speaking the same
language they have begun to do this, then nothing they plan to do will be
impossible for them. Come, let us go down and confuse their language so
they will not understand each other."
So the LORD scattered them from there over all the earth, and they
stopped building the city. That is why it was called Babel-because there
the LoRD confused the language of the whole world. From there the LORD
scattered them over the face of the whole earth.
Genesis 11:1-9 (New International Version).
8. See Ottawa Website, supra note 6.
9. The Ottawa website describes its category of "Civil Law Systems" as
follows:
In this category you will find political entities that, apart from other
sources, have drawn their inspiration largely from the Roman law heritage
and which, by giving precedence to written law, have resolutely opted for
a systematic codification oftheir general law. However, you will also find
political entities, generally with mixed legal systems, which may not have
resorted to the technique of codification but which have retained, to
varying degrees, a sufficient number ofelements ofRoman law, in written
form, to warrant their inclusion in the civilian tradition (e.g. Scotland). On
2005]
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law. 12 There is a fifth category, described as "Mixed," which is
designed to broadly state the presence of many jurisdictions which
have a combination of two or more of the four legal systems
described. 3
the other hand, this category also includes political entities less influenced
by Roman law but whose law, whether codified or not, is founded on a
perception of the role of statute law which, in many regards, approaches
that of countries with a "pure" civilian tradition (e.g., Scandinavian
countries, which occupy an original position in the "Romano-Germanic"
family).
Id.
10. The Ottawa website describes its category of "Common Law Systems" as
follows:
Like that of civil law, the common law system has taken on a variety of
cultural forms throughout the world. Notwithstanding the significant
nuances that such diversity can sometimes create, and which political
circumstances further accentuate, this category includes political entities
whose law, for the most part, is technically based on English common law
concepts and legal organizational methods which assign a pre-eminent
position to case-law, as opposed to legislation, as the ordinary means of
expression of general law. Thus this category includes countries or
political entities that may not always have close ties with the English
tradition and that sometimes possess an abundance of codes, legislation
and non-jurisprudential normative instruments, but for which common law
jurisprudence retains its character as the fundamental law (e.g.,
California).
Ottawa Website, supra note 6.
11. The Ottawa website describes its category of "Customary Law Systems"
as follows:
Hardly any countries or political entities in the world today operate under
a legal system which could be said to be typically and wholly customary.
Custom can take on many guises, depending on whether it is rooted in
wisdom bom of concrete daily experience or more intellectually based on
great spiritual or philosophical traditions. Be that as it may, customary law
(as a system, not merely as an accessory to positive law) still plays a
sometimes significant role, namely in matters of personal conduct, in a
relatively high number of countries or political entities with mixed legal
systems. This obviously applies to a number of African countries but is
also the case, albeit under very different circumstances, as regards the law
of China or India, for example.
Id.
12. The Ottawa website describes its category of "Muslim Law Systems" as
follows: "The Muslim legal system is an autonomous legal system which is actually
religious in nature and predominantly based on the Koran. In a number ofcountries
of Muslim persuasion it tends to be limited to personal status, although personal
status can be rather broadly defined." Id. That is, in general, Islamic law tends to
concern itself with matters such as family law, estates and heirship proceedings, and
penal matters, whereas matters such as contracts, commercial law, and taxation are
largely, though not always completely, left to secular legalsystems of the region.
See David M. Neipert, Law of Global Commerce: A Tour 11 (2002).
13. The Ottawa website describes its category of "Mixed Legal Systems" as
follows:
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Based on these categories, the University identifies the nations of
the world by the appropriate category of legal system. 4 The
jurisdictions are divided into "pure" legal systems of only one of the
categories, and also various combinations of "mixed" jurisdictions.
All but three 5 of the one hundred ninety-one nations of the world
The term "mixed", which we have arbitrarily chosen over other terms such
as "hybrid" or "composite," should not be construed restrictively, as
certain authors have done. Thus this category includes political entities
where two or more systems apply cumulatively or interactively, but also
entities where there is a juxtaposition of systems as a result of more or less
clearly defined fields of application.
Ottawa Website, supra note 6.
14. Actually, the Ottawa website describes the legal affiliation of232 "political
entities," rather than the 191 jurisdictions recognized by the United Nations. In this
regard, the Ottawa website states:
The term 'political entities' refers to countries but it can also refer to
political subdivisions of countries as well. Indeed, it seemed important to
identify the legal system of a number of non-independent territories (some
of which even enjoy varying degrees of autonomy), either because their
geographic location obscures their connection to the legal systems of
distant countries (e.g., the French territories in the Pacific Ocean, Indian
Ocean or West Indies) or because they belong to a federal or other
political structure, yet their legal system has acquired or maintained
distinct characteristics within such structure (e.g., Quebec, which is a
mixed law jurisdiction whose general law, at least in important areas
pertaining particularly but not exclusively to private law, is essentially a
product of codified civil law while, in the rest of Canada, general law is
essentially based on the common law).
Id.
Notwithstanding the value of the University's sub-categorization of the
political regions in this manner, I have consolidated the various
"territories" into their parent sovereigns, so that the "percentage of
nations" numbers are calculated based on a denominator of 191, rather
than 232. So, for instance, in the subsequent percentages of nations with
common law systems, the United States, Puerto Rico, and Guam all count
as only one nation. Likewise, in the percentages of nations with civil law
systems, France, Guyana, and Martinique all count as only one nation, and
so on.
15. The three nations which are not listed as having any form of either
Common Law or Civil Law are Andorra (purely customary), and the "pure" Muslim
Law nations of Afghanistan and Maldives Islands. Id. This data would appear to
be based on the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which was toppled by
coalition forces in 2001, in the aftermath of the events of September 11,2001. The
current government in place in Afghanistan is the interim Islamic Transitional State
of Afghanistan. A constitution was signed on January 16, 2004. However, the
future of Afghanistan's judiciary and legal system is unknown at present. See CIA,
The World Factbook: Afghanistan, at
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/af.html#Govt (last visited May
1, 2005). The constitution does provide that Muslim Law is to play a dominant
role. See Afghanistan Const., available at http://www.constitution-
afg.com/resrouces/Draft.Constitution.pdf. Article one of the new constitution
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have some form of either civil law or common law. This represents
98.43% of all nations of the world. 16 The population measure is even
more impressive-99.56% of the population lives in a jurisdiction
which utilizes a civil law system, common law system, or
combination of the two, with some nations having other elements of
indigenous customary law, or Muslim law, mixed into the system.'7
Hence, literally all corners of the earth have been touched by either
the Common Law or Civil Law systems.
Common law (exclusive of any Civil Law), whether in "pure" or
"mixed" form, is utilized by some fifty-one nations, or 26.7% of all
nations of the world."s These nations account for 34.81% of the
world's population. 9 These aggregate numbers are derived by
adding together four combinations of nations: (1) Common Law
(including the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia,
and Ireland); (2) mixed systems of Common Law, Muslim law, and
local Customary law (including India, Kenya, Malaysia and Nigeria);
(3) mixed systems of Common Law and local Customary Law
(including Ghana, Myanmar, Nepal, Tanzania, and Uganda); and (4)
mixed systems of Common Law and Muslim Law (including
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Singapore, and Sudan)."0
Civil law (exclusive of any Common Law), whether in "pure" or
"mixed" form, is utilized by some 115 nations, or 60.21% of all
nations of the world.2' These nations account for 59.01% of the
world's population.22 These aggregate numbers are derived by
adding together yet another four combinations of nations: (1) Civil
Law (most of Continental Europe, Asia, Central America, and South
America, including Argentina, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Colombia,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, Peru, Poland,
Romania, Russia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Vietnam);
(2) mixed systems of Civil Law and local Customary Law (including
China, Congo, Ethiopia, Japan, North Korea, South Korea,
provides that the new nation shall be an Islamic republic, and article three provides
that "In Afghanistan, no law can be contrary to the sacred religion of Islam and the
values of this Constitution." Id. arts. 1, 3.
16. See Ottawa Website, supra note 6.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. The breakdowns for these categories were as follows: twenty-three
nations (pop. 397,652,899) were "pure" Common Law; six nations (pop.
1,231,387,977) were a mixture ofCommon Law, Muslim Law and Customary Law;
fourteen nations (pop. 201,311,714) were a mixture of Common Law and
Customary Law; and eight nations (pop. 329,192,332) were a mixture of Common
Law and Muslim Law. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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Madagascar, and Niger); (3) mixed systems of Civil Law and Muslim
Law (including Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia);
and (4) mixed systems of Civil Law, Muslim Law, and local Customary
Law (including Indonesia).23
Finally, it happens that there are a handful ofjurisdictions which, in
fact, have a legal system which is a mixture of Common Law and Civil
Law. Such a Common Law-Civil Law blended legal system is utilized
by some twenty-two nations, or 11.52% of all nations of the world.24
These nations account for 5.74% of the world's population.25 These
aggregate numbers are derived by adding together the following four
combinations of nations: (1) mixed systems of Civil Law and Common
Law (including Philippines, South Africa, and Thailand);26 (2) mixed
systems of Civil Law, Common Law, and Customary Law (including
Cameroon, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe); (3) mixed systems of Civil Law,
Common Law, and Muslim Law (including Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia,
Somalia, and Yemen); and (4) mixed systems of Civil Law, Common
Law, and Talmudic Law (including only Israel).27
The statistics thus bear out the proposition that Common Law and
Civil Law are the two dominant legal systems of the world. For this
reason, I have formulated my thesis so as to constrain myself to an
observation of which of these two dominant legal system
models--Common Law or Civil Law-is more suited to serve the
needs of the international community in the form of a new, global
commercial system. This is with all due respect for the localized
indigenous practices which comprise the various Customary Laws and
certainly also with due respect for the religious-based legal systems
such as Muslim Law and Talmudic Law. In fact, these systems will
almost certainly continue to have a sweeping influence.28 Recognition
23. Id. The breakdowns for these categories were as follows: seventy-five
nations (pop. 1,453,545,340) were "pure" Civil Law; twenty-five nations (pop.
1,771,184,518) were a mixture of Civil Law and Customary Law; eleven nations
(pop. 199,732,510) were a mixture of Civil Law and Muslim Law; and four nations
(pop. 237,016,553) were a mixture of Civil Law, Muslim Law, and Customary
Law. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. In fact, the Ottawa website also includes Louisiana, Quebec, and
Scotland in this category. While I have included those territories' populations in
the numbers above, I have not included them as nations.
27. Id. The breakdowns for these categories were as follows: eleven nations
(pop. 178,686,772) were a mixture of only Civil Law and Common Law; five
nations (pop. 49,542,339) were a mixture of Civil Law, Common Law, and
Customary Law; five nations (pop. 121,898,071) were a mixture of Civil Law,
Common Law, and Muslim Law; and one nation, Israel, (pop. 6,029,529) was a
mixture of Civil Law, Common Law, and Talmudic Law. Id.
28. See Charles H. Koch, Jr., Envisioning a GlobalLegal Culture, 25 Mich. J.
Int'l Law 1, 76 (2003).
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must also be here given to the fact that in many respects I am engaging
in gross oversimplification-in the strictest sense it is not correct to
simply say that all parts of the world are governed by either common
law or civil law.29 And, even within the systems which have here been
classified as either fully or partly "common" or "civil," there exists
greater heterogeneities within these systems." However, given the
dominance of the Civil Law and the Common Law, it seems certain that
a future international commercial legal system will bear the
characteristics of one of these systems or the other.
B. Basic Origins, Precepts, and Characteristics of the Common
Law System
1. Historical Roots
As I assume that much of my audience consists of common law
lawyers, any explanation of the common law system need not be
Strong and influential alternatives to these transatlantic cultures [i.e.,
common law and civil law] will no doubt cause continual reworking of the
global legal culture. Islamic law, for example, covers in some way
perhaps a billion people, nearly 19% of the world's population, or the
same as the coverage of the common law. It has shown a resilience and
adaptability that guarantees that it will be a major factor in the final design
of the world legal culture. The Hindu legal family is said to cover 450
million people-a greater population than the U.S. or all the E.U.
countries combined. A variety of indigenous legal cultures may emerge
from under superficial acceptance of the European legal systems. Non-
transatlantic instincts, such as the Chinese and Japan [sic) exultation of
cooperative values over individuality, will also increasingly vie for [a]
place in the world's legal philosophy. And history and humility tell us that
there are influences, philosophies, and value systems that cannot now be
identified which will someday change, perhaps radically, the make up of
the legal system.
Id.
29. See Frederick H. Lawson, A Common Lawyer Looks at the Civil Law 3
(1955). As Lawson stated in his widely-cited lecture:
Accordingly, one is tempted to say that with certain exceptions western
law now prevails everywhere, and that it falls into two blocs, the Common
Law bloc and the Civil Law bloc. That is, however, not correct: the
Scandinavian laws, though slightly influenced by both blocs, are really
independent; and there are many systems, some of considerable
importance, which are hybrids, as it were balanced between the two blocs
and possessing many of the characteristics of both. Such are Scots, the
Roman-Dutch Law of South Africa and Ceylon, and the law of Quebec,
all of which, though originally civilian, have suffered the impact of
English Law, and the Laws of Louisiana, Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone,
and the Philippines, which have been brought within the American orbit.
Id.
30. Id.
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overly comprehensive. Nevertheless, a few comments are in order,
for purposes of a later comparison with essential components of the
Civil Law system. It is generally accepted that the Common Law
system originated in England. At least parts of the British territory
were, at one time, part of the Roman Empire.3 With the eventual fall
of the Roman Empire, and the concomitant loss of its grip on political
control and organization in Western Europe, including Britain, came
the "de-legalization" of culture and society generally, and the descent
into what is known colloquially as the "Dark Ages." 12 Many factors,
including the rise of Islam in the seventh century, and the rise of
Norse savagery, with the accompanying seizure of control of much
of the Mediterranean Sea, began to isolate Western Europe, including
Britain, from its eastern brethren in the former Roman Empire.33 As
was stated by Pirenne in his work, Economic and Social History of
Medieval Europe:
It is quite plain, from such evidence as we possess, that from
the end of the eighth century western Europe had sunk back
into a purely agricultural state. Land was the sole source of
substance and the sole condition of wealth. All classes of
population, from the Emperor, who had no other revenues
than those derived from his landed property, down to the
humblest serf, lived directly or indirectly on the products of
the soil, whether they raised them by their labor, or confined
themselves to collecting and consuming them. Moveable
wealth no longer played any part in common economic life.
All social existence was founded on property or on the
possession of land.34
Because of this development into an agrarian-based society, Britain,
like much of Western Europe, developed into such a state that
markets, and sales and purchases generally, were relatively rare,
being only necessary in the event of a personal financial calamity.
35
Because there were no markets, and thus no systematically, recurring
commercial transactions, there also came to be no real need for a
system of law in any organized sense, as had existed in the prior days
of the Roman Empire.3W The Anglo-Saxon rule of law, to the extent
31. See Arthur Taylor Von Mehren & James Russell Gordley, The Civil Law
System: An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Law 4 (2d Ed. 1977).
32. See id
33. See id. at 4-5 (citing H. Pirenne, Economic and Social History of Medieval
Europe 4-5 (Clegg Trans., 1937)).
34. H. Pirenne, Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe 7 (1937)
(cited in Von Mehren & Gordley, supra note 31, at 4-5).
35. Von Mehren & Gordley, supra note 31, at 5.
36. Id.
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it existed at all, was highly regional, fragmented, and arbitrary.37 The
systems for resolving disputes were quite crude, as the society during
this time was quite crude by modem standards.38 This was
attributable in large part to the feudal societal structure, which tended
to decentralize the region and prevent the rulers from exercising
effective control.39 The legal order of the day tended towards
primitive processes, such as vengeance, compurgation, the ordeal,
and the hue and cry.4" In short, it has been described as "barbarian
law.,,4
It was not until the English conquest of William from Normandy
in 1066, that outside stimuli began to affect the prevailing systems
there. This is the year commonly identified as the year that the
common law tradition commenced. 42  The Normans, unlike the
indigenous Anglo-Saxons they conquered, were able administrators
37. See W. Freeman Galpin, A History of England 54-60 (1938).
38. Id.
It is important for the student, at this point, to divorce from his mind all
present day concepts of law and court actions, as the great majority of
these were totally unknown to the Saxons. Theirs was a simple life and
there was no reason for an elaborate system of courts or laws.
Id. at 56-57.
39. Id. at 54.
40. Id. at 58-60. Compurgation consisted of sworn, formal oaths by others as
to the conduct made the basis of the trial. The ordeal was even more emblematic
of the crudity of the Saxon legal system-it involved applying a hot iron to the
hands, or perhaps being tossed in a pond, and determining if the accused was
burned, or if he floated, for purposes of determining his innocence or liability.
Obviously, most of these methods lacked any probative value in the actual
evidentiary sense, but rather were viewed as "appeal[s] to God who was known to
have wreaked vengeance upon those who had knowingly wreaked vengeance upon
those who had knowingly perjured themselves. It took courage to defy the wrath
of Providence unless one was quite certain of the innocence of the accused." Id. at
58-59. See also Dorothy Whitelock, The Beginnings of English Society 142 (1976
ed.) (also describing the "ordeal of hot water," in which the accused "plunged his
hand into boiling water to take out a stone. The hand was bound up, and if the
wound had healed after three days without festering, the man was cleared of the
charge."); Frederick W. Maitland & Francis C. Montague, A Sketch of English
Legal History 48-49 (1915) (describing ordeals and noting "[w]e cannot but guess
that it was well to be good friends with the priest when one went to the ordeal.").
41. Rene David & John E.C. Brierly, Major Legal Systems in the World
Today: An Introduction to the Study of Comparative Law 287-88 (2d ed. 1978).
42. Merryman, supra note 4, at 3. This is not to say that the seeds for the
common law may not have been germinated sooner. In fact, it has been claimed
that "[t]he origins of the common law can be traced at least from Aristotle and
Cicero through the Book of Exodus." M. Stuart, The Vital Common Law: Its Role
in a Statutory Age, 18 U. Ark. Little Rock L. J. Rev. 555, 572 (1996) (citing
Aristotle, The Nichomachean Ethics, Book V (1947); Cicero, De Legibus 114, 10
(quoted in Benjamin Fletcher Wright, Jr., American Interpretations ofNatural Law:
A Study in the History of Political Thought 5 (1931)); Exodus 22:9 (quoted in
James J. Restivo, Jr., InsuringPunitive Damages, Nat'l L.J., July24, 1995 at C-l)).
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which quickly claimed a centralized monarchical and political power
over all the British territory.4" Much of the early thrust of English
political influence was directed toward the increasing centralization
and unification of the English royal governmental structure and
processes. 44 The Norman rulers quickly discovered that the state of
the rule of law in England was in dire straits-it was said by a writer
of the time that "definite truth of the law can seldom be found."45 It
has further been stated that "in the early twelfth century men in
England had every reason to be bewildered by the law."'
Accordingly, one of the Normans' most critical and influential
efforts was the creation of the king's court, devised in order to
impose orderly judicial rule.47 Serving at the pleasure of the throne,
these royal courts began to exercise competing jurisdiction with the
local, feudal courts of the pre-Norman period. 48  The initial
assumption of jurisdiction of these courts was a delicate matter, and
initially much effort was directed at not stepping lightly around areas
still adjudged by the Saxon-era courts.4 Under Henry I, at the
beginning of the twelfth century, the royal courts began to travel to
the various municipalities in the country so as to hear local disputes.5 °
Unlike the older Saxon courts, which rendered decisions in an often
arbitrary and inconsistent manner, the new royal courts began
applying a uniform, or "common" law, throughout England, with the
purpose of normalizing and unifying the law for the entire country.5'
43. Von Mehren & Gordley, supra note 31, at 12. One of the ways in which
William quickly weakened the populace was to subdivide England into
approximately 15,000 separate estates, making each separate "fief' so small that it
would not have sufficient resources or power to provide a meaningfully substantive
challenge to the king's supremacy and dominion. See Neipert, supra note 12, at 14.
44. Von Mehren & Gordley, supra note 31, at 12. The English region was
highly compartmentalized at the time of William's invasion and was divided for
legal purposes into "the law of Wessex, the law of Mercia, and the Danelaw." H.
J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition
406 (1983).
45. R. C. Van Caenegem, The Birth of the English Common Law 17 (2d ed.
1988).
46. Id. (citing H.A. Cronne, The Reign of Stephen 1135-54: Anarchy in
England 253 (London, 1970)).
47. Von Mehren & Gordley, supra note 31, at 12.
48. Id. Initially, three separate types of royal courts were created: the Court
of Exchequer, the Court of Common Pleas, and the Court of King's Bench. David
& Brierly, supra note 41, at 291. These were originally created to hear cases on
"royal finances, matters respecting the ownership and possession of land and
serious criminal matters affecting the peace of the kingdom," respectively, though
eventually all three branches attained concurrent jurisdiction. Id.
49. See id.
50. Von Mehren & Gordley, supra note 31, at 12. See also Van Caenegem,
supra note 45, at 18-22.
51. Von Mehren & Gordley, supra note 31, at 12.
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The English citizenry gradually began to prefer these royal
courts over the older Saxon-era courts, perceiving them as superior
sources of adjudicatory and enforcement power.5 Thus, the royal
courts eventually became the main courts in England, and the older,
Saxon-era courts eventually ceased to have any importance.53 This
new uniform and superior law adjudicated by the royal courts,
"common to all the realm," began to completely subsume and
displace all of the "petty local and tribal peculiarities of which
English law, at the time of the Conquest, [had been] full. '5 4 Thus,
from the coronation of Henry I in 1100, through the death of Henry
Il in 1272, the royal courts "declared the Common Law of
England."55  Eventually, of course, with the advent of British
imperialism, the common law system was transplanted far and wide,
such that "the sun never set on the British empire," nor on some land
which utilized the common law system.56
52. David & Brierly, supra note 41, at 291.
The courts were also prompted to increase their jurisdiction upon the
solicitation of the people in whose eyes royal justice appeared superior to
that of the other court. It was only the royal courts that had the means to
summon witnesses and to enforce judgments; and only the king, apart
from the church, could require the swearing of an oath.
Id.
53. Id. at 292. See also Maitland & Montague, supra note 40, at 81-82 ("The
king's courts have been fast becoming the only judicial tribunals of any great
importance... the small freeholder.., could here obtain a stronger and better
commodity than any that was to be had elsewhere, ajustice which, as men reckoned
in those days, was swift and masterful.") (citing Pollock and Maitland, History of
English Law, 1., 202-03).
54. Von Mehren & Gordley, supra note 31, at 13 (citing E. Jenks, Law and
Politics in the Middle Ages 36 (2d ed. 1913)).
55. Id. (citing Jenks, supra note 54, at 38). See also Merryman, supra note 4,
at 50:
The Norman conquerors of England at the Battle of Hastings quickly set
about centralizing the government, including the administration ofjustice.
They established royal courts and a system of royal justice that gradually
displaced the old feudal courts and rules. In the process of centralizing
English justice, the judges of the royal courts developed new procedures
and remedies and a new body of substantive law applicable, at least in
theory, to all Englishmen. For this reason it was called the common law.
56. Koch, supra note 28, at 20 (citing H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions ofthe
World: Sustainable Diversity in Law 228-29 (2000)).
The common law expanded throughout much of the world as a result of
the British empire .... The result ... was a kind of embedding of
common law thinking in a large number of diverse societies around the
world. ... What has happened, generally, is the marriage of the idea of
a common law with that of multiple nation-states, and the marriage has
been at times a difficult one.
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2. Basic Mechanics of the Common Law System
What were, and are, the attributes of this system known as "the
Common Law"? The answer is derived from the historical workings
of the early court system in England. Early on, the royal courts
developed a system of several dozen specific writs-i.e., court orders
for relief-which could be issued to a litigant.57 Only cases which
had factual patterns matching one of these situations could be granted
relief via a writ.58 As a result, the early royal courts in the first two
centuries after the Norman conquest began to pay particularly close
attention to the different fact scenarios involved in the cases before
them.59 As the case load increased, the royal courts turned to an
innovation in the interest of judicial efficiency-once the courts
decided a particular dispute, all subsequent disputes would be
decided in the exact same way, thereby eliminating the need for the
judge to ever address that particular issue in any comprehensive
manner again.' Indeed, based on the lack of any other written source
of law, the English adherence to precedence seems logical.6 As
early as the thirteenth century, Judge Bracton stated the principle in
his incomparable treatise of the day:
[If any new and unwonted circumstances.., shall arise, then
if anything analogous has happened before, let the case be
adjudged in like manner (sit amen Sicilia evenerint per simile
iudicentur), since it is a good opportunity for proceeding from
like to like (a similibus ad Sicilia).62
However, it was actually not until the sixteenth century that case
decisions began to be reported in print and available to
lawyers-before this, the lawyers and judges simply worked from
memory of the professionals and the official case file record.63
Nevertheless, it is seen that early on the common law embraced
the doctrine of stare decisis, defined thusly: "The doctrine of
precedent, under which it is necessary for a court to follow earlier
judicial decisions when the same points arise again in litigation. '
57. See Neipert, supra note 12, at 15. Neipert states that there were fifty-six
such writs. Id.
58. Id. See also David & Brierly, supra note 41, at 292-94; Maitland &
Montague, supra note 40, at 90-101.
59. Neipert, supra note 12, at 15.
60. Id. at 15-16.
61. See Maitland & Montague, supra note 40, at 87.
62. Arthur R. Hogue, Origins of the Common Law 200 (1966).
63. Id. at 202.
64. Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). See also William M. Lile et al.,
Brief Making and the Use of Law Books 321 (3d ed. 1914).
The rule of adherence to judicial precedents finds its expression in the
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The common law system has been described as the process of applying
rules derived from case precedents, to new factual situations, all for the
purpose of producing uniform, consistent, and certain results.65
Champions of the common law method of law-making and case
resolution often praise it as being dynamic and ever-evolving, able to
adjust to new situations which have been previously unaddressed by
legal rules or principles.66 Indeed, part of this dynamism is in the fact
that common law courts and scholars have even imbued the rule of
stare decisis, though it is the certainty-imbuing mechanism of the
common law, with limitations.67 As the United States Supreme Court
doctrine of stare decisis. This doctrine is simply that, when a point or
principle of law has been once officially decided or settled by the ruling
of a competent court in a case in which it is directly and necessarily
involved, it will no longer be considered as open to examination or to a
new ruling by the same tribunal, or by those which are bound to follow its
adjudications, unless it be for urgent reasons and in exceptional cases.
Id.
65. Hogue, supra note 62, at 245 (citing Mirehouse v. Rennell, 1 Cl. & F. 527,
546 (1833)). See also David & Brierly, supra note 41, at 348-49. Sir Frederick
Pollock stated: "The [common law] judgment looks forward as well as backward.
It not only ends the strife of the parties but lays down the law for similar cases in
the future." Maitland & Montague, supra note 40, at 84-85 (citing Sir Frederick
Pollock, Expansion of the Common Law 46-50).
66. See, e.g., Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 456 A.2d 894,903
(Md. 1983) (citing Felder v. Butler, 438 A.2d 494 (Md. App. 1981)) ("[T]he
common law is not static; its life and heart is its dynamism---its ability to keep pace
with the world while constantly searching for just and fair solutions to pressing
societal problems.").
67. See Boblitz v. Boblitz, 462 A.2d 506, 526 (Md. 1983) (quoted in
Madden, supra note 42, at 590):
Notwithstanding the great importance ofthe doctrine of stare decisis, we
have never construed it to inhibit us from changing or modifying a
common law rule byjudicial decision where we find, in light of changed
conditions or increased knowledge, that the rule has become unsound in
the circumstances of modem life, a vestige of the past, no longer
suitable to our people.
As Oliver Wendell Holmes put it more forcefully:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it
was laid down in the time in Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the
rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Collected Papers 187 (1920) (quoted in Madden,
supra note 42, at 590 n. 165).
Thus, the American experience with stare decisis has been a lukewarm one,
which has been whittled away by scholars and judges alike. See John Henry
Wigmore, Problems of Law 79 (1920):
Is the judge to be bound by his precedent? This part of the question
ought not to trouble us overmuch. Stare decisis, as an absolute dogma,
has seemed to me an unreal fetich. The French Civil Code expressly
repudiates it; and, though French and other Continentaljudges do follow
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has stated, albeit in the context of constitutional interpretation: "[t]he
doctrine of stare decisis is essential to the respect accorded to the
judgments of the Court and to the stability of the law. It is not,
however, an inexorable command." '68
It does seem as though, in reality, common law judges do not
follow prior decisions as dogmatically as the theoretical conventions
precedents to some extent, they do so presumably only to the extent that
justice requires it for safety's sake. Stare decisis is said to be
indispensable for securing certainty to the application of the law. But
the sufficient answer is that it has not in fact secured it. Ourjudicial law
is as uncertain as any law could well be. We possess all the detriment
of uncertainty, which stare decisis was supposed to avoid, and also all
the detriment of ancient law-lumber, which stare decisis concededly
involves-the government of the living by the dead, as Herbert Spencer
has called it.
See also Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 149-51
(1921):
I think adherence to precedent should be the rule and not the exception
.... But I am ready to concede that the rule of adherence to precedent,
though it ought not to be abandoned, ought to be in some degree relaxed
... . There should be greater readiness to abandon an untenable
position when the rule to be discarded may not reasonably be supposed
to have determined the conduct of the litigants, and particularly when in
its origin it was the product of institutions or conditions which have
gained a new significance or development with the progress of the years.
See also Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 382, 54 S. Ct. 212, 215 (1934)
("That this court and the other federal courts, in this situation and by right of their
own powers, may decline to enforce the ancient rule of the common law under
conditions as they now exist we think is not fairly open to doubt.").
68. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,577, 123 S. Ct. 2472,2483 (2003) (citing
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991)) ("Stare
decisis is not an inexorable command; rather, it 'is a principle of policy and not a
mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision."').
The Court noted, however, that "when a Court is asked to overrule a precedent
recognizing a constitutional liberty interest, individual or societal reliance on the
existence of that liberty cautions with particular strength against reversing course."
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2483 (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833,855-56, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2809(1992)). The Court cautioned
that "[1]iberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt." Id. It should be noted
that the English courts are far more vigilant about upholding the rule of stare
decisis:
[W]e must apply those rules, to all cases which arise; and we are not at
liberty to abandon all analogy to them, in those to which they have not yet
been judicially applied, because we think that the rules are not as
convenient and reasonable as we ourselves could have devised. It appears
to me to be of great importance to keep this principle steadily in view, not
merely for the determination of the particular case, but for the interests of
law as a science.
Hogue, supra note 62, at 245 (citing Mirehouse v. Rennell, I Cl. & F. 527, 546
(1833)).
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of common law ideology and stare decisis would otherwise
command.69
This system of constant potential for change, while celebrated as
a virtue among those who praise the common law's adaptability, is
not without its historical critics. Jeremy Bentham, the English
codification proponent, for instance, is said to have observed:
"Common law judges make law as a man makes laws for his dog.
When a dog does anything you want to break him of, you wait till he
does it, and then you beat him for it."7 Nevertheless, this system of
precedent is the lifeblood of the operation of the common law, and it
has persevered in the entire English-speaking world and elsewhere
for centuries. The use of prior precedent as authoritative in future
cases "is the distinctive feature of a common law legal system."'" So,
quite simply, common law is "judge-made" law.72 Cases are law.73
69. Koch, supra note 28, at 51. Sereni sheds further light on the historical
context of stare decisis: "The rule of stare decisis . . . is of comparatively recent
origin; it developed slowly in England during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries; it was finally established there at a time when the law was almost entirely
unwritten and precedents were few." Angelo Piero Sereni, The Code and the Case
Law, in The Code Napoleon and the Common-Law World 66 (Bernard Schwartz
ed., 1956). The American experience has been complex:
In the United States the rule of stare decisis was never rigidly followed,
probably because of the fact that the vesting of the legislative power in
Congress from the very origin of the Republic was not challenged by the
courts, and because of the substantial number of statutes enacted in this
country since its early days. Furthermore, the great number of cases
officially reported tends somewhat to impair the binding force of judge-
made law, and the increasingly rapid pace at which the law changes tends
to shorten the period during which most cases may be considered as
authorities.
Id.
70. Lawrence M. Friedman, American Law 93 (1984).
71. Benjamin P. Friedman, Fishkin and Precedent: Liberal Political Theory
and the Normative Uses of History, 42 Emory L.J. 647, 673 (1993) (citing
Precedent in Law 1 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987)).
72. See, e.g., Spokane Methodist Homes, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 501
P.2d 589 (Wash. 1972) ("It is fundamental that the rules of common law which are
court-made rules, can be changed by the court when it becomes convinced that the
policies upon which they are based have lost their validity or were mistakenly
conceived."); see also Madden, supra note 42, at 555 ("[T]he common law... [is]
the judge-made law of property, contracts, torts and beyond."). Different scholars
andjurists have defined the common law differently. For instance, Richard Posner
defined it as "any body of law created primarily through judges by their decisions
rather than by the framers of statutes or constitutions." Richard A. Posner, The
Problems of Jurisprudence 247 (1990). Professor Madden stated that "[t]he
common law is often called 'judge-made' law, to distinguish it from statutes,
regulations and ordinances, which are enacted by state and federal legislatures,
agencies and political subdivisions." Madden, supra note 42, at 558. Arthur
Corbin, in a pragmatic manner, suggested that "the common law is not a body of
rules; it is a method. It is the creation of law by the inductive process." Richard A.
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3. Legislation in Common Law Systems
There are, of course, statutes in common law jurisdictions.74
However, by and large, the common law is the comprehensive
backdrop of law in such jurisdictions:
As a rule a common-law statute does not propose completely
to supersede the pre-existing traditional law governing the
topics covered by it, nor does it propose to lay down general
principles of its own; on the contrary, it presupposes the
existence of general principles, relating to the topic covered
by it, that are part of the traditional common law predating
the statute itself, and that may or may not have crystallized
into precise legal rules. The statute is meant to be understood
and construed against the background and to operate within
the framework of such prior law. Thus, the general principles
underlying the statute are to be found within the realm of the
traditional unwritten law, while the main function of the
statutory provisions is that of clarifying doubtful points,
settling the law with regard to particular questions relating
thereto, and implementing pre-existing rules and principles."
One state supreme court justice, speaking over twenty years ago,
observed that in the cases before her court, only about ten percent of
such cases were "purely common law," with statutes bearing some
relevance to the balance of the disputes.76 Nevertheless, even so, the
presence of statutes does not change the fundamental nature of the
common law adjudicatory method, nor the manner in which courts
are empowered to invoke wide-ranging interpretations and resort to
prior precedents for aid in resolving disputes. The common law still
"represents the largest proportion of property, contracts and torts. 77
Cosgrove, Our Lady the Common Law: An Anglo-American Community
1870-1930 at 39 (1987) (quoting Arthur Corbin, What is the Common Law? 75).
73. Koch, supra note 28, at 51.
74. See Merryman, supra note 4, at 26 ("There is probably at least as much
legislation in force in a typical American state as there is in a typical European or
Latin American nation.").
75. Sereni, supra note 69, at 58-59. See also David & Brierly, supra note 41,
at 354-58.
76. Ellen Ash Peters, Common Law Judging in a Statutory World: An Address,
43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 995, 996 (1982) (commenting on cases before the Connecticut
Supreme Court).
77. See Madden, supra note 42, at 558. Professor Madden's observation came
with a rather sizable caveat insofar as this conclusion related to the law ofcontracts.
Namely, in order for the observation to be accurate in regard to the law of contracts,
the presence of the Uniform Commercial Code must be considered to be a
"crystallization of the common law of sales, negotiable instruments, secured
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Indeed, since much legislation is concerned with public interests
such as criminal prohibitions, environmental protections,
employment relations, securities regulation, and the like, it has been
said that legislatures in Anglo-American legislatures seem largely
to "leave individual pursuit[s] of monetary or injunctive relief to
existing common law.""8
Even where there are statutes in common law jurisdictions, they
are "organic, a living creature."7 9 Statutes, where applicable, do in
theory govern preemptively, but even then cases may add "judicial
gloss" to the statute by way of interpretation."0 That is, in the words
of one observer, "[t]he U.S. approach [to statutory language] easily
recognizes the need for judicial adaptation. It has not committed
itself to a stable approach to statutory interpretation."'" In the
United States system, at least, judges often balance the interests
advanced by the statute in question, rather than simply adducing the
grammatical meaning of the provision.82  Here, there is great
internal debate in the common law system between jurists willing to
liberally construe statutory language and those who cling more
fervently to a strict constructionist approach. 3 Nevertheless, the
presence of statutes in common law jurisdictions, though undeniably
affecting the common law, has not fundamentally transformed its
basic essence and the law-making effect of case decisions.
interests, and the like." Id, at 558 n.15. If not, then quite obviously much of
modem American contract law has been subsumed within the Uniform Commercial
Code's statutory framework.
78. Id. at 559.
79. Koch, supra note 28, at 42.
80. See 15A Am. Jur. 2d Common Law § 1 (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Strnad, 876 P.2d 1362 (Kan. 1994); State v. Lawrence, 565 P.2d 989 (Idaho
1977); Wagner Bros., Inc. v. City of Williston, 335 N.W.2d 328 (N.D. 1983);
Senearv. Daily Journal-American, a Division ofLongview Pub. Co., 641 P.2d 1180
(Wash. 1982); H. Marlow Green, Can the Common Law Survive in the Modern
Statutory Environment?, 8 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 89 (1998); Madden, supra
note 42, at 55).
81. Koch, supra note 28, at 42.
82. Id. (citing Cass Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103
Harv. L. Rev. 495, 456 (1989)).
83. Koch, supra note 28, at 54.
U.S. jurisprudence also struggles with the overall confusion created by
judicial law making. Justice Scalia of the United States Supreme Court
has been a strong advocate for judicial faithfulness to [statutory] language.
For example, in his concurring opinion in Convoy v. Aniskoff, he criticized
the Court for not adhering to the literal language of the statute. He argued
that free-wheeling interpretation "undermines the clarity of law."
Id. (quoting Convoy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 518-19, 113 S. Ct. 1562,
1567 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)).
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4. Equitable Powers of the Courts
The influence of the common law judge is even more impressive
when her equitable powers are taken into account. Judges in the
common law tradition have such equitable powers inherent in their
judicial authority, in addition to the powers to decide disputes
according to fixed legal principles.8 4 This power of equity gives the
common law judge the ability to ameliorate the perceived harshness
of a legal rule in the context of a particular set of factual
circumstances, so as to achieve justice in the context of an individual
dispute." The common law judge's equitable powers are even seen
as giving her the ability to "interpret and reinterpret in order to make
the law respond to social change."86 While this poses the potential
for tension between the twin desires for certainty and justice in the
law, in the common law system the mandate to maintain the balance
between these two competing interests is set squarely at the feet of
the common law judge.87 Hence, the maintenance of balance
between these two tensions is yet another responsibility of the
common law judge, and yet another source of wide discretion and
power within the operation of the common law system.
5. The Role of the Court and Judges in the Common Law
System
From the foregoing, it is perhaps unsurprising that one of the
enduring characteristics of the common law system is our reverence
for, and even glorification of, judges and the judicial function. In the
United States, and at least historically in England, judges at certain
levels are heroes of the culture, at least the legal culture. "Many of
the great names of the common law are those of judges: Coke,
Mansfield, Marshall, Story, Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo." s The
reasons for this, given the mechanics of the common law system, are
obvious. The judges are the creators of the law, with deference to the
legislature's role. 9 It has been stated that the common law arose, at
84. See Merryman, supra note 4, at 51. The development of equitable
principles in the common law stems from the courts of chancery in England, which
themselves were an evolution from the system whereby the king's chancellor was
appointed to hear petitions from Englishmen who pleaded for relief from the harsh
effects of the application upon them of a principle of the common law. Id. at
50-51. See also Maitland & Montague, supra note 40, at 120-21.
85. Merryman, supra note 4, at 51. See also David & Brierly, supra note 41,
at 300-05; Maitland & Montague, supra note 40, at 125-28.
86. Merryman, supra note 4, at 51.
87. Id. at51-52.
88. Id. at 34.
89. Id. See also Von Mehren & Gordley, supra note 31, at 1146 ("The
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least in part, out of an inherent suspicion of democratically elected
majority rule, and, at least by implication, the legislative function.9 °
In the American experience, the judicial system has been a stimulus
for the advancement and safeguarding of civil liberties.91 As John
Henry Merryman observed:
We know that our legal tradition was originally created and
has grown and developed in the hands of judges, reasoning
closely from case to case and building a body of law that
binds subsequentjudges, through the doctrine of stare decisis,
to decide similar cases similarly. We know that there is an
abundance of legislation in force, and we recognize that there
is a legislative function. But to us the common law means the
law created and molded by judges, and we still think (often
quite inaccurately) of legislation as serving a kind of
supplementary function. We are accustomed, in the common
law world, to judicial review of administrative action, and in
the United States the power of judges to hold legislation
invalid if unconstitutional is accepted without serious
question. We know that our judges exercise very broad
interpretive powers, even where the applicable statute or
administrative action is found to be legally valid. We do not
like to use such dramatic phrases as "judicial supremacy," but
when pushed to it we admit that this is a fair description of
the common law system, particularly in the United States.92
The fact that judges are held in such high regard in common law
jurisdictions is, of course, a function of the reality that they are an
indispensable part of operating the common law system. However,
it also stems largely from the success that they have had in the
practice of law before assuming the bench. Judges in common law
jurisdictions have generally attended law school and had successful
careers as practicing attorneys.93  Further, in common law
common law is a monument to the judicial activity of the common-law judge. He,
not the legislator or the scholar, created the common law. He still enjoys the
prestige of that accomplishment.").
90. See Koch, supra note 28, at 56-57 (citing Martin Vranken, Fundamentals
of European Civil Law and Impact of the European Community 63 (1997)).
91. Koch, supra note 28, at 57. Though the prospect for judicial abuses is
acknowledged even in common law jurisdictions, the shining role that the court
system has had in the American experience has led to the characterization of the
judicial arm of government as the "least dangerous" branch. See id. (citing
Alexander M. Brickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1962) ("Brickel's famous and
perhaps elitist characterization incorporates the notion that courts are also
dangerous but somewhat more trustworthy than the democratic institutions.").
92. Merryman, supra note 4, at 34.
93. Id. See also Koch, supra note 28, at 59 ("The common law judiciary has
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jurisdictions,judges generally attain their office through, in part, their
successful practice, but also in large part through peer reputation, and
even influence in political circles. 4 It is rare for someone to become
a judge early in his or her career, and certainly virtually unheard of
to take the bench directly after law school. Rather, becoming ajudge
is often a "crowning achievement," bringing a great deal of prestige
and esteem. 95 In short, as one of the crafters of the law through the
rendering of adjudications having precedential effect, the judge is a
critical figure in the common law.
6. Summary of Common Law System
In summary, the Common Law derived historically from
medieval England, as a way to provide uniformity-i.e.,
"commonality"-to the law throughout all of England. Its chief
identifying methodological characteristic is its use of stare decisis to
give precedential effect to case decisions, thereby giving them the
force of law. The common law spread throughout much of the world
as a direct result of eighteenth and nineteenth century British
imperialism. Common law systems exalt the role of the judiciary,
which has a very strong influence on the law-giving functions within
government, rivaling and even exceeding the legislatures in this
regard. Because of the largely positive experience with this system
in England, and especially the United States, common law courts and
judges have an esteemed place within government, and even society
itself.
C. Basic Origins, Precepts and Characteristics of the Civil
Law System
1. Roman Origins and the Corpus Juris Civilis
The Civil Law system of legal methodology is the world's oldest
system still in wide practice-it is also the world's most broadly
practiced and implemented system.97 Other than the areas permeated
by British imperialism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
virtually the entire remainder of the world practices some form or
another of civil law, or at least has systems which were, or are,
more status [than the civil law judiciary] in the system.... This status is enhanced
in the legal community by the fact that common law judges come to the bench as
successful members of the practicing bar.").
94. Merryman, supra note 4, at 34.
95. Id.
96. Id at 35.
97. Id. at 2.
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influenced by civil law.98 The system almost certainly has its origins
in the ancient Roman Empire.99 The Romans were quite adept, given
their historical context, at developing legal methodologies and
substantive legal precepts. l° Justinian's great codification in the
sixth century A.D. is often the starting point for a discussion of the
history of the civil law, but that does not go far back enough.'
Rather, the civil law system is said by Merryman to have originated
nearly a millennium earlier, in 450 B.C. when the Twelve Tables
were published in Rome.1"2 This was Rome's first system of written
law, codified around the time the Roman Republic was founded,0 3
shortly before the demise of the original Roman monarchy."° The
process of putting the law of the Republic into written form was
important, as one of its chief functions at the time was to give the
Roman citizenry the means to review the applicable legal standards
of the day. 0 5 The legal principles were literally inscribed onto
98. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
99. See Von Mehren & Gordley, supra note 31, at 4 ("Our sketch [of civil law
history] must begin with the Romans.").
100. Id.
101. Though not often cited in discussions of the history of Civil Law,
Hammurabi's Code far pre-dated the Roman Empire. Hammurabi was a unifying
leader over the ancient kingdom of Babylon (present-day Iraq), and his rule
occurred approximately 3,750 years ago, or in approximately the year 1,750 B.C.
See Neipert, supra note 12, at 5-6. Hammurabi, unlike the arbitrary monarchical
governments of that and subsequent ages, desired a uniform law which would
obtain social justice and protection of human rights. Id. at 6. Therefore, he ordered
the assembling of what has been called "the forerunner of a modem legal code,"
one which contained provisions on family law, inheritances, property law, criminal
law, rules of evidence, womens' and slaves' rights, medical malpractice, lending,
water rights, agricultural activities, minimum wages, principal and agent rules, and
appellate rights. Id. The provisions of the Code of Hammurabi were set forth in
282 separate sections, and were engraved onto stone tablets and set up for public
viewing in Babylon. Id. at 7. Perhaps Hammurabi's contributions to the modem
code, and to the Civil law system itself, are greatly underrated by legal historians.
102. Merryman, supra note 4, at 2.
103. See James Bacchus, Turning to Tacitus, 37 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 631, 644
(2004) (citing Michael Grant IV, Translator's Introduction to Tacitus, The Annals
of Imperial Rome 132 (Michael Grant IV trans., Penguin Books 1996)).
104. See Larry Cata Backer, Retaining Judicial Authority: A Preliminary
Inquiry on the Dominion of Judges, 12 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rts. J. 117, 167 n.211
(2003).
105. Id. See generally Alan Watson, The Law of the Ancient Romans (1970);
Alan Watson, Rome of the XII Tables: Persons and Property (1975) (cited in
Backer, supra note 104, at 167 n.2 11). Henry Maine has suggested that, ultimately,
the benefit of codes in ancient society "was the protection which they afforded
against the frauds of the privileged oligarchy and also against the spontaneous
depravation and debasement of the national institutions." Henry Sumner Maine,
Ancient Law 18 (Transaction Pub. 2002). The law was thought to eventually be
better put in writing and made publicly available, rather than being "deposited with
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twelve stone tablets, which were then affixed in a prominent location
in the city itself, so as to be viewable by all citizens.10 6 The physical
Tables were demolished by the marauding Gauls in 390 B.C.
10 7
However, due to the prior memorization of all the principles
contained in the Tables by Roman citizens, the Twelve Tables had an
enduring influence and continued vitality until the time of Justinian's
great codification and reformation of Roman law.0 8
In 533 A.D., nearly one thousand years after the publication of
the Twelve Tables, the Emperor Justinian published his great
codification, the Corpus Juris Civilis. °9 Justinian had at least two
critical rationales for ordering the codification."0 His first rationale
was that a reformation of Roman law was in order-Justinian
considered the legal system of the day to be corrupt, as a result of
centuries of deterioration and decline. Justinian desired to return
the Roman law to its prior glory at the foundation of the Republic. "2
His second rationale was more pragmatic-he perceived a need for
codification in light of the massive volume of authorities, treatises,
and commentaries on Roman law, many of which differed in opinion,
and even directly contradicted each other. 1 3 These commentaries
were written by the legal scholars of the period, which were called
jurisconsults." 4 Accordingly, Justinian sought to reform the existing
legal precepts and authorities by discarding what he perceived as
incorrect, arcane, or superfluous, and to organize the remainder into
a categorized, systematized whole-i.e., a code." 5
When Justinian's Code was completed, it consisted of
approximately 4,600 sections, which were organized into ten
volumes."16 The Code provisions themselves were written in Latin,
which was the academic language throughout the empire.' 17 Included
in the promulgation of Justinian's Code were: the Institutes (a
the recollection of a privileged oligarchy." Id. at 14.
106. See Barbara R. Hauser, The Tale of the Testament, 12 Probate and Property
58, 62 (Sept./Oct. 1998).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Merryman, supra note 4, at 6-7. The preparation of Justinian's Code was
accomplished under the supervision of the scholar Tribonian. Id.
110. Id. at 7.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. See also Alan Watson, The Evolution of Western Private Law 3 (2001).
116. See Neipert, supra note 12, at 8.
117. Id. The codification in the Latin language would prove useful for the
purpose of the Code's subsequent study in the Renaissance period by European
legal scholars. See infra notes 12-36 and accompanying text.
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treatise-like exposition of the code provisions), the Digest (a
collection of excerpts of writings from scholars on the pre-Justinian
Roman law), and the Codex (an aggregation of royal pronouncements
affecting the law)." 8 Also accompanying the Code provisions were
the Novels, which were declarations of Justinian himself, and were
written in Greek, the language commonly used by ordinary citizens
of the time." 9 The Code was a celebrated achievement of the day
(those sharing this view included Justinian himself). 2 ° One of the
commands Justinian gave regarding the Code was that all pre-Code
authority (which was not incorporated into the code itself or the
supplementary code materials), such as jurisconsult commentary, was
to be thenceforth disregarded as legal authority, persuasive or
otherwise. 2' Justinian's motives in this regard were at least partly
positive-he wanted to obviate the need for the citation of any
authority other than the Code itself, lessening the research burden of
finding the law.'22 Justinian sought not only to abolish prior
commentary, his motive was actually to abolish all prior law itself,
with the Corpus Juris Civilis completely replacing and superseding
all prior law.'23 Justinian even went so far as to have many of the
pre-Code manuscripts and authorities burned in order to effectuate
his pronouncements in this regard.'24 Though he also sought to ban
any subsequent commentary after the promulgation of the Code, he
was utterly unsuccessful, as commentary began to be written almost
as soon as the Code was completed.'25
118. See Lawson, supra note 29, at 10-11. The Digests were especially
important. They included the recommended adjudication of both actual and
hypothetical fact patterns. Id. at 11. "The Digest is the core of the Corpus Juris,
and it is a world in itself Of the same order of size as the Bible, it has meant
different things to different ages, and is almost as exhaustible." Id. at 12.
119. Id. at 11. See also Neipert, supra note 12, at 8.
120. It is from the name of Justinian, that we derive the following words: justice,
jurisprudence, jury, judicial, judge, judgment, etc. See Neipert, supra note 12, at
5, 8. It should be noted, however, that Justinian is not without blemishes on his
historical legacy. Historians note that, in 532 A.D., a large crowd of Roman
citizens assembled in the Hippodrome to demand that a new emperor be appointed.
Id. at 9. The reason they were disgruntled with Justinian's rule was the
extraordinary taxes he had imposed in order to finance various military campaigns
to reacquire certain lands which had previously been lost. Id. at 8-9. In response,
Justinian reputedly loosed a vicious legion of barbaric German mercenaries on the
crowd, resulting in a massacre of approximately 30,000 Roman citizens. Id. at 9.
Any outward signs of protest against Justinian's taxes quickly dissipated. Id.
121. See Merryman, supra note 4, at 7.
122. Id. Of course, it is impossible not to consider that power and ego were not
also driving factors in this monarchical maneuvering.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 7-8.
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2. Revived European Study of the Corpus Juris Civilis
With the fall of the western Roman Empire (succeeded to the
east by the Byzantine empire), all of Western Europe descended into
the Dark Ages. 26 Much interest in law and scholarly studies
virtually disappeared during this period, replaced instead by the
force of might and feudal hierarchies.'27 The Roman civil law
remained in the consciousness and memories of the indigenous
peoples of Western Europe, however, and eventually cruder,
"vulgarized" versions of the Roman civil law, mixed with
indigenous cultures and customary law of invading tribes, came to
be practiced in many parts of Western Europe during this period.'28
The revived intellect and scholarly pursuits that came with the
Renaissance in Europe, however, brought with it a renewed spark of
enthusiasm for studying the law in a refined, intellectual manner.129
The first modern-era university was founded in Bologna, Italy at the
end of the eleventh century (not long after the time William was
conquering England).13 ° At Bologna, law was one of the primary
areas of academic interest, and the law which was studied was not
any of the indigenous laws of the various regions or the "vulgarized"
Roman law that had appeared in certain parts of Europe-rather, the
academians turned their attention to Justinian's Corpus Juris
Civilis.13 1 Imerius is given credit for being the first scholar to
provide instruction based on the Roman code.'32 Soon, other
universities in Italy and elsewhere in Europe were founded, and
they, too, studied the Corpus Juris Civilis.'33 So dominant was the
emphasis on studying Roman law, that virtually none of the
126. See Neipert, supra note 12, at 9.
127. Id. "There was a general decline in culture which attended the barbarian
invasions from the fifth century and even earlier, and the diversion to theology of
many of the best brains which might formerly have been attracted to law." Lawson,
supra note 29, at 12.
128. See Merryman, supra note 4, at 8.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 8-9.
131. Id. at 9. See also Neipert, supra note 12, at 9 ("no modem law arose to
take the place of the feudal system. Instead, scholars looked back to the Romans
.... "). The revived study of Roman law "was of immense importance, for it
restored to human knowledge the mass of detailed solutions which, far more than
a few imperfectly stated general principles, are the true contribution of Roman Law
to modem civilization." Lawson, supra note 29, at 21-22.
132. See Von Mehren & Gordley, supra note 31, at 7.
133. See Merryman, supra note 4, at 9. "Roman law became the basis for all
teaching of law in Europe's new universities, and the universities took the lead in
promoting the idea of the rule of law throughout the Renaissance." Neipert, supra
note 12, at 9.
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universities in Europe concerned themselves with the study of "local
laws" until well into the 1700s.1
34
There were several reasons for the interest in Justinian's Code by
the legal scholars of Renaissance Europe. First, it had the obvious
credibility associated with the great Roman civilization, which by
this point seemed almost mystical in its historical and sociological
significance, especially in light of the dim period from which the
continent had just emerged. 35  Further, the European scholars
recognized the superior logical and organizational scheme of the
Code, which they came to refer to as "written reason. ' ' 131 It was
quickly realized that Justinian's codification contained substantive
legal principles which were well suited for the solution of many of
the dilemmas presented by the emerging commercial markets and
increasingly sophisticated citizenry. 3 More pragmatically, perhaps,
the Code was written in Latin, which was still the common language
of academic study in Renaissance Europe, and hence, Justinian's
Code was eminently accessible by the scholars of the day.138 In a
very real sense, with the uniform study of the Corpus Juris Civilis
throughout Europe, and its almost universal acceptance as the
foundation for all prospective thought about the law and what it
should be, the Corpus Juris Civilis, along with the commentary on it
by the scholars of the day, became known as the "common law of
Europe," or the jus commune.'39 Indeed, at a certain point in the
thirteenth century and beyond, Roman law began to go beyond being
the source of academic study, and began also to be applied by the
courts in Italy and elsewhere, so as to actually have the force of
binding law. 4 ° This was known as the "Reception" of Roman law. 14'
134. Neipert, supra note 12, at 9-10.
135. Merryman, supra note 4, at 9. As stated by Von Mehren and Gordley,
[t]he newly discovered Corpus Juris Civilis had a claim to direct authority
as the law of the imperium romanum. It also embodied the Roman
cultural ideal. Rome, its glory and its unity, had lingered on in men's
minds. Roman law was one of the expressions of that glory and that unity
for which men still longed.
Von Mehren & Gordley, supra note 31, at 8 (citing P. Koschaker, Europa und das
r6mische Recht 81-82, 114-15 (1947)).
136. Merryman, supra note 4, at 9.
137. See Von Mehren & Gordley, supra note 31, at 8.
138. Merryman, supra note 4, at 9.
139. Id. The scholars in Renaissance Europe, which produced massive amounts
of commentaries on the Corpus Juris Civilis for modem academic study, were
known as the Glossators and the Commentators. Id. See also Lawson, supra note
29, at 22-23 (the name "Glossators" came from the fact that these scholars
"glossed" the Justinian Code with cross-references and notes, and made greater
systematic sense of it for further academic study).
140. See Von Mehren & Gordley, supra note 31, at 10.
141. See Lawson, supra note 29, at 24. Indeed, Maitland famously lectured that
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At this stage, therefore, Merryman has observed that "[t]here was a
common body of law and of writing about law, a common legal
language, and a common method of teaching scholarship."' 42
3. The Rise of the Nation-State, the Revolution, and the
Advent of National Codes
The Roman Empire, and subsequently the Byzantine empire, was
the dominant civilization and organized governmental structure in the
wider European-Mediterranean region for the better part of two
millennia.43 When the Roman Empire fell in the West, for a time,
only crude tribal and regional authorities filled the power vacuum
that was left by Rome's absence.' The eastern Byzantine empire,
which was based in Constantinople, did not fall until 1453 A.D. when
it was conquered by the Ottoman Turks. 145 The fall of the last
vestiges of the supraregional Roman Empire, coupled with the
renewed intellectual and philosophical energy that accompanied the
Renaissance, corresponded from the fifteenth century and forward
with the gradual ascendancy of the concept of the nation-state, and
national sovereignty. 46 With this development, the idea of a jus
commune, or "common law of Europe," began to decline, and instead
sovereign nations began to assume the lawmaking prerogative for
their own populaces. 47  Nevertheless, the Corpus Juris Civilis
continued to have a profound influence on the laws of these nations,
as nearly all of the continental European nations either formally
received Roman law as having the actual binding force of law, or at
least were heavily influenced by Roman law in their own
promulgation of laws.' 41 In short, "Roman law was the beginning
German historians referred to the "triad of three R's" which symbolized the
inception of the modem era--"Renaissance, Reformation, and Reception." Id.
(citing Frederic William Maitland, English Law and the Renaissance (1901)). It is
interesting to note, however, that the idea of a "reception" in Italy and southern
France is of dubious value, since Roman law never fully left these regions from the
days of the Roman Empire. Id. at 26.
142. Merryman, supra note 4, at 9. Notably absent from this "common study"
was England, which developed its system of common law and precedent in a
manner fairly isolated from its Continental brethren. "The English courts never
received Roman law at all." Von Mehren & Gordley, supra note 31, at 10.
143. See generally Carlton J.H. Hayes, Marshall Whithed Baldwin, & Charles
Woolsey Cole, History of Western Civilization, Vol. I (2d ed. 1967); Wikipedia,
Rome, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rome (last visited May 1, 2005).
144. See Hayes, Baldwin, & Cole, supra note 143, at 63-75.
145. See Neipert, supra note 12, at 7; see also Hayes, Baldwin, & Cole, supra
note 143, at 305.
146. See Merryman, supra note 4, at 10.
147. Id.
148. Id. Merryman states:
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point for the development of modem legal systems on continental
Europe."'49
Eventually, the continental European nations began devising
plans for their own national codes. However, other complex political
forces were at work, more than merely a desire to intellectually
arrange and re-systematize the original Roman codification. Broad
geopolitical revolutionary forces were at work in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, including notably the revolutions of America
and France. 50 Novel approaches of thought arose about humankind,
social order, markets, and national sovereigns. 5' These new
paradigms for thinking about government and society were very
much the impetus for the new European legal order of the day.'2
One important influence was that of nonreligious "natural law"-the
idea that all humans are equal, all have rights to property and life and
liberty, and that government should protect these rights.'53
Feudalism, and the idea that wealthy members of society could
"purchase" judicial protection for the highest price, were swift
In some parts of Europe (e.g. Germany), the Roman civil law and the
writings of the Bolognese scholars were formally 'received' as binding
law (Civil lawyers use the term 'reception' to sum up the process by
which the nation-states of the civil law world came to include the jus
commune in their national legal systems). In other parts of Europe the
reception was less formal; the Corpus Juris Civilis and the works of the
Glossators and Commentators were received because of their value as
customary law or because of their appeal as an intellectually superior
system. But, by one means or another, the Roman civil law was received
throughout a large part of Western Europe, in the nations that are now the
home of the civil law tradition.
Id.
149. Neipert, supra note 12, at 9.
150. Merryman, supra note 4, at 14.
This movement, which affected most Western nations, included such
dramatic events as the American and French revolutions, the Italian
Risorgimento, the series of wars of independence that liberated the nations
of South and Central America, the unification of Germany under
Bismarck, and the liberation of Greece after centuries of Turkish
domination.
Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 15. See also Neipert, supra note 12, at 10.
The concept of natural law was the first expression ofthe idea that humans
had individual rights merely because they were humans and existed on the
earth. The concept of a natural law had a profound effect on government
because the idea of government not merely enforcing law, but itself being
subject to a natural law. [sic] It limited government's powers to unjustly
interfere with the lives of the citizenry and provided the basis for thought
that led to the American democracy.
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casualties of this new revolutionary thought.'54 Instead of feudalism,
the new era was to glorify the secular nation-state, which was to gain
sovereignty within its borders over the lawmaking function.'55
Another extremely important consequence of this revolutionary'
thought was in the idea of governmental separation of powers.
Several philosophers of the day, including Montesquieu and
Rousseau, stressed the critical importance to democratic
governmental structure of separating the dominion of, respectively,
the legislative and the executive branches, from the judicial branch."57
The explicit purpose of this separation was to thwart any attempt by
the judiciary to exercise the other governmental powers-namely,
legislation and/or executing the laws. 58
Understanding the reason for the revolutionary hostility to the
judicial function on the continent is critical to understanding the
modem civil law tradition as it exists today.'59 The French
revolutionary movement besieged the judicial branch for at least two
reasons-their propensity for favoring the land-owning aristocracy,
and also their tendency to make law outright rather than merely apply
existing law."6 This distrust ofthejudiciary had longstanding origins
in French history, as courts were seen as instruments of monarchical
subjugation.' 6' Even prior to the revolution, the French courts had
154. Merryman, supra note 4, at 15.
155. Id. at 17.
156. Id. at 15.
157. Id. Montesquieu's work in this regard was Spirit of the Laws, whereas one
of Rousseau's writings covering this area was The Social Contract. Id.
158. Id. It is worth noting that, though separation of powers is an important
concept in American democracy, the Founders of the American Republic were not
nearly so distrustful of the judiciary. Id. "The system of checks and balances that
has emerged in the United States places no special emphasis on isolating the
judiciary, and it proceeds from a philosophy different from that which produced the
sharp separation of powers customarily encountered in the civil law world." Id. at
15-16.
159. Id. at 16.
160. Id. As to the former reason, one explanation for the fact that the judiciary
was less of an issue in the American democracy was that feudalism was essentially
a non-factor in the American colonies. Id. at 17. On the other hand, it was very
much alive and well in France and throughout Europe. Id. Thus, for French
revolutionists, the political process was in part a means by which to effect, in the
words of Maine, a "transition 'from status to contract."' Id.
161. See Koch, supra note 28, at 25 (citing Andrew West, et al., The French
Legal System 142 (2d ed. 1998)) ("The Republic had traditionally been wary of the
power of the judiciary. This distrust is rooted in the way the Parlements of the
Ancien Rdgime abused their position and interfered in politics."); see also Sereni,
supra note 69, at 77 n. 11:
[I]n France the judiciary was, prior to the Revolution, a class organization
and courts were responsible for many abuses; thus, it was felt that their
power should be controlled. Further, from the doctrine of the sovereignty
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proven reticent to enforce the various reforms propounded by the
French monarchs, frustrating the government's attempts at
progressivism. 16' The French revolutionaries, in part influenced by
Montesquieu and others, came to conclude that the surest manner by
which to prevent such perceived abuses was to sharply isolate the
judiciary from the legislative function, and to closely guard against
any operational judicial encroachment into such lawmaking areas. 163
Thus, closely restricting the ability of judges to do anything other
than strictly a law-application/enforcement function was of
paramount importance in French revolutionary thought.
In the aftermath of the French Revolution, Napoleon Bonaparte
rose to power in 1799.164 In 1804, France adopted its Code Civil, or,
as it is sometimes called, the Napoleonic Code. 165 The substantive
areas covered by the Napoleonic Code were very similar to
Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis, and even the structure was quite
comparable. 66  The Roman influence was obvious and
comprehensive. 67 Also comprehensively influential, however, were
the ideologies of the revolutionary thought that flowered in the years
prior to the Code's promulgation. 168 As had Justinian's Code, the
of the people and of the right of the people to enact its own laws through
legislative bodies freely elected, it necessarily followed that the
lawmaking power should be vested in the legislature only, which
expressed the will of the nation, whereas courts, not being the expression
of the will of the people, should administer, not create, the law.
162. See Merryman, supra note 4, at 16; see also Von Mehren & Gordley, supra
note 31, at 1147:
In the struggle for nonrevolutionary reform during the period immediately
preceding the Revolution, the courts were on the side of the old order.
Particularly resented were the obstructionist tactics of the French courts
known as 'Parlements' both in refusing to give effect to reform legislation
and in issuing general orders (arrest de reglement) on such matters as
customary law, police regulations, and procedure.
163. Merryman, supra note 4, at 16. Again, it is worth noting that, in the great
common law jurisdictions of England and the United States, this wariness of
judicial legislation and lawmaking was not extant. Id. Rather, the power of
common law judges to shape the law, and provide a force for progressivism and
against governmental tyranny, was widely celebrated and even encouraged. See id.
In short, "[t]he judiciary was not a target of the American Revolution in the way
that it was in France." Id.
164. See Charles Downer Hazen, The French Revolution and Napoleon 265-69
(1917). Napoleon initially rose to power in a relatively peaceful coup dgtat, taking
the office of First Consul-the leading officer in a three party executive. Id.
Eventually, however, in 1804, he became emperor. Id. at 288-89.
165. Merryman, supra note 4, at 10.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 27. Indeed, it has been said that
[t]he Code Civil has remained, for the peoples (of the world), the French
Revolution-organized. When one speaks of the benefits of this
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Napoleonic Code purported to abolish all prior law. 169 Nationalism
played a large role in this decision, as any notion that the law could
have come from a larger community (i.e., post-Roman Europe via the
jus commune) outside the glorified state violated the sense of
patriotism that accompanied the revolution and the growing
nationalism of the era.1 0 The acute restriction on judicial power
permeated the ideology of the Napoleonic Code, and moreover, one
of the utopian goals of the Code was to eventually obviate the need
for lawyers.'' As stated by Merryman:
There was a desire for a legal system that was simple,
nontechnical, and straightforward--one in which the
professionalism and the tendency toward technicality and
revolution and of the liberating role of France, one thinks of the Code
Civil, one thinks of this application of the idea ofjustice to the realities of
life.
C. J. Friedrich, The Ideological and Philosophical Background, in The Code
Napoleon and the Common Law World (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1956) (quoting
Albert Sorel's Introduction to Le Code Civil 1804-1904 XXX (1904)).
169. Specifically, Article 7 of the Law of 30 Vent6se, An XII (March 21, 1804),
provided: "From the day on which these laws enter into force, the Roman laws, the
ordinances, the general and the local collections of customs, the statutes (statuts),
the regulations all cease to have the force of law in the matter covered by the laws
which comprise this Code." Von Mehren & Gordley, supra note 31, at 14.
"Justinian and the French codifiers sought to destroy prior law for different but
analogous reasons: Justinian sought to re-establish the purer law of an earlier time,
the French to establish an entirely new legal order." Id. It is said that a French
lawyer of that era would often say: "I know nothing of the civil law; I know only
the Code Napoleon." Merryman, supra note 4, at 28. Or, as stated in French: "Je
ne connais pas le Droit civil, je n'enseigne que le Code Napoleon." Lawson, supra
note 29, at 42 n.67. This is not to suggest that all of pre-Code French law was of
no import in the Code era. Indeed, a large amount of existing French law, much of
it having been reported and organized by the commentator Pothier, was
incorporated into the Code. See Sereni, supra note 69, at 56:
Nor could it be maintained that the substance of many of the Code
Napoleon's provisions was startlingly original. To a considerable extent
the Code adopted and organized pre-existing French law as mainly
developed through the coutumes and the decisions of the various
Parlements; also, in many instances it almost literally embodied
provisions of previous statutes, such as the famous Ordonnances of
Daguesseau on Gifts (1731), Wills (1735), and Substitutions (1747). By
the time work started on the Code these various bodies of law had been
systematically organized and authoritatively construed by Pothier and the
other great commentators of pre-Napoleonic French law.
170. Merryman, supra note 4, at 27. It was also was bound up in the
revolutionary ideology of reform that marked the era, as embodied in Voltaire's
declaration: "Do you want good laws? Bum yours and make new
ones!".-"Voulez-vous avoir des bonnes lois? Brfilez les v6tres, et faites-en des
nouvelles." See Friedrich, supra note 168, at 1.
171. Merryman, supra note 4, at 28.
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complication commonly blamed on lawyers could be avoided.
One way to do this was to state the law clearly and in a
straightforward fashion, so that the ordinary citizen could
read the law and understand what his rights and obligations
were, without having to consult lawyers and go to court.
Thus the French Civil Code of 1804 was envisioned as a kind
of popular book that could be put on the shelf next to the
family Bible. It would be a handbook for the citizen, clearly
organized and stated in straightforward language, that would
allow citizens to determine their legal rights and obligations
by themselves. 7
2
The French Code Civil was an undeniable triumph for the orderly
rule of law and a great improvement over the previous state of law
in France.1h The Code was a vast improvement over any prior Codes
since the days of Justinian, and the Code's language is "clear and
precise, concise and direct . . . a literary as well as a legal
masterpiece.' 74 It is said that Napoleon considered it his greatest
achievement in his military and political career, which was not small,
self-praise since his exploits included political conquest of most of
Western Europe.'75
Because a principal purpose of the French Code was to constrain
the role of the judiciary to merely the application of existing law, the
172. Id.
173. Jean-Etienne-Marie Portalis, a French scholar of the day and one of the
advisers to the drafting of the Napoleonic Code, is said to have commented on the
state of the law prior to the enactment of the Code:
What a spectacle opened before our eyes! Facing us was only a confused
and shapeless mass of foreign and French laws, of general and particular
customs, of abrogated and nonabrogated ordinances, of contradictory
regulations and conflicting decisions; one encountered nothing but a
mysterious labyrinth, and, at every moment, the guiding thread escaped
us. We were always on the point of getting lost in an immense chaos.
Von Mehren & Gordley, supra, note 31, at 14. Indeed, diversity of the law was the
controlling attribute of the state of the pre-Code law in France-i.e., the Ancien
Rfgime. See Ren6 Cassin, Codification and National Unity, in The Code Napoleon
and the Common-Law World 46 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1956). This caused
Voltaire to remark about the state of the pre-Code law: "The traveler changed his
law as often as he changed his horses." Von Mehren & Gordley, supra note 31, at
48.
174. See Sereni, supra note 69, at 56; see also Lawson, supra note 29, at 48
(The Napoleonic Code's "style, with its admirable clarity, its pure everyday French,
and its almost complete freedom from jargon, remains incomparable.").
175. See Bernard Schwartz, Preface to The Code Napoleon and the Common-
Law World vii (1956). It is said that Napoleon wrote, near the end of his life: "My
glory is not to have won forty battles, for Waterloo's defeat will destroy the
memory of as many victories. But what nothing will destroy, what will live
eternally, is my Civil Code." Id.
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drafters strove to make the Code consistent (so there were no
conflicting provisions which a judge could choose between and
thereby "make law"), comprehensive in its coverage (so there were
no "gaps" in coverage which a judge might thereby fill in by making
law), and clear (so as to minimize any reason for a jurist to seek to
engage in the demonized "lawmaking" or even its recognizable
cousin, law interpreting).,7 6 Thus, the ultimate goal of the French
codifiers was to draft a systematic, comprehensive code, which
would be so all-encompassing and lucid that the judicial role would
be restricted simply to ascertaining the pertinent code section and
applying it to adjudicate the litigation before the court. 77
Though the Napoleonic Code is often described as the
"archetype" of the civil codes promulgated in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, 1 71 mostly in Western Europe, it was not the only
significant one, nor the first. A decade earlier, in 1794, an immensely
detailed civil code was adopted by Prussia under Frederick the
Great. 179 Whereas the Napoleonic Code had 2,281 sections 8 0 the
Prussian Code had over 17,000 sections, all designed to govern a
myriad of factual scenarios."' This attempt at hyper-specificity was
widely viewed as a "spectacular failure," one which the French
codifiers explicitly endeavored to avoid by making the Napoleonic
Code more general and universal, in the nature of its Roman
ancestor. s8 The French codifiers recognized the futility of trying to
address every possible factual scenario, and instead sought to
promulgate broad principles, which would suggest the correct
outcomes of disputes. 83 As several of the codifiers of the day stated:
176. Merryman, supra note 4, at 29.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 10.
179. Id. at 29. At least three other codes which could be characterized as
civilian in nature were also enacted in the century before the Prussian code, though
they are fairly unheralded in most discussions of civil law history. See Sereni,
supra note 69, at 55.
As early as 1683 Christian V had promulgated for Denmark a civil code
that was later extended to Norway and Iceland; in 1734 a civil code was
enacted in Sweden; and in 1786 a body of family laws that were to be part
of a civil code was issued in Austria.
Id.
180. See Schwartz, supra note 175, at vii-viii.
181. Merryman, supra note 4, at 29.
182. Id. at 29-30. "One notes as a principal defect of the Prussian code the
overabundance of doctrine." Von Mehren & Gordley, supra note 31, at 55 (quoting
Jaubert, Member of the Tribunate, Report on 30 vent6se An XII to the Legislative
Body, 1 P. Fenet, Recueil Complet des Travaux Prdparatories du Code Civil civ,
cxvi (1827)).
183. See Von Mehren & Gordley, supra note 31, at 54 (quoting Portalis,
Tronchet, Bigot-Pr~ameneu & Maleville, Discours pr~liminaire, in J. Locr6, La
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"The function of the law (loi) is to fix in broad outline, the general
maxims of justice (droit), to establish principles rich in
suggestiveness (consequences), and not to descend into the details of
the questions that can arise in each subject."' 84
The other great civil code of the nineteenth century was the
German Civil Code enacted in 1896.85 Many German scholars
originally advised patterning after the much-admired Napoleonic
Code- however, it was eventually decided instead that the German
Code would more directly codify existing and historical law,
including Roman law, and would tend toward the more detailed
nature of the Prussian Code, though not to that extent of excess. 186
The German code exudes a belief that the law is entirely scientific.8 7
Unlike the Napoleonic Code, which was theoretically written so as
to be understandable by laymen, the German code was written strictly
for legal professionals-the structure and language utilized makes
legal acumen an absolute necessity.18 8 However, though there are
great differences between the French and German codes (including
prominently the difference in the level of detail), substantial
similarities in ideology are unmistakably present.8 9 Certainly one of
these major similarities was the desire for a clear, lucid, yet
comprehensive and all-encompassing code, to govern all aspects of
the affairs of its citizenry. 9 ° Another overarching similarity is the
adoption of a well-defined role for the judiciary and its complete
prohibition from any type of law-making function whatsoever.'' In
this regard, the French and German codes, and all of their progeny
adopted by the various civil law nations of the world throughout the
Lgislation Civile, Commerciale et Criminell de la France 251, at 255-72 (1827)):
A code, however complete it may appear, is no sooner promulgated than
a thousand unexpected questions are presented to the judge. Because the
laws, once written, remain as they were written. Man, on the contrary,
never remains the same, he changes constantly; and this change, which
never stops, and the effects of which are so diversely modified by
circumstances, produces at every instant some new combination, some
new fact, some new result .... [Therefore a] great many things are
necessarily left to be determined by custom (usage), to the discussion of
informed men, to the decision (arbitrage) of the judges.
184. Id.
185. Merryman, supra note 4, at 30.
186. Id. at30-31.
187. Id. at31.
188. See Von Mehren & Gordley, supra note 31, at 78 (citing P. Boehmer,
Einfihrung in das Bfrgerliche Recht 77 (2d ed. 1965)) ("For example, in order to
determine one's legal rights upon discovering that a newly purchased cow is sick,
five different parts of the code must be consulted.").
189. Merryman, supra note 4, at 32.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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nineteenth and twentieth centuries, share these legalistic values.
These codes, and especially the French code, 9 2 as the modem
descendants of the Roman law tradition and the Corpus Juris Civilis,
serve as the models for the modem civil law tradition.' 93
4. Codification Efforts in England and the United States
The geopolitical reverberations of the study of the Corpus Juris
Civilis, and, later, the French Revolution, did not have the same
effect in England and on its common law heritage, but their effects
were certainly felt. Cardinal Reginald Pope, in the sixteenth century,
suggested that England promulgate a code in the order of the Corpus
Juris Civilis in order to reform "barbaric," confusing English law.'94
Although it is said that Henry VIII, the monarch at the time of Pope's
suggestion, was amenable to the idea, nothing came of it.' 95 Edward
VI was also said to be open to the idea of codification, and the House
of Lords considered it in 1549, but again no consensus or action was
ever effected.'96 These suggestions for codes continued during the
reigns of Elizabeth I (1558-1603) and James I (1603-1625). 197
James is actually reputed to have attacked the common law, and to
have suggested that all laws be converted to statute; James revered
the Danish legal system, where "the formality of the law hath no
place.., all their state is governed only by a written law .... Happy
were all kingdoms if they could be so. But here, curious writs,
various conceits, different actions and variety of examples breed
questions in the law."' 98 But, no codification occurred, despite the
efforts of the early English codifying proponent Sir Francis Bacon.' 99
Most of the reasons for the failure of these codification proposals
were political, not jurisprudential.00 Parliament was generally too
192. See Schwartz, supra note 175, at viii (The French Code "has served as the
model for similar codes in most countries outside the Anglo-American world. In
countries so diverse as Belgium and Japan, Italy and Egypt, the French Code has
served as the basis for analogous codifications.").
193. See Neipert, supra note 12, at 10.
194. See Gunther A. Weiss, The Enchantment of Codification in the Common-
Law World, 25 Yale J. Int'l L. 435, 471 (2000) (citing Frederic W. Maitland,
English Law and the Renaissance, in 1 Selected Historical Essays of F. W.
Maitland 135, 137 (1907)).
195. Id. (citing Maitland, supra note 194, at 142).
196. Id. (citing Maurice E. Lang, Codification in the British Empire and
America 28 (1924)).
197. Id. at 471-72.
198. Id. at 472 (citing The Political Works of James 1 332 (C.H. Mcllwain ed.,
1918), quoted in Donald Veall, The Popular Movement for Law Reform,
1640-1660 at 71 (1970)).
199. Id. at 472-73.
200. Id. at 473-74.
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conservative during this period to consider such sweeping reforms."'
The only legal, as opposed to political, reason which can be
historically ascertained for England's opposition to codification at the
time was that English law was not yet "thoroughly syxstematized and
conceptualized"- i.e., not yet "ripe" enough.2 2 Eventually,
Blackstone's commentary on English common law was published in
1765, and this seemed to satisfy the English desire for a
systematizing organization of English common law precepts.
20 3
As the eighteenth century drew to a close, Jeremy Bentham
emerged as the new English champion of the codification ideology.2 °4
In fact, so obsessed was Bentham with eradicating the "evils" of the
common law and replacing it with codified systems, that he has been
called the "greatest codification enthusiast of all times and all
peoples." ' 5 He even went so far as to correspond with several heads
of state in England, the United States, and elsewhere in an effort to
convince those nations to adopt his codification ideology.
2 6
Bentham was convinced that England had reached a "disastrous"
state in the development of its law, and that radical reform was
imperative; he detested what he perceived as the lack of clarity, lack
of certainty, and even dawdling functioning of the English
judiciary.20  Instead, Bentham advocated a streamlined,
comprehensive code, simple enough that it shared the French
revolutionary ideal that "every man [could be] his own lawyer!"0 8
Like his English codifying predecessors, however, Bentham's
efforts to implement actual Anglo codification were generally
unsuccessful, though it is noteworthy that his theoretical
conceptualizations of codification are very widely respected in the
civil law world.2 9  The reasons for the historical failure of
codification in England are varied and complex, but some of them
are: (1) national pride and admiration for the long, textured history
201. Id.
202. Id. at 473-74 (citing Werner Teubner, Kodifikation und Rechtsreform in
England 59 (1974)).
203. Id. at 474-76 (referring to William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws
of England)).
204. Id. at 475-76.
205. Id. at 476 (citing Karl Freirechtsbewegung und Kodifikationsidee, reprinted
in Gesetzesbindung und Richterfreiheit: Texte zur Methodendebatte 1900-1914 at
275-76 (Andreas Gangel & Karl A. Mollau eds., 1992)).
206. See id. (citing 8 Jeremy Bentham, The Correspondence of Jeremy Bentham
xxx & 366-71 (Stephen Conway ed., Oxford 1988)).
207. Id, at 476.
208. Id. at 480 (citing Jeremy Bentham, Letter to the Citizens of the Several
American United States (II) (1817)).
209. See id. at 476 (citing Michel Berger, Codification, in Perspectives in
Jurisprudence 144 (Elspeth Attwooll ed., 1977) ("Bentham's is regarded as the
most thorough-going approach to codification.")).
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of English common law,21° (2) no need for a code as a unifying agent
since England was already well-unified by its common law system,
and (3) a general conservatism and view of the French revolution as
a traumatic event to be avoided.2 1
The United States also has a history of considering the possible
codification of its law. In the aftermath of the American Revolution
and the War of Independence, codification was widely considered a
distinct possibility for the shaping of future American law. 212 This is
quite unsurprising, given the fierce conflict with England, the desire
to be free of all or many things English, and the French support
during the war. Louisiana eventually decided to expressly codify its
law in the tradition of Roman law and the Napoleonic Code, and still
practices it today as a civilian island in a common law sea.213 The
other states considered codification, but in a much more measured
manner than Louisiana.214  Bentham wrote a letter to President
Madison in 1811, urging the adoption of an American code, and he
also posted letters to various state governors as well.21 5
Subsequently, Joseph Story addressed the idea of codification in an
1821 speech to the Suffolk Bar, but his support was generally
ignored.216
More recognized were the efforts of William Sampson, in 1823,
to support the idea of American codification. 21 7 His efforts led to a
serious American discussion ofthe possibility of codes.2"' Beginning
in 1830, the American consideration of codification became
210. See David & Brierly, supra note 41, at 287:
The English jurist likes to emphasize the historical continuity of his own
system; it appears to be the product of a long tradition untroubled by
revolution and he is proud of this fact because he sees in it, and with good
reason, proof of the great wisdom of the Common Law, its ability to
adapt, its lasting value and those other qualities that correspond to the
nature of English jurists and English people generally.
211. See generally Weiss, supra note 194, at 489-93.
212. Seeid. at 498-499.
213. Id. at 499-501; see generally William E. Crawford, Life on a Federal
Island in the Civilian Sea, 15 Miss. C. L. Rev. 1 (1994).
214. See Weiss, supra note 194, at 501.
215. Id. (citing 8 Jeremy Bentham, The Correspondence of Jeremy Bentham
(Stephen Conway ed., Oxford 1988)).
216. Id. (citing Joseph Story, Progress ofJurisprudence, in The Miscellaneous
Writings of Joseph Story 213-14, 23 7-39 (1852)).
217. Id. (citing William Sampson, An Anniversary Discourse Before the
Historical Society of New York, on Saturday, December 6, 1823: Showing the
Origin, Progress, Antiquity, Curiosities, and Nature of the Common Law, in
Sampson's Discourse, and Correspondence with Various Learned Jurists Upon the
History of the Law, with the Addition of Several Essays, Tracts, and Documents,
Relating to the Subject (1826)).
218. Id. (citing Charles M. Cook, The American Codification Movement: A
Study of the Antebellum Legal Reform 108-18 (1981)).
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especially strong, especially in light of the Jacksonian desire for
improved democracy---ordinary citizens came to view the complex
nature of the law as evidence of attempts by lawyers to impose
control over the system and keep non-lawyers ignorant of basic legal
principles.2"9 During the 1830s and 1840s, both South Carolina and
Massachusetts came quite close to a codification of their laws.22
In the advent of these failures to codify, David Dudley Field came
upon the scene in the United States. Described as "America's
Bentham," Field was actually a practicing lawyer, who had a
pragmatic perspective on reforming and codifying American law, as
contrasted with Bentham's theoretical underpinnings. 22' Field was
principally concerned with judicial sluggishness, lack of clarity, and
also the overly complex nature of the law of New York, which was
emblematic of the law in all of the American states.22' Field defined
his vision of codification thusly:
The records of the common law are in the reports of the
decisions of the tribunals; the records of the statute law are in
the volumes of legislative acts. To make a code of the known
law is therefore but to make a complete, analytical, and
authoritative compilation from these records . . . . [a]
complete digest of existing law, common and statute,
dissected and analyzed, avoiding repetitions and rejecting
contradictions, molded into distinct propositions, and
arranged in scientific order, with proper amendments, and in
this form sanctioned by the Legislature, is the Code which the
organic law commanded to be made for the people of this
State.223
Field actually had great success in enacting codifications of New
York's rules of civil procedure, and Field's theories remain the
structural framework and inspiration for the American Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure currently in force.224 However, Field's vision for
a codification of substantive law in New York did not succeed, and,
in the aftermath of the American Civil War, interest in the project
declined as other matters became more pressing.225
219. Id. at 502-03.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 503-04 (citing Charles Noble Gregory, Bentham and the Codifiers,
13 Harv. L. Rev. 344, 356 (1900)).
222. Id at 504.
223. Id. (quoting 1 David Dudley Field, Speeches, Arguments, and
Miscellaneous Papers of David Dudley Field 326 (Abram P. Sprague ed., 1884).
224. Id. at 505-06.
225. Id. at 506-08.
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The arguments in Field's day for and against codification were
familiar to Anglo-American codification proponents. Codifiers urged
that reform would make the law easier to access, greater in
efficiency, and more clear, as well as introduce stricter separation of
powers .26 Those against codification urged that a code would be too
inflexible as contrasted with common law, and varied judicial
interpretation would lead to greater uncertainty.227 Another reason
was that Americans were generally less suspicious of the courts, and
actually more suspicious of occasionally corrupt legislative bodies.
228
Perhaps the most efficacious reason for opposition, however, was
that, as in England, American legal professionals were conservative,
traditionalist, and thus for the sheer force and pride of history alone
were successful in opposing codifying reforms of the law.229
Actually, later in the nineteenth century, five states did enact
legislation resembling, and even titled, civil codes, though the
practice in these states still retains a decidedly common law
characterization. 230 Thus, though England and the United States
considered civil law-type codifications throughout their history, the
effects have never matured into practice, and thus these nations
remain the vanguards of the common law tradition.
5. The Code in the Modern Civil Law System
With the foregoing richness and depth of historical and
ideological perspective in mind, what then are the basic operational
structures and mechanics of the modem civil law system, and how is
it different from the other great legal tradition, the common law? It
is often recited that the cornerstone of civil law is "the Code., 231 This
concept is far more philosophical and dogmatic than most common
lawyers immediately realize. 32 What is the philosophy? First and
226. Id. at 509.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 510 (citing Merryman, supra note 4, at 34).
229. Id. (citing Charles M. Cook, The American Codification Movement: A
Study of the Antebellum Legal Reform 206 (1981); Rene David & John Brierly,
Major Legal Systems in the World Today: An Introduction to the Comparative
Study of Law 402 (3d ed. 1985); Karl N. Llewellyn, Prkijudizienrecht und
Rechtsprechung in Amerika 24 (1933); Mathias Reimann, Historische Schule und
Common Law: Die deutsche Rechtswissenschaft des 19. Jahrhunderts im
amerikanischen Rechtsdenken (1993); Mathias Reimann, The Historical School
Against Codification: Savigny, Carter, and the Defeat of the New York Civil Code,
37 Am. J. Comp. L. 95, 115-16 (1989)).
230. Id. at 511-13 (codes were enacted in Georgia, North and South Dakota,
California, and Montana).
231. See Koch, supra note 28, at 24.
232. See id. (citing Merryman, supra note 4, at 26-27).
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foremost, it can be described as a fundamental preference for
"positive law" in the judicial and legal process.233 As mentioned
earlier, this is bound up with restraining judicial abuses, and the
ideology of having an all-encompassing code itself is a large part of
effectuating this ideal.234 Law is supposed to come from the code,
and not from the decisions of the judiciary. 35 The lawmaking
prerogative of the legislature is jealously guarded against incursion
by a lurking ambitious judicial system, which is to be avoided based
on historical experience.236 In civil law jurisdictions, courts
persist in the attitude of obedience to enacted law, even when
the legislature itself has recognized that they [sic] may be
gaps in the legislation .... Legislators, who nowadays are
called upon to establish the framework of the legal order, do
so by formulating commands and creating rules of law. Very
rarely are courts authorized to use this method.237
Preventing a freewheeling judiciary is one of the reasons for the
ideology of the code, but what is the reason behind this reason?
Certainty in the law. Within civil law jurisdictions, certainty "has
come to be a kind of supreme value, an unquestioned dogma, a
fundamental goal. 238 Certainty is unquestionably a value in common
law jurisdictions as well, but not to the extent it is in the civil law.239
Approaching the law from more of a scientific perspective24 ° than the
rugged experiential approach of the common law,24' civil law
233. See Jeffrey Waggoner, Comment, Discretion and Valor at the Russian
Constitutional Court: Adjudicating the Russian Constitutions in the Civil-Law
Tradition, 8 Ind. Int'l and Comp. L. R. 189, 199 (1997) (citing J.G. Sauveplanne,
Codified and Judge Made Law: The Role of Courts and Legislators in Civil and
Common Law Systems 1 (1982) ("[Iln civil law [sic] systems the starting point for
legal reasoning is formed by the provisions of the written law.")).
234. See Koch, supra note 28, at 25.
235. See Bernard Rudden, Courts and Codes in England, France and Soviet
Russia, 48 Tul. L. Rev. 1010, 1012 (1974) ("The courts, however, may not make
law. This prohibition stems from the doctrine of separation of powers..
236. See Koch, supra note 28, at 25-26.
237. David & Brierly, supra note 41, at 123.
238. Merryman, supra note 4, at 48.
239. See id.
240. See Lawson, supra note 29, at 76.
241. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 1 (Dover ed. 1991).
As Holmes, the revered realist, stated in virtually complete ideological opposition
to the ideals of the civil law:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories,
institutions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices
which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to
do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be
governed. The law embodies the story of a nation's development through
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jurisdictions approach their codes as the embodiment of logic and
reason itself.24 Civil law codes are drafted, developed, and utilized
based on the view that there is order to life, rather than haphazard
happenstance of events. 243 The code philosophy is tied up in the ideal
of objective rationality in the law.2 " Civilians design and revere their
civil code to be the lifeblood of the legal system, indeed, even the
very framework for all of society. 4  Oliver Wendell Holmes
famously stated that, as to common law, "[t]he life of the law has not
been logic: it has been experience. ' ' 247 This statement is somewhat
puzzling to civilians. 24" The importance of experience is undoubted
to them, but logic is the very lifeblood of the civil code ideology.249
To civil law scholars, there is no meaningful distinction between
logic and experience-they are the same. The code is an aggregation
of legal precepts with such internal consistency that to civilians logic
is inescapably part of the legal reason which must accompany judicial
operations:
Logic should be an important factor in the development of
law, and it can play a much more important role in the
judicial process, both in civilian countries and in common-
law countries, than is usually admitted. Only logic brings
clarity and justice. The question whether a particular set of
circumstances should be governed by precedent A or
precedent B (or by Article A or Article B) is of no
consequence if precedents A and B (or Articles A and B) are
logically consistent. The question will not even arise.
Litigation will arise, on the contrary, if the precedents or
articles are inconsistent. The decision will even be a third
precedent that will make the law more complicated than it
was. Logic, therefore, is an essential need of law, as of any
many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the
axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.
Id.
242. See Koch, supra note 28, at 28.
243. Id. (citing Martin Vranken, Fundamentals of European Civil Law and
Impact of the European Community 35 (1997)).
244. Id. at 29.
245. Id. (citing Lord GoffofChievely, The Future of the Common Law, 46 Int'l
& Comp. L.Q. 745, 753 (1997)) ("Continental lawyers love to proclaim some great
principle, and then knock it into shape afterwards. Instead the boring British want
to find out first whether and, if so, how these great ideas are going to work in
practice.").
246. Id.
247. Holmes, supra note 241, at 1.
248. See Andrd Tunc, The Grand Outlines of the Code, in The Code Napoleon
and the Common Law World 19 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1956).
249. See id.
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other intellectual experience, and it is submitted that it would
do injustice to the common law, as well as to the civil law, to
consider them as collections of rules without connection and
without consistency.2 50
Thus, civilians perceive no meaningful contrast between experience
and logic.25' The code is a manifestation of both logic and
experience. 2
The concept of having all positive law stated in a written code has
more pragmatic justifications as well. In making the law enacted by
the representative legislature firm, fixed, and unassailable by the
threat of an activist judiciary, the civil code ideology embodies the
quintessence of majoritarian governmental rule."'  The people
democratically elect the legislatures, which enact the laws. The
judges, not being subject to the electorate, are not empowered to
enact laws. It is also noteworthy that the civil code has long been
viewed as having a distinctly unifying feature-that is, civil codes
have unified the law of the sovereigns which have promulgated
them.
254
The code, to effectuate these civilian ideals, also seeks to be all-
encompassing and exhaustive, affecting all aspects of social order.
Hence, the frequent usage by civilian codifiers as implementing the
code as a "legislative novation," replacing all prior law since the new
code is thoroughly complete in nature.255 Because civilians value the
ability of human reason to effect a legal order, the code is envisaged
as complete, with the wherewithal to furnish the resolution of any
legal issue which could possibly arise as to matters within its
jurisdiction.5 That is, as stated by Sereni on the advent of the 150th
anniversary of the enactment of the Napoleonic Code: "within [the
code's] four comers an answer could and should be found to each
question arising in connection with any topic covered by the code
250. Id.
251. Id. at 31.
252. Id.
253. Koch, supra note 28, at 30.
254. See Lawson, supra note 29, at 51; see also Koch, supra note 28, at 30 ("[A]
code is an effective technique for centralization. The code-like use of the treaties
forming the E.U. demonstrates this unifying nature."). Interestingly, "[t]he E.U.
treaties' ambiguous nature has generated a call for the creation of an actual
European code." Id. at 30 n. 128 (citing Ugo Mattei, Hard Code Now!, 2 Global
Jurist Frontiers 1 (2002)).
255. See Sereni, supra note 69, at 57 (citing G~ny, La Technique Lggislative
dans la Codification Civile Moderne, in Le Code Civil, 1804-1904, Livre du
Centenaire, Vol. II, 987 (1904)).
256. Id. (citing Art. 4 of the Code Napoleon, which goes so far as to state that
"a judge who shall refuse to decide a case under pretext that the law is silent,
obscure or inadequate, may be prosecuted for denial ofjustice.").
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itself without resorting to other sources or to any method of
implementation of its provisions. ' 257  One commentator has
succinctly summarized the purpose and characteristics of the civil
law code in the following manner:
The goal is to have the entire body of law on a subject
condensed into a general code. The code does not try to
answer directly every question that may arise in that
particular area of law. Rather, the code is supposed to be a
set of basic rules from which the proper resolution of a
specific legal problem can be deduced. If the rule is too
general, it is not of any help to someone wishing to read the
law in order to find a way to avoid a conflict with it. On the
other hand, it must be general enough to apply to a broad
situation rather than some particular aspect of it.... The
code should set out the general framework of the law and
give the court a set of standards for its decision. If the code
is too detailed it will encourage parties to find loopholes and
therefore a certain amount of generality is thought to give the
judge more latitude to achieve a just result.258
Though different jurisdictions have codified their civilian laws along
different parts of this continuum,259 this remains nevertheless the
fundamental philosophy of the civil code: rational, systematized,
organized, clear, and comprehensive, leaving the judiciary with no
function but to select and apply the applicable provisions, with resort
to no other sources of law.
6. The Judicial Function in the Modern Civil Law System
The judicial function in modem civil law systems follows
inexorably from the ideology of the civil law code-that is, in fact,
part and parcel of the reason for the code in the first place. There
are at least two fundamental limitations placed on civil law
judiciaries.26" The first limitation is that, since positive law in a civil
law jurisdiction is ideologically expressed exclusively in the
257. Id. at 58.
258. Neipert, supra note 12, at 11. "The fictions of completeness and self-
sufficiency... constitute the fundamental premises of a modem civil-law system
considered as a whole. The body of provisions (code and statutory) constituting the
written law of the country is held to be complete and self-sufficient." Sereni, supra
note 69, at 59.
259. Witness the broad, general provisions of the French Code, vis-6-vis the
much more detailed and numerous provisions of the German Code. See Neipert,
supra note 12, at 11.
260. See generally Sereni, supra note 69, at 62-65.
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comprehensive provisions of the code, the power of courts to
adjudicate disputes is limited quite literally and strictly to the scope
of coverage of the code precepts.261 The court must come to its
resolution of the case by working strictly within the framework of
the code.262 Because of the dogmatic philosophy that the code is
complete and sufficient, the court may not rely on any authorities
not contained in the code itself.263  So devout is this dogma of
completeness, courts are generally prohibited from declining to
adjudicate a dispute based on any perception of gaps in the code's
coverage of a particular subject matter." This is simple enough
when the civilian judge is able to readily find a clearly applicable
code section, but what of the situation where none presents itself as
being directly "on point?" The judge is to enlarge the meaning of
another code section, or even to analogize from one or more other
code sections to obtain a reasoned solution.2 65 The tendency of civil
codes to be broad and general in nature, actually accords civil law
courts with greater discretion than their common law counterparts. 266
This is by civilian design, as stated by the French codifier Portalis:
The function of the law is to determine, by means of basic
concepts, the general precepts of the law, and to establish
principles fertile in consequences, rather than to go into the
details of questions that may arise with regard to each
particular matter. It is for the judge and the lawyer, who are
imbued with the spirit of a legal system, to attend to its
implementation.... Those changing and petty details with
which the legislator ought not to be preoccupied and all
those matters that it would be futile and even dangerous to
attempt to foresee and to define in advance, we leave to the
courts.2 6 7
261. Id. at 62.
262. Id. See also Von Mehren & Gordley, supra note 31, at 1134-35 ("In
France and Germany, an authoritative starting point for legal reasoning is ordinarily
to be found in one of the various codes or in the general body of statutory law.").
263. Sereni, supra note 69, at 62. See also Von Mehren & Gordley, supra note
31, at 1135 n.20 ("It is unquestionable that for the judge in the existing state of our
system [France] there is not, properly speaking, any source of positive law other
than statute.") (quoting Ballot Beaupr6, Le Centenaire du Code Civil 26 (1904)).
264. Sereni, supra note 69, at 62. See also supra note 256 and accompanying
text (discussing Napoleonic Code's criminal prohibition of judicial refusal to
adjudicate disputes based on perceived silence of the code).
265. Id.
266. Sereni, supra note 69, at 61.
267. Id. at 62 (referring to Portalis, Preliminary Discourse of the Commission
of the Year VII).
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The process has been likened to the moves in a chess match, with
each following logically and intellectually from the prior move.268 It
is for this reason, in part, that the code is required to be organized in
such a logical and systematic manner-the code provisions are
envisaged as a system of closely interrelated premises, different
threads of the same fabric, which may be utilized through deduction
to achieve an adjudicative solution.269 Coming back to the all-
encompassing authority of the civil code, however, the case must
ultimately find its definitive authority within the precepts of the
code. 270 This complete focus on the code language as the sole source
of primary authority results, unsurprisingly, in a much greater civilian
emphasis on the explicit language of the legislative embodiments
than is found in common law jurisdictions.27' Where actual
definitions of code terms are codified, such definitions will, of
course, be referenced, but where there are no such definitions, the
court will rely on other concepts and sections of the code, construing
them together consistently as part of an organic whole.272
Accordingly, it is seen that the first fundamental limitation placed on
the civil law court is that it must derive its judicial solutions from the
code.
The second fundamental limitation on civilian judiciaries follows
from the first---cases are not law. Only the code is law. That is to
say, civil law courts may not adopt prior cases as precedents, or
"positive law" to be followed in subsequent litigation.73 There is no
stare decisis.274 It follows, of course, that civil law courts do not see
themselves as "making law" at the time of the rendering of their
opinions. So vigorously and dogmatically is this principle adhered
to in France, that it is not only explicitly legislated, 2" but criminal
268. Koch, supra note 28, at 43.
269. Id. at 36 ("The theory is that every code provision is considered a thread
in one whole cloth. The significance of this strategy is that where there is an
ambiguity in a code provision, the first place one looks is at other code
provisions."). See also Sereni, supra note 69, at 63.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 65. See also Von Mehren & Gordley, supra note 31, at 1135 (Civil
law ideology "refuses any binding effect to previous judicial interpretations, even
one emanating from a hierarchically superior court.").
274. Sereni, supra note 69, at 65. See also Lawson, supra note 29, at 83 ("Of
course in the strict sense that a judge is absolutely bound by a previous decision
which he knows to be radically wrong in logic, justice, and common sense, no Civil
Law judge adheres to the principle."); Merryman, supra note 4, at 46 ("judicial
decisions are not a source of law").
275. Sereni, supra note 69, at 65 (citing C. civ. art. 22 (Fr.), which provides:
"Judges are forbidden to decide in a general manner or in the form of regulations
with regard to the cases submitted to them.").
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liability is actually imposed for violating it.276 Though this precept
is set forth expressly in the Napoleonic Code, such provision is
basically superfluous, as "the principle of nonrecognition of the rule
of stare decisis applies, as a rule, in civil-law countries even in the
absence of an express provision to that effect., 277 In France, even the
form of the opinions reflects this narrow focus in terms of source
authority.27  This refusal to allow citation to other single court
decisions as positive law, though at first quite foreign to the common
lawyer, actually follows as a matter of inescapable logic in light of
the doctrine of the completeness of the code-what reason would
there be for a court to concern itself with case authority when all of
the answers are in the code directly, or may be deduced from the
code's provisions?279 Again, the civilian concept of separation of
powers is crucial to this ideology-legislatures are the lawmakers,
and courts are merely to apply the law written down by the
legislature: they must do no more and they must do no less.28 V
This is not to suggest or imply that civil law cases are utterly
inconsequential. In fact, the French use the term jurisprudence to
refer to the body of case decisions rendered by its courts. 28 1 Civil
cases do tend to be persuasive in civilian litigation.282 A civil court
may well, and often does, review prior civilian decisions.283
276. Id. (citing C. pdn. art. 127 (Fr.)).
277. Id.
278. See Von Mehren & Gordley, supra note 31, at 1135:
[T]he traditional form of the French decision... begins with a recital of
the applicable code provisions, does not discuss or analyze previous
decisions, and sets forth the court's holding as deductively derived from
the cited provisions, usually without indicating such doubts as the court
may have had to overcome in reaching this result.
For that matter, it is interesting to note the differences in the case reporting systems
between, for example, the United States, France, and Germany. As one would
expect, the United States case reporting system is comprehensive in nature,
covering the full text of the case decisions, and being organized along practical
scenarios for subsequent research. Id. at 1141-41. In France and Germany, on the
other hand, the reporting system is much less developed and systematized. Id. at
1142. The reports are selective, and even when opinions are reported often only
excerpts are printed, rather than the full text. Id. Such differences in reporting
would seem to follow from the vastly different emphases placed on case decisions
by these jurisdictions.
279. See Sereni, supra note 69, at 65.
280. See id. at 65-66.
281. Id. at 67.
282. Id.
283. See Merryman, supra note 4, at 47 ("A [civil] lawyer preparing a case
searches for cases in point, uses them in his argument; and the judge deciding a
case often refers to prior cases."); see also Koch, supra note 28, at 51 ("Only a fool
would refuse to seek guidance in the work of other judges confronted with similar
problems. The civil law system is unlikely to produce any more fools than the
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However, the purpose is usually said to be in order to study an
example of a logically-obtained resolution worked out from the code
provisions themselves-i.e., an illustration of the deduction of a
result from the positive code law, not a case law precedent to be
followed in its own right. 284 A civil law court may even choose to
assimilate another court's reasoning, but once it does so it becomes
the court's own reasoning, for which it is fully responsible.8 5 The
difference between common law treatment of case decisions, though
perhaps initially superficial, is in fact deeply embedded in the civilian
ideology and exemplifies a fundamental divergence in treatment of
case decisions from that practiced in common law jurisdictions.286
There is at least one way in which civilians approach the
recognition of case authority, and that is in the doctrine of
jurisprudence constante.287 Whereas a single court decision is no
authority at all in a civil law system, but is rather only an illustration
of that court's opinion of the correct solution to be deducted from the
code, a series of decisions which reach the same result by the same
deductive process in the same or similar situation will eventually
attain a much higher level of persuasiveness than that of a single
decision.288 This is jurisprudence constante-but even in light of
such a line of similar resolutions, the court facing the present dispute
must satisfy itself of the correct deduction to be reached.289
common law system.").
284. Sereni, supra note 69, at 67. See also Lawson, supra note 29, at 84:
If, however, the decisions [in a civil law jurisdiction] are well reported and
indexed, the judges will tend to follow them, partly for the negative reason
that they may lose prestige if they are seen to be inconstant, and partly for
the positive reason that they acquire the additional prestige attaching to
legislators if they make stable law by always adhering to their decisions.
See also Merryman, supra note 4, at 47:
Although there is no formal rule of stare decisis, the practice is for judges
to be influenced by prior decisions. A lawyer preparing a case searches
for cases in point and uses them in his argument; and the judge deciding
a case often refers to prior cases. . . . Those who contrast the civil law
and the common law traditions by a supposed nonuse ofjudicial authority
in the former and a binding doctrine of precedent in the latter exaggerate
on both sides. Everybody knows that civil law courts do use precedents.
Everybody knows that common law courts distinguish cases they do not
want to follow, and sometimes overrule their own decisions.
285. Sereni, supra note 69, at 67.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 68.
288. Id
289. See Von Mehren & Gordley, supra note 31, at 1135 n.21:
Decisions, especially a series of successive decisions reaching similar
results, have as a practical matter considerable influence upon the future
judicial handling of comparable situations. '... . Certainly in theory, this
is not a binding rule of law because, with us, in contrast to the case law or
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Quite obviously, in actual practice, the dogma of metaphysical
completeness of the civil code is a fiction.' 9  Short of perfect
clairvoyance, not every conceivable scenario can ever be accounted
for in a code in advance. Moreover, even where provision is made
in a code, the dogma of perfect lucidity and clarity so as to obviate
the need for any interpretation is likewise a fiction.29' Accordingly,
though the civil law courts do in fact practice the deductive and
analogizing processes described herein, they also may fairly be said
to engage in a considerable amount of statutory interpretation.292
Civil law courts are to take into account not only the express
grammatical provisions of the code section, but they are also to
consider the legislative intent and the social goal of the provision.293
This is sometimes referred to as the "teleological approach"-that is,
interpreting legislation in light of evolving societal or market
forces.294 One scholar described the civilian interpretive process
thusly:
English law of cases, other courts, and even those which made the
decisions that established the jurisprudence (case law), retain full freedom
to decide in a different way in similar cases that they will be called upon
to decide in the future. But, in fact, these reversals hardly ever take place
and the precedents, if they do not bind our judges, inevitably inspire
them.'
Id. (quoting 1 A. Colin & H. Capitant, Cours 61 6mentaire de droit civil franqais §
36 at 40 (1 1th ed. 1947)). See also Sereni, supra note 69, at 68 ("Yet even a
jurisprudence constante does not excuse a subsequent court from the duty of
writing an opinion in support of its holding, nor does it prevent from reaching a
different conclusion.").
290. Id at 59. See also Von Mehren & Gordley, supra note 31, at 1136
(German civil law theory "clearly perceive[s] that the codified law is neither
complete nor unambiguous") (citing L. Enneccerus, Allgemeiner Teil des
Biirgerlichen Rechts § 51, at 194, § 58, at 207-12 (14th ed. 1952)).
291. See Merryman, supra note 4, at 42-43:
[T]he illusion ofthe self-applying statute, the legislative norm so clear that
its application is an automatic process, was long ago dispelled by exposure
to the facts. Ever since the revolutionary period, civil law courts have
been engaged in hearing and deciding disputes whose resolution depends
on the meaning to be given to a legislative provision.
292. Id. Merryman adds,
Hardly an article in a typical civil code has escaped the need for judicial
interpretation to supply a meaning that was unclear to the parties, to their
counsel, or to the judges themselves. ... [T]he dogma that a code can be
complete and coherent fails to survive even a cursory glance at the
jurisprudence (the civil law term for judicial decisions).
Id. See also Von Mehren & Gordley, supra note 31, at 1135.
293. Id. (citing Julien Bonnecase, The Problem of Legal Interpretation in
France, 12 J. Comp. Leg. & Int. Law 3d Ser. 79, 91(1930)).
294. See Koch, supra note 28, at 36 (citing Peter de Cruz, Comparative Law in
a Changing World 270 (2d ed. 1999)).
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[W]hen the text presents some ambiguity, when doubts arise
as to its meaning and scope, when it can to a certain extent be
contradicted or contracted or when on the contrary expanded
through comparison with another text, I believe that the judge
has the broadest powers of interpretation. He does not need
to confine to an obstinate inquiry into the meaning that, in
framing such and such an article, the framers of the Code had
actually intended a hundred years ago. He must ask himself
what would have been their intent if the same article had been
framed by them today. He must say to himself that in the
light of all changes that have occurred in the course of a
century of ideas, ethical standards, and institutions, in view of
the economic and social conditions now prevailing in France,
justice and reason direct him to adapt the statutory text,
liberally and with humanity, to the realities and needs of
modem life.295
Similarly, in Germany, courts go beyond the grammatical text where
necessary, and instead seek the underlying gist and reason for the
code provision.296 As in France, German courts are to consider not
only the text of the statute, but, if necessary, the history of the text,
and even what the legislator would have intended, in the hypothetical
scenario of her writing the code section with full cognizance of the
present situation before the court.29 7 The array of steps available to
the civil law court in this process, and the manner according to which
such interpretation proceeds, has been compared to playing a chess
match.298  As stated by Merryman, the judge's role is to seek
applicable code sections and apply them to the fact pattern: "[t]he
whole process of judicial decision is made to fit into the formal
syllogism of scholastic logic.
299
Some mention should be made, as well, of the oft-repeated
characterization that the common law courts use inductive reasoning
processes, whereas the civil law courts use deductive reasoning
processes. By induction, is meant the "inference of a generalized
conclusion from particular instances."3 ° In one sense, of course, this
is obviously a quite correct manner of describing the common law
system-the law is made by various cases which adjudicate specific
295. Von Mehren & Gordley, supra note 31, at 1135-36 n.24 (quoting Ballot
Beaupr6, Le Centenaire du Code Civil 27 (1904)).
296. Id. at 1136 (citing L. Enneccerus, Allgemeiner Teil des BUrgerlichen
Rechts § 51, at 195 (14th ed., 1952)).
297. Id. (citing 1 J. Staudinger, Kommentar zum BUrgerlichen Gesetzbuch 31
(10th ed. 1936)).
298. See Koch, supra note 28, at 43.
299. Merryman, supra note 4, at 36.
300. Merriam-Webster Online, Induction, at www.m-w.com.
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disputes, out of which come generalized rules or precepts. By
deduction, is meant "inference in which the conclusion about
particulars follows necessarily from general or universal premises. '30 1
And thus, the same holds true of describing the civil law processes in
this manner, for it is true that civil codes seek to be broad and
universal, and cases are merely the adjudication of specific disputes
based on those principles. Lawson, however, thought that this
description was of limited accuracy or usefulness."' In either
system, he said, there is the finding of the law-the general
principles-in common law it is often found in cases, and in civil law
it is found in the code. °3 Then, however, in both systems, a specific
factual dispute-the litigation-is resolved by applying those
principles to resolve the case.3 °4 More crucial, in Lawson's view, was
the fact that the common lawyer's source of law was in constant flux
and increase, whereas the civil lawyer's source-the code-was
much more stable.30 5
When civil law courts apply and interpret the code provisions
deemed to be applicable, it could be argued that, at least in some
sense, they are "creating" law.30 6 However, such "law" is secondary
to the code at all times.307 The decisions of civil law cases are to be
viewed as evolving "beside the sanctuary of the statutes and under
the control of the legislator., 3 8 Civilians thus view the role of the
judiciary, not as making law, but as serving a function in assisting in
the actualization of the code-the courts add definition and sharpness
to the code, they fill in the gaps of the code, and they even adjust it
to conform to new societal pressures and innovations.30 9 However,
through all of these judicial machinations and refinements, the
supremacy of the code provisions themselves is the recurring theme,
and respect is never lost for its guiding principles.310 Rather, the
courts are viewed as merely extending the law set forth in the code
provisions to the specific circumstances presented by the case.31'
301. Id.
302. See Lawson, supra note 29, at 65.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. See Tunc, supra note 248, at 26-27.
307. Id. at 26.
308. Id. at 27 (quoting Fenet, Recueil complet des travaux prdparatoires du Code
Civil, Vol. 1470 (1827-1828); Locr6, Ldgislation civile, commerciale et criminelle
de la France, Vol. 1 258 (1827-1832)).
309. Id.
310. See id.
311. Id. at 28; see also Merryman, supra note 4, at 44:
The books are full of decisions in which the court has had to fill gaps in
the legislative scheme and reconcile apparently conflicting statutes.
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That is, "[t]he courts make explicit the law in particular
circumstances, according to the general rules declared by the
legislature" in the articles of the code.3 12 Thus, although civil law
courts do in a sense perform some "tuning" of the law, they do it
with reverence for the code, and with due cognizance for their
relative inferiority to the code provisions and the legislature.313
The courts recognize that the legislature is to make any significant
modifications or additions to the law, and that the judicial function
is, at most, only "to legislate interstitially."31 4  Moreover, the
purpose of the code as the sole source of positive law is not
defeated by such judicial refinement-to the contrary, such
refinement would be meaningless without the backdrop of a code,
and invariably the adjudication will be based on a comparison of
two or more analogous code provisions; that is, the debate will not
be whether or not the code applies, but which part of it applies with
greater force.315 Thus, the code reigns supreme over the judicial
function.
Although the text of a statute remains unchanged, its meaning and
application often change in response to social pressures, and new
problems arise that are not even touched on by existing legislation ...
[The civil law judge] is engaged in a vital, complex, and difficult process.
He must apply statutes that are seldom, if ever, clear in the context of the
case, however clear they may seem to be in the abstract. He must fill gaps
and resolve conflicts in the legislative scheme. He must adapt the law to
changing conditions. The code is not self-evident in application,
particularly to the thoughtful judge.
312. Tunc, supra note 248, at 28.
313. Id.
314. Id. Actually, it was Justice Holmes who remarked about the judicial task
of "legislating interstitially," but the concept has been ascribed to the process of
civil law adjudication. See id.; see also Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205,
221, 37 S. Ct. 524, 531 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("I recognize without
hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially;
315. See Tunc, supra note 248, at 28-29:
One may ask, if there is a case law supplementing the Code, has not the
purpose of codification been defeated? The answer is clearly No....
[M]any of the provisions of the Code are so clear that they have not even
been the subject matter of any litigation. There were no 'particular
circumstances' in which their application needed any clarification. As for
the many provisions that did give rise to litigation, the Courts found in the
Code all the basic principles giving a lead to the decision of concrete
cases. The discussion was therefore greatly clarified and narrowed. The
question was often which of two principles, apparently conflicting on the
given occasion, should prevail over the other; but at least the two
principles themselves could not be a matter for discussion. The law had
received a frame.
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7. The Status of Judges in the Civil Law System
Before concluding the discussion of the basic history and
mechanics of the civil law system, some mention should be made of
the social and legal status of judges in the civil law system. As
mentioned earlier, judges in common law jurisdictions are widely
revered, celebrated figures in legal and societal culture. This follows
naturally from the fact that they are entrusted with a powerful
lawmaking role in our common law system.3" 6 As may be apparent
from the different role ofjudges in the civil law system, and the lack
of stare decisis in a formal sense, the same is not true, generally
speaking, of judges in civil law jurisdictions. Civilian judges
typically choose that career path directly out of school.3 17 Moving
from a career as a practicing attorney to a judicial office is relatively
rare. 3 1 Instead, judges typically commence their judicial career at an
entry-level position with a lower court and then advance through the
system to, hopefully, progressively higher courts.3 9
The actual work of the judge is seen as "fairly routine activity. 32 °
The judge's job is to perfunctorily seek the applicable code
provisions, apply it to the litigation, and render a decision. 321 "The
net image is of the judge as an operator of a machine designed and
built by legislators. His function is a mechanical one. 3 22 This is,
quite obviously, bound up in the historical development of the civil
law separation of powers ideology, with its concomitant suspicion of
the judicial system.323 Thus, whereas the great names of the common
law are often those of the judges (e.g., Holmes, Cardozo, Frankfurter,
Mansfield, Coke), the celebrated historical names of the civil law are
the codifiers (e.g., Justinian and Napoleon), and the academics (e.g.,
Pothier, Imerius, Savigny, Portalis). 3 24 In civil law jurisdictions,
judges tend to be anonymous, based in large part on the severe
restrictions placed on them.325 In sum, the civil law judge is a civil
316. See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
317. See Merryman, supra note 4, at 36.
318. Id.
319. See Koch, supra note 28, at 37 (citing Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kctz, An
Introduction to Comparative Law 109 (Tony Wier trans., 3d ed. 1998)).
320. Merryman, supra note 4, at 37.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 38.
323. See Von Mehren & Gordley, supra note 31, at 1147.
324. Merryman, supra note 4, at 35, 38.
325. See Von Mehren & Gordley, supra note 31, at 1149. The civil law judge,
though he has in some ways broad powers over the conduct of the
litigation and usually sits without a jury, tends, except perhaps in the case
ofpresiding judges, to be an anonymous figure, whose individuality is lost
in a collegiate bench that does not permit the expression of concurring or
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servant-a respected one, to be sure, but merely a servant seen as
performing "important but essentially uncreative functions. 326
8. Summary of Civil Law System
In summary, the modem civil law system derived historically
from the ancient Roman Empire,and more recently through the
codifications of revolutionary France in 1804 and Germany in 1896.
The chief identifying methodological characteristic of the modem
civil law is its use of a unitary source of law-the code-which is
dogmatically held to be all-encompassing, comprehensive, clear in its
language, systematic, and capable of providing the solutions to any
legal problem which may arise. The legislature is the superior
governmental branch, which is seen as creating the governmental
machinery, which the civil law judges simply operate as
functionaries. There is no stare decisis. The only law is the
code-cases are not law. Courts, in rendering their decisions, must
always justify their decisions under code provisions which are
directly applicable, under other code provisions by analogy, or by
deducting a solution from broad principles derived from the overall
structure of the code itself. Strict separation of powers dictates that
the legislature makes law through the code, and judges are strictly to
apply, not make, law.
III. INTERNATIONALIZED CONTRACT LAW: PAST AND PRESENT
A. The Needfor International Contract Law
The world perceives a need for an international, even global, law
to deal with transnational commerce and trade. There is no real
debate that the global economy has arrived in unprecedented, modem
force.327 Over the last half century, the global economic inclination
has been steadily in favor of open markets-worldwide exports
dissenting opinions.
Id.
326. Merryman, supra note 4, at 38.
327. See Loukas A. Mistelis, Regulatory Aspects: Globalization,
Harmonization, Legal Transplants, and Law Reform-Some Fundamental
Observations, 34 Int'l L. 1055, 1057 (1999) (citing John A. Spanogle, Jr., American
Attorneys' Use of International and Comparative Legal Analysis in Everyday
Practice, 28 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1,1 (1993)):
Any business person can tell you that the Global Economy is here. The
necessity is to produce wherever it is most advantageous, and then to
market and compete all over the world, is hardly news to them. It does
still seem to be news to much of the legal profession, however, and to
many in legal education.
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expanded from eight percent to twenty-seven percent of total
worldwide gross domestic product from 1950 to 1998.328 Moreover,
total worldwide trade was fourteen times greater in 1997 than it was
in 1950.329 Since shortening production and distribution times is
crucial to profitable business operation, it has been stated that "the
history of capitalism has been characterized by a speed-up in the pace
of life."33 Such accelerated processes of economic production and
communication "increasingly render national borders
anachronistic. 33'
This anachronistic limitation of individual nations is illustrated
by some of the growing transnational issues of the day. For instance,
the rising use of multinational enterprises such as Siemens, or
General Motors, as a corporate form of business entity which
transcends many national borders, increasingly defies the application
of any single system of national law to its operations. Perhaps an
even more profound example is the explosion of the Internet-who
could have foreseen even ten years ago the extent to which the
Internet has now pervaded our lives, both personally and
commercially? The Internet also often defies application of any
single system of national law to its operations. Consider the
following hypothetical: an Internet web site is maintained on a server
which is located in London, a mirror site and server is maintained in
Sydney, Australia, and persons from the United States, France, and
Germany all transact business on the Internet site. Which nation's
law governs in the absence of an agreement? Which nation's laws
should regulate affairs conducted on the site? Our legal regimes are
currently struggling for answers to these questions. 32 Such dilemmas
328. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Culture,
Trade and Globalization: Questions and Answers, at
www.unesco.org/culture/industries/trade/html-eng/introduction.shtml (last visited
May 1, 2005) [hereinafter UNESCO].
329. Id.
330. William E. Scheuerman, Global Law in Our High Speed Economy,
available at http://www.isanet.org/noarchive/scheuerman.html (paper presented at
2002 annual conference of International Studies Association in New Orleans)
(citing David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity 240 (1989)).
331. Id.
332. See, e.g., Ray August, International Cyber-jurisdiction: A Comparative
Analysis, 39 Am. Bus. L.J. 531 (2002); Michael A. Geist, Is There a There There?
Toward Greater Certainty for Internet Jurisdiction, 16 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1345
(2001); Asaad Siddiqi, Welcome to the City of Bytes? An Assessment of the
Traditional Methods Employed in the InternationalApplication ofJurisdiction over
Internet Activities-Including a Critique ofSuggestedApproaches, 14 N.Y. Int'l L.
Rev. 43 (2001); Henry H. Perrit Jr., The Internet is Changing the Public
International Legal System, 88 Ky. L.J. 885 (2000); Michael S. Rothrnan, It's A
Small World After All: Personal Jurisdiction, The Internet and the Global
Marketplace, 23 Md. J. Int'l L. & Trade 127 (1999); Mark C. Dearing, Personal
[Vol. 65
WAYNE R. BARNES
have led at least one international observer to note that "[n]ation
states will continue to decline as effective centers of power-they are
too small to solve the big problems, and too big to solve the small
problems." '333 Because of this reality, a system of supranational law
seems to be required in order to handle these emerging issues which
transcend the legal system of any one nation.
There has, in fact, been growing supraregional economic
integration, accomplished by such supranational entities as the
European Union, ASEAN (Association of South East Asian
Nations), NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), and
MERCOSUR (the Southern Cone Common Market).334 The general
reasons for such supranational systems are obvious. They include
efficiency, uniformity, certainty, reduction of transaction costs, and
reduction of obstacles to trade. The globalization of the economy
Jurisdiction and the Internet: Can the Traditional Principles andLandmark Cases
Guide the Legal System into the 21st Century?, 4 J. Tech. L. & Pol'y 4 (1999);
Developments in the Law-The Law of Cyberspace, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1575,
1680-1704 (1999); Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 Cardozo L. Rev
121 (1999); Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1199
(1998); Steven Betensky, Jurisdiction and the Internet, 19 Pace L. Rev. 1 (1998);
David G. Post, The "Unsettled Paradox ": The Internet, the State, and the Consent
of the Governed, 5 Ind. J. Global Leg. Stud. 521 (1998); Steven R. Salbu, Who
Should Govern thelnternet?: Monitoring andSupporting a New Frontier, 11 Harv.
J.L. & Tech. 429 (1998); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internet Is Changing
InternationalLaw, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 997 (1998); John A. Lowther IV, Personal
Jurisdiction and the Internet Quagmire: Amputating Judicially Created Long-
Arms, 35 San Diego L. Rev. 619 (1998); Yvonne A. Tamayo, Who? What? When?
Where?: Personal Jurisdiction and the World Wide Web, 4 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 7
(1998); Steven M. Hanley, International Internet Regulation: A Multinational
Approach, 16 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 997 (1998); Henry H. Perritt, Jr.,
The Internet as a Threat to Sovereignty? Thoughts on the Internet's Role in
Strengthening National and Global Governance, 5 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 423
(1998); Stephan Wilske & Teresa Schiller, International Jurisdiction in
Cyberspace: Which States May Regulate the lnternet?, 50 Fed. Comm. L.J. 117
(1997); Timothy S. Wu, Cyberspace Sovereignty? The Internet and the
International System, 10 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 647 (1997); Howard L. Steele, Jr.,
Comment, The Web That Binds Us All: The Future Legal Environment of the
Internet, 19 Hous. J. Int'l L. 495 (1997); Gwenn M. Kalow, From The Internet To
Court: Exercising Jurisdiction Over The World Wide Web Communications, 65
Fordham L. Rev. 2241 (1997); Sean Selin, Governing Cyberspace: The Needfor
an International Solution, 32 Gonz. L. Rev. 365 (1996-1997); David Johnson &
David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 Stan. L. Rev.
1367 (1996); I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace, "55 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 993 (1994).
333. Ernesto GrUn, Globalization of Law: A Systemic and Cybernetic
Phenomenon (Maria Micaela Novas trans.), at
http://www.filosofiayderecho.com/rtfd/numero2/globalenglish.htm (citing Walter
Goodbar, Los enigmas delporvenir, La Naci6n, Oct. 5, 1997) (last visited April 3,
2005).
334. See UNESCO, supra note 328.
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has been likened to the twenty-first century's equivalent of the
debate during the eighteenth and nineteenth century about societal
organization itself.3 5  "Globalization as generally understood
involves the increasing interaction of the world's peoples through
their national economic systems. 336 As evidenced by the statistics
set forth herein, trade markets in the world have dramatically
broadened in the last fifty years, especially as obstacles to such trade
and financial activity have gradually lessened. 337  Because
globalization of economies tends to stimulate economic expansion,
it also tends to improve standards of living for the population of
states participating therein.338
As the worldwide economy has become more globalized, there
is an irresistible urge to work the law itself toward globalization in
order to accommodate. 3 9 The inclination toward unification may be
irreversible as well.34° The globalizing of the markets is primarily
an economic occurrence, though it has undeniable political
characteristics as well.34 1 Any new global commercial law will
value certainty so as to facilitate commercial activity.342
"Convergence of legal systems or harmonization of commercial law
will, in the long run, stabilize and strengthen national economies and
will create a healthy competitive environment": 343 hence, the
discussion of how best to effectuate such an international legal order
of contracts.
335. See Alan Greenspan, Remarks at The Institute for International Economics'
Inauguration of the Peter G. Peterson Building, Washington, D.C. (October 24,
2001), available at www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2001/
20011024/default.htm.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. See Mistelis, supra note 327, at 1057; see also Koch, supra note 28, at 30
("Globalization will instinctively drive toward unification .... ."). As one
commentator has stated, "The globalization of law should be the answer of lawyers
to the globalization of the international market." Aleksandar Goldstajn, Lex
Mercatoria and the CISG: The Global Law Merchant, in The International Sale of
Goods Revisited 241, 258 (Petar Sarcevic & Paul Volken eds., 2001).
340. See Franco Ferrari, Uniform Interpretation ofthe 1980 Uniform Sales Law,
24 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 183, 187 (1994):
[A]lthough the revival of this ancient trend [lex mercatoria] has been
criticized by legal scholars, the trend seems irreversible, as evidenced by
the fact that in some systems the new lex mercatoria has been recognized
not only by legal scholars, but also by courts and arbitration tribunals as
well as by the legislature.
341. Mistelis, supra note 327, at 1057.
342. Id. at 1068.
343. Id.
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B. Historical International Contract Law: The Jus Commune and
Lex Mercatoria
The current era is not the first time in which there has been a
contemplation of global commercial law: "Medieval lex mercatoria
and ius communis [i.e., jus commune] were genuine global legal
rules.",344 For the last two hundred years or so, all legal systems have
been a function of national sovereigns, but this was not always so.
345
As Europe ascended from the Dark Ages, a new international,
informal body of law arose to accommodate the businesspractices of
merchants who readily moved across regional borders.34 This body
of law which arose at the time, is now referred to historically as "law
merchant," or "lex mercatoria.' '347 It was autonomous, and was run
not by a formal legal order, but rather by the business persons,
merchants, themselves a.34  This law merchant, likened by some
scholars to the Europeanjus commune, waned in effectiveness with
the advent of the nation states and codes in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries.349 What were the jus commune and lex
mercatoria? A brief historical overview provides an enhanced
modern perspective.
From the fall of the western Roman Empire, until late in the
eleventh century-the so-called "Dark A es"-there was no
"common" law of Europe that prevailed.35 - Around this time,
however, at least two factors began to contribute to a common legal
thought on the continent. First, the influence of the Roman Catholic
Church and canon law began to have a dominating effect, spreading
uniformly to the nations of Europe.31 This canon law encompassed
areas of ecclesiastical authority, but also family law, inheritance law,
criminal law, and even civil law, as well as procedure.3 52 The other
great contributor to the idea of a European common law, or jus
344. Id. (citing Clive M. Schmitthoff, The Law of International Trade, in
Commercial Law in a Changing Economic Climate (2d ed. 1981)).
345. Franco Ferrari, International Business, Law Merchant, and Law School
Curricula, 6 Yale J.L. & Human. 95, 95 (1994) (citing R. H. Graveson, The
International Unification ofLaw, 16 Am. J. Comp. L. 4 (1968) ("[t]he international
process of assimilating the diverse legal systems of various countries goes back into
ancient history.")).
346. Id. at 96.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 96-97.
350. See Harold J. Berman & Charles J. Reid, Jr., Roman Law in Europe andthe
Jus Commune: A Historical Overview with Emphasis on the New Legal Science of
the Sixteenth Century, 20 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. 1, 4-5 (1994).
351. Id. at 5.
352. Id. (citing Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the
Western Legal Tradition 199-254 (1983)).
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commune, was the revival of the study of Justinian's Corpus Juris
Civilis.353 In the time of the Renaissance, this became the universal
subject of legal scholars in Italy and elsewhere in Europe.354 Though
it was not ever formal, "positive law" in such a sense, its effect was
pervasive, and permeated the promulgation of indigenous law
throughout the continent in this time frame.355 Latin was the
universal language of study, and this also facilitated the common
schools of juristic thought throughout Europe during this period.356
Whereas thejus commune constitutes an almost mystical, "soft"
historical significance, the history and effect of the medieval law
merchant-lex mercatoria-was more concrete and more substantive
in practice. While the European scholars were busy studying
Justinian and the jus commune on the university campuses, the
business persons and merchants of the day were industriously
forming rules and procedures to govern disputes which arose from
their transactions. It is certainly true that "some form of commercial
law is as old as commerce" itself.357 However, the beginning of the
medieval law merchant as scholars now describe it can be traced to
Italy and the Crusades, for it was then that the Mediterranean sea
routes were re-opened to western European businesses.358 Guilds
were formed, and towns became centers of commercial activity with
rules being prescribed to govern the fairs and other commercial
activity there.359 The "courts" which heard such disputes were staffed
353. Id. at 6.
354. Id.
355. Id. Berman and Reid explain that
[t]he thousands of jurists trained in Roman law who graduated annually
from the European universities became the advisors and officials of rulers
at all levels of government in the various European polities, and they
applied their Roman legal learning to the solution of practical legal
problems. To cite one famous example: in 1158 the Emperor Frederick
I recruited the greatest scholars of Roman law of the University of
Bologna--"the four doctors," Martinus, Bulgarus, Jacobus, and Hugo-to
draft legislation for the Diet of Roncaglia, defining in detail the
jurisdiction and legal powers of the emperor in the cities of northern Italy.
The law that they drafted was not the Roman law of Justinian, but it drew
heavily on the Romanist legal concepts and doctrines which they
expounded in their glosses of the Digest and in their university courses.
Id.
356. See Merryman, supra note 4, at 9.
357. Id. at 12-13. See also Leon E. Trakman, The Law Merchant: The
Evolution of Commercial Law 7 (1983) ("That commonwealth of merchants hath
always had a peculiar and proper law to rule and govern it; this law is called the
Law Merchant whereof the law of all nations do take special knowledge.") (quoting
Sir John Davies, The Question Concerning Impositions 10 (1656)).
358. Merryman, supra note 4, at 13.
359. Id.
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with merchants, not legal professionals.36 ° The rules promulgated by
the various towns and fairs quickly gained a uniformity, even across
national borders, such that in a very real sense, an international
commercial law developed to accommodate trade."' The law
merchant and its principles were developed largely exclusive of
formal legal systems-indeed, it has been hailed as "the most
successful example of global law without a state." '362 However, its
principles were gradually subsumed by the sovereign national legal
systems which arose at the time of the Renaissance and
beyond-both, notably, by common law jurisdictions and civil law
jurisdictions alike.363
The law merchant was quite informal-it emphasized flexibility
of approach and commercial orientation, and good faith was of
paramount importance. 3" It has been said that the lex mercatoria had
five characteristics: "(1) it was transnational; (2) its principal source
was mercantile customs; (3) it was administered not by professional
judges but by merchants themselves; (4) its procedure was speedy
and informal; and (5) it stressed equity, in the medieval sense of
fairness, as an overriding principle."'  Above all, merchants were
required to perform their agreements.366  Agreements were
enforceable largely without regard to any requisites of form.367
Another of the procedural features of the law merchant was that
disputes were heard and adjudicated on an expedited basis to avoid
unwarranted interruptions of the contestants' commercial activities. 368
This included the common practice of oral hearings, informal
evidentiary standards, and immediate oral rulings from the
adjudicator.3 69  "The grandeur and significance of the medieval
merchant is that he creates his own laws out of his own needs and his
own views. '
360. See Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation ofthe Western
Legal Tradition 346-48 (1983).
361. Id. at 342-44.
362. Gunther Teubner, "Global Bukowina": Legal Pluralism in the World
Society, in Global Law Without a State 3 (Gunther Tuebner ed., 1997).
363. Merryman, supra note 4, at 13.
364. See Trakman, supra note 357, at 23.
365. Harold J. Berman & Colin Kaufman, The Law of International
Transactions (Lex Mercatoria), 19 Harv. Int'l L.J. 221, 225 (1978). See also
Wyndham A. Bewes, The Romance of the Law Merchant 19 (1923) ("[T]he two
great distinctive elements in the merchant's law, as enforced by their own courts,
were good faith and dispatch, for speed and honesty must be obtained, though by
means not sanctioned by common law.").
366. Trakman, supra note 357, at 10.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 13.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 10 (quoting 1 Goldschmidt, Handbuch des Handelsrechts 373-75
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The law merchant flourished for centuries, largely because of the
homogeneity of commerce along the Mediterranean Sea and
throughout Europe.37' In fact, the presence of this element was fairly
crucial to the success of the law merchant, that is, "a general
similarity in economic conditions.., and [a] predominant influence
of the legal conceptions and the commercial usages of...
merchants." '372 With the rise, however, of nation states and their
assertion of monopoly power over the creation of positive law, the
force of the law merchant began to wane.373 Moreover, greater
diversity and heterogeneity among merchants' practices, inevitable
at the time with the advent of more widely observed national
boundaries, made the maintenance of a uniform law merchant even
more difficult.374 This indigenous variation in both rules, customs,
and results all contributed to a budding lack of unity, which itself led
to an actual growing distrust in the law merchant itself, as inferior to
the growing, sovereign, national, legal systems in which merchants
began to have national pride and investment.375 Hence, by the time
of the promulgation of the Napoleonic Code in 1804, if not before,
the existence of a vibrant, effective law merchant ceased to have the
currency it had enjoyed previously. The positive law thenceforth was
almost wholly a matter of national government and politics.
The historical evidence for thejus commune and the medieval lex
mercatoria provides interesting food for thought. Though many now
believe that unification of contract law on a global scale is an
insurmountable, Sisyphean task, it was a reality over a millennium
ago. And it existed under much harsher conditions, much less
technology, and much less comprehensive structures for world
communication and diplomacy. The historical evidence answers the
skepticism that an international commercial law could not be
fashioned in the present day.376
(1891)).
371. Id. at 18-19.
372. Id. at 19 (quoting Mitchell, An Essay on the Early History of the Law
Merchant 156 (1904)).
373. Id. See also Ferrari, supra note 340, at 184-85 (noting that the enactment
of the great codes of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries "infringed upon the
transnational character of the law previously in force which constituted a real lex
universalis: the so called lex mercatoria.").
374. Trakman, supra note 357, at 19.
375. Id.
376. Cf Kilian, supra note 2, at 220:
[T]he romantic notion that the old lex mercatoria truly represented
disinterested anationalism is, ofcourse, a fallacy. There has never been a law
that transcends domestic legal traditions, nor has there ever been a genuinely
disinterested judiciary (or, in case of the medieval lex mercatoria,
disinterested merchant judges). Ajudge cannot be genuinely independent of
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C. Present Day Echoes of the Lex Mercatoria
Is there a modem lex mercatoria which has arisen during the
twentieth and twenty-first centuries? This question has been hotly
disputed for the better part of the last half-century.377 There arises a
more fundamental question, which is whether the parties agree on what
the term "lex mercatoria" means in the present day, and whether it
even is worthwhile to have this debate at all.378 Be that as it may, there
has been a clear rise of efforts to craft an international commercial
legal order for the better part of a century, and these initial efforts shed
much light on any subsequent efforts that may be undertaken to create
a true, unifying international regime of contract law.
The perception of a modem-era need for transnational law is
widely believed to have originated in the Industrial Revolution, since
national economies at that time began to over-produce in proportion to
their population, thereby economically necessitating the exportation of
products beyond national borders.3 9 Therefore, for the past one
hundred years or so, efforts have increasingly been underway to
"create an internationally uniform discipline for cases linked to a
plurality of countries."38 Stated another way, economists and scholars
have increasingly been working toward a droit corporatif
international.38' The growing sense of a need for such a unifying legal
regime is based on the perceived "anarchy upon which [current]
international relationships are based," '382 and the obstacles presented by
the fiercest adversary of international business persons-"nationality
of law. Therefore, beginning in the twentieth century, scholars and
legal professionals began to take steps to fashion contract laws which
his or her own legal paradigm. Nevertheless, the myth--and utopia--ofa lex
mercatoria haunts legal scholars in search for harmonization of international
law so that transborder trade may proceed without certainty [sic] and to the
satisfaction and benefit of all trading parties.
377. See Hans-Joachim Mertens, Lex Mercatoria: A Self-Applying System Beyond
National Law?, in Global Law Without a State 31 (Gunther Tuebner ed., 1997).
378. Id.
379. See Franco Ferrari, The Sphere of Application of the Vienna Sales
Convention 1 (1995).
380. Id. (citing Sergio Carbone & Marco Lopez de Gonzalo, Art. 1, Nuove
Leggi Civili Commentate 2, 2 (1989)).
381. Id. at 2 (citing Edouard Lambert, Sources du droit compar ou
supranational. L6gislation uniforme etjurisprudence comparative, in 3 Receuil
D'Etudes sur les Sources du Droit en L'Honneur de Frangois Gdny478,499 (1934)
(using the term in a similar way as lex mercatoria)).
382. Id. (citing Ren6 David, I Grandi Sistemi Giuridici Contemporanei 9 (1980)).
383. Id. (citing Roy Goode, Reflections on the Harmonization of CommercialLaw,
in Commercial and Consumer Law. National and International Dimensions 3, 3 (Ross
Cranston & Roy Goode eds., 1993) ("The particular characteristic of [. .]
harmonization lies in its motivation, which is to reduce the impact of national
boundaries.").
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would transcend national boundaries and thereby facilitate world
commerce.
1. Uniforn Laws on Sales of Goods (ULIS, ULFIS, and CISG)
The first such effort is widely credited with having commenced at
the end of the 1920s, when a scholar named Ernst Rabel suggested the
creation of a uniform law to govern the international sale of goods.384
The contract for sale of goods was selected as the focus of this first
effort because of its perception as the "mercantile contract par
excellence." '385 Rabel's suggestion was directed to the logical private
body of the day, the International Institute for the Unification of
Private Law, or as they are more commonly known, UNIDROIT.386
Rabel became the leading member of the group constituted to effect
this task and was also its general reporter. 87 The first drafts of the
uniform sales law were prepared in 1935 and 1939-they were based
primarily on an amalgamation of European civil law principles, though
the common law had some influence as well.388 Some years later, in
1964 to be exact, the first two formal bodies of international uniform
contract law were adopted by multiple nations in The Hague-the
Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (ULIS) and the
Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods (ULFIS). 389 The ULIS and ULFIS, like the earlier drafts,
reflected mainly the principles in Continental Europe.390 For whatever
reason,391 the ULIS and ULFIS were only adopted by a handful of
nations, not including France or the United States.392
So, the international legal community decided to try again. This
time, the task was undertaken by the United Nations Commission on
384. See Ole Lando, Comparative Law and Lawmaking, 75 Tul. L. Rev. 1015,
1017 (2001).
385. Ferrari, supra note 379, at 2 (citing Francesco Galgano, I1 Diritto Privato
fra Codice e Costituzione 6 (2d ed. 1980)).
386. Lando, supra note 384, at 1017.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id. (citing Diplomatic Conference on the Unification of Law Governing the
International Sale of Goods, The Hague April 1964, at 2 (1964)).
390. Id.
391. Franco Ferrari has opined that the relative failure of the ULIS and ULFIS
can be attributed to the scarce role that both Socialist and Third World
countries played in the elaboration and compilation of the aforementioned
Conventions and which resulted in those countries' refusal to enact the
1964 Hague Conventions which they considered as being modeled on the
sole exigencies of the industrialized nations.
Ferrari, supra note 379, at 3.
392. Lando, supra note 384, at 1017.
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International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in 1968."93 The scope of
coverage of the ULIS and ULFIS was merged, and the new text took
the form of a treaty, namely, the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG).3 94 At an
international conference in Vienna in 1980, forty-two nations adopted
the new sales convention as law.395 As of 2001, over sixty countries
have subscribed to the CISG.396 It has been referred to as "the most
important piece of [modem] jus commune within the law of
obligations. "397 The CISG is positive, actual, operating law in these
sixty-plus nations, and it will be discussed more below.
2. Principles of European Contract Law and the UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts
In 1968, the same year that UNCITRAL was charged with the
task of reworking a uniform code for the sale of goods which
eventually led to the CISG, UNIDROIT began considering the
concept of preparing a broader, more comprehensive "Restatement"
of all principles of international contract law.3 98 In 1971 UNIDROIT
published an initiative called "Progressive Codification of the Law
of International Trade," which further signaled its resolve in this
regard.39 9 It took another nine years, in 1980, for a committee to
actually be appointed by UNIDROIT to begin drawing up the
Restatement.40 ° The first version of the contract principles was made
public in 1994 and adopted by UNIDROIT. 40 1 Entitled "UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts" (hereinafter
"UNIDROIT Principles"), they were originally published in English
and French, and then subsequently in all of the "major languages. 402
The principles contain 119 articles, which cover the broad range of
most issues of contract law, including: freedom of contract,
393. Id. at 1018. Sixty-two different nations participated in UNCITRAL's
process. Id.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. See Klaus Peter Berger, The Lex Mercatoria Doctrine and the UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contract, 28 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 943,
944 (1997).
399. Id. at 944-45 (citing Progressive Codification of the Law of International
Trade: Note by the Secretariat for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), 1
Uncitral Yearbook 285, 285 (1968).
400. Id. at 945.
401. Id. (citing Klaus Peter Berger, Formalisierte Oder "Schleichende"
Kodifizierung Des Transnationalen Wirtschaftsrechts 141-42 (1996)).
402. Lando, supra note 384, at 1019.
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formation, pacta sunt servanda, good faith, and also trade usages.403The provisions contain basic statements of legal rules and precepts,
followed by commentary and hypothetical case illustrations.,'
Notably, though the experts who participated in the drafting of the
UNIDROIT Principles came from five continents and all major legal
systems of the world, the introductory commentary to the
UNIDROIT Principles states that they "are drafted more in the style
of European codes than of typical common law statutes," though the
commentary also states that the "drafters deliberately avoided using
the terminology peculiar to any given legal system and preferred the
the ermnolgy ecuiartony in lnegnoal te ondtrer ed The
adoption of terms frequently used in international contracts." 405 The
UNIDROIT Principles are not positive law,40 6 nor is this on the
immediate horizon-rather, the more modest goal of the UNIDROIT
Principles is to be used in any number of ways, including
incorporation by parties into their own private contracts, reference by
arbitrators, and even by judges and legislative bodies.40 7
Curiously, at about the same time that UNIDROIT was beginning
work on its comprehensive restatement of international contract law,
a separate group of scholars organized itself with the self-styled
moniker Commission on European Contract Law (CECL).4 °8 The
CECL had as its forming mission the drafting of a similar set of
comprehensive contract law principles, with a focus on the rules of
the nations of Europe.4"9 After an initial draft was prepared in 1995,
a complete version of the CECL's text-the Principles of European
Contract Law (PECL)-was published in 1999.41' English and
French versions have been published, and CECL intends to also
publish and widely disseminate the PECL in German, Spanish,
Italian, Russian, Chinese, and Japanese. 41' Like the UNIDROIT
Principles, the PECL cover issues of "formation, validity,
403. See Berger, supra note 398, at 946.
404. Id.
405. UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, in G.
Gregory Letterman, UNIDROIT's Rules in Practice: Standard International
Contracts and Applicable Rules 66-67 (2001).
406. It should be noted, however, that while the UNIDROIT Principles are not
themselves positive law, they have already been widely influential in recent
legislation in numerous countries. See Michael Joachim Bonell, The UNIDROIT
Principles on Practice: The Experience of the First Two Years, 2 Uniform L. Rev.
34, 37 (1997) (noting that the Principles inspired the Dutch Civil Code, the new
Civil Code of Quebec, and the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, and that the
Principles were referenced by Lithuania, Estonia, Czech Republic, Scotland,
Tunisia, New Zealand, and several African states in recent legislative drafts).
407. See Lando, supra note 384, at 1019.
408. Id. at 1018.
409. See generally id. at 1018-19.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 1019.
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interpretation, contents, performance and nonperformance (breach)
of contract, and remedies for nonperformance. ,412
The PECL are held out for the same immediate purposes as the
UNIDROIT Principles-adoption by parties into their contracts,
arbitrational usage, and even potential reference by courts and
legislative bodies. 413  However, the CECL has a much more
ambitious, express goal for the PECL: "several of the members of
the CECL hope that the EU or its member states will one day adopt
a European civil code, and they see the PECL as a first draft of the
contract rules of that Code."' 4  Thus, the PECL have been
implemented for the express purpose of facilitating development of
a common unified contract law for all of Europe. However, for now,
neither the UNIDROIT Principles, nor the PECL, are positive law in
and of themselves-they are merely private drafts of contract law,
held out to the world for discussion about their prospective utilization
in further developments of the law.
D. The Implementation of CISG as Positive Law and the Degree
of Uniformity in its Interpretation Among Contracting States
As set forth herein, and as is well known, the CISG is a landmark
achievement insofar as it is "real" law,4 5 which applies to all those
states who have subscribed to it.4 16  It is the only current
comprehensive contract law applicable on an international scale, and,
for all practical purposes, the first one ever in the age of cooperation
among modem nation-states. As such, it is unparalleled in its
potential for "laboratory observations" which may illuminate the
process of fashioning unifying contract law in the future. As it turns
out, many commentators have concern for the CISG's viability in the
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. See Ferrari, supra note 379, at 4-5. Ferrari explains that the CISG
represents a so-called self-executing treaty, that is, a 'treaty where legal
rules arising from the treaty are open for immediate application by the
national judge and all living persons in a Contracting State are entitled to
assert their rights or demand fulfillment of another person's duty by
referring directly to the legal rules of the treaty.
Id. This is in contrast to the ULIS and ULFIS, which were not self-executing, but
rather required for their implementation the respective national legislatures to
incorporate them by domestic legislative enactment. Id. at 5.
416. See Murray, supra note 1, at 365 ("When the United States and ten other
nations ratified the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods (CISG), it was quite legitimately characterized as a monumental
achievement.").
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future.417 Paramount among these fears is the problem of uniform
interpretation of its provisions-indeed, it was noted early on that
"the lack of a common heritage ofjudicial techniques and substantive
law among the Contracting States" could ose a "special hazard" for
the CISG's implementation in practice. 4'P Put simply, "even if you
get uniform laws you will not get uniform results.'' 9
The CISG was promulgated with input from members of all of
the major legal systems, including both common law and civil law,420
though its designers hoped it would "escape[] the ethnocentric
perspectives and biases of any one legal system.""42 Additionally,
because of the CISG's unique compromising feature of being limited
in scope, hardly exhaustive in content, and taking on a hybrid nature
vis-6-vis the dominant legal methodologies of the nations, problems
417. See, e.g., id.:
As the Convention begins its second decade as the governing law for the
sale of goods in a number approaching fifty nation states, one can only be
cautiously pessimistic about its future. It has not lived up to the promise
that was so cheerfully shared by those of us who gathered at the
University of Pittsburgh School of Law for a 1988 symposium to celebrate
this achievement.
418. Id. at 367 (citing John Honnold, The United States Uniform Commercial
Code: Interpretation by the Courts of the States of the Union, 181, 183, in
International Uniform Law in Practice, Acts and Proceedings of the 3rd Congress
on Private Law Held by the International Institute for the Unification of Private
Law, UNIDROIT (Rome, September, 1987)).
419. John 0. Honnold, The Sales Convention in Action-Uniform International
Word: Uniform Application?, 8 J.L. & Com. 207 (1998). See also Michael Van
Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 687, 740 (1998)
("Whatever rules are chosen, uniform words risk remaining empty shells without
a uniform methodology for their interpretation."); Ferrari, supra note 340, at 204
("[T]o succeed in the uniform application of the Vienna Sales Convention, as in any
convention of uniform law, it does not suffice that the Convention is considered an
autonomous body of rules, since it still can be interpreted in diverse ways in various
systems."); Lisa M. Ryan, The Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods: Divergent Interpretations, 4 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 99, 101 (1995)
("textual uniformity... is insufficient"); Ferrari, supra note 2, at 245:
[I]n order to create legal uniformity it is insufficient to merely create and
enact uniform laws or uniform law conventions because 'even when
outward uniformity is achieved. . ., uniform application of the agreed
rules is by no means guaranteed, as in practice different countries almost
inevitably come to put different interpretations upon the same enacted
words.
Id. (quoting R. J. C. Munday, Comment, The Uniform Interpretation of
International Conventions, 27 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 450, 450 (1978)).
420. See Ferrari, supra note 379, at 5 ("'[T]he Convention represents a truly
global effort, with balanced representatives of all the regions and economic and
legal systems of the world."').
421. Id. (quoting Errol P. Mendes, The U.N. Sales Convention & U.S. -Canada
Transactions; Enticing the World's Largest Trading Bloc to Do Business under a
Global Sales Law, 8 J.L. & Com. 109, 122 (1988)).
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in interpretation and application are perhaps bound to occur.4 22 In
order to affect a uniform, international interpretation of the CISG's
provisions, article 7 was included, which provides as follows:
(1) In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be
had to its international character and to the need to promote
uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith
in international trade.
(2) Questions concerning matters governed by this
Convention which are not expressly settled in it are to be
settled in conformity with the general principles on which it
is based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity
with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private
international law.423
The meaning of Article 7's mandate of uniform, international
interpretation has proven elusive. One commentator, John Murray,
has stated that to the extent "it means that the court is to transcend its
domestic perspective and become a different court that is no longer
influenced by the law of its own nation state ... it can only be an
aspiration. ' ' 2 In fact, it almost certainly does mean that, in theory,
courts are to consider CISG issues without regard to the legal
methodology from which they originate.42 ' As Murray further
metaphorically posited: "If a judge in Hungary, the United States or
any other Contracting State is to see the Convention through an
international lens instead of a lifetime domestic lens, we now know
that the typical judge may require assistance from an international
legal ophthalmologist." 42  Notwithstanding the importance of the
objective of uniformity, the different legal systems and judicial
methodologies involved make it an exceedingly complex puzzle.427
422. Ferrari, supra note 340, at 198.
423. The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods art. 7 (1980) [hereinafter CISG].
424. Murray, supra note 1, at 367.
425. Ferrari, supra note 340, at 200. See also Dimatteo, supra note 2, at 133:
The Convention is meant to be interpreted based upon its uniqueness and
not its similarities to any one of the systems from which it was created.
Article 7 mandates that the Convention be interpreted in a way that would
"promote uniformity in its application." One commentator has noted that
this dictate of uniformity was meant to allow individual judges to sever
their thinking from domestic law mind-sets. It was an attempt "to free
judges, particularly in countries of the common law tradition, from the
iron chains of precedents, thus permitting them to examine foreign cases
as well in order to attain uniformity."
Id.
426. Murray, supra note 1, at 367.
427. See id.
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One of the difficulties is that, although Article 7 establishes a
requirement to invoke the CISG's "general principles" when there is
no explicitly applicable provision, ascertaining what these principles
are has proven problematic.428 Professor Honnold has remarked that
"[i]nternational unifying conventions, unlike true (civil law) codes,
lack a general framework from which general principles can be
derived." '429 This notion of "general principles" is quite clearly a
civilian concept in which principles are used to fill in gaps in civil
code coverage.43' In common law jurisdictions, on the other hand,
the concept of general principles in legislation is not nearly as
prevalent-statutes are ordinarily only for addressing specific,
defined circumstances, rather than the broad, comprehensive
coverage of a civil code. 3' The few United States court decisions
applying the CISG have, perhaps unsurprisingly, violated Article 7's
requirement to maintain the "international character" of the CISG, by
instead falling back on domestic law.432 These courts too often view
the CISG through their "domestic lens," rather than through the
aspirational "international" lens which the CISG seems to dictate.433
Moreover, there have been very few cases decided in United States
courts at all, which is itself problematic for the development of a
CISG jurisprudence which would aid in future interpretation.434 This
is likely due to the fact that lawyers and their clients frequently avoid
the CISG altogether due to unfamiliarity. 435 Honnold has stated that
he "has not yet seen a clear solution to this dilemma."'436
428. Id. ("What, precisely are the general principles on which the Convention
is based? The Convention does not say. They cannot be the general principles of
any particular domestic legal system, since the pursuit of such principles would
violate the directive to transcend domestic principles."). But see Ferrari, supra note
340, at 223-24 (identifying several general principles in the CISG, including good
faith, party autonomy, lack of form requirements, interest, and communications
being effective on dispatch).
429. Murray, supra note 1, at 367-68 (citing Honnold, supra note 419, at 190).
430. Ferrari, supra note 340, at 220.
431. Id. at221.
432. Murray, supra note 1, at 367-68 (citing Being Metals & Minerals
Import/Export Corp. v. American Bus. Ctr., Inc., 993 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1993)
(applying Art. 8(3) of the CISG and failing to perceive the fundamentally different
treatment by the CISG of parol evidence); Delchi Carrier Spa v. Rotorex Corp., 71
F.3d 1024 (2d Cir. 1995) (finessing the differences between the classical limitation
on foreseeability of damages in Hadley v. Baxendale and CISG's limitation on
damages set forth in Article 74)).
433. Id.; see generally Cook, supra note 2 (noting the failure of U.S. courts
applying the CISG to take into account the numerous foreign cases as either having
"persuasive value" or "full precedential effect").
434. Murray, supra note 1, at 367-68.
435. Id.at371.
436. Id. at 368 (citing Honnold, supra note 419, at 190).
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Central to the debate on uniformity of interpretation of the CISG,
as it is structured, is the precedential effect that foreign cases
interpreting the CISG should have on domestic courts. In this regard,
it is interesting to note the dichotomy in the volume of CISG case
decisions emanating from the common law member states on the one
hand, versus the civil law member states on the other hand.437 In
short, the civil law jurisdictions have generated a much larger number
of cases, out of proportion to the ratio between the member states of
the two traditions.4' The reasons for this discrepancy are, ultimately,
a matter largely of speculation. One reason which has been advanced
is that the common law courts "are loath to apply law that has not
been created from within and, moreover, that may conflict with well-
established domestic common law or code (such as the United States'
Uniform Commercial Code)."' 39 However, this is not necessarily any
more the case with common law jurisdictions than civil law ones.
Many scholars conclude that Article 7(1)'s requirement for
international interpretation necessitates that domestic courts at least
consider foreign CISG decisions."4 At least one commentator has
even argued for a "supranational stare decisis" to be practiced by
common law and civil law courts alike." However, although no one
questions that foreign case law should have persuasive authority, this
suggestion of supranational stare decisis has been criticized," 2
437. See generally Kilian, supra note 2.
438. Id. at 218 (citing 1 UNILEX, International Case Law and Bibliography on
the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (2000)). As
of the time of writing her article, Kilian stated that out of over 600 CISG case
decisions, only twenty-one were from common law jurisdictions-"one from
Australia, two from Canada, and eighteen from the U.S." Id. It should be noted
that Pace University School of Law has CISG case decisions, as well as a wealth
of other CISG and other international contract law-related material, on its website.
See Pace Law School, CISG Database, at www.cisg.law.pace.edu (last visited May
1, 2005).
439. Kilian, supra note 2, at 218-19.
440. See, e.g., Helen Elizabeth Hartnell, Rousing the Sleeping Dog: The
Validity Exception to the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, 18 Yale J. Int'l L. 1, 7 (1993); Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty
Interpretation, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 687, 787 (1998); Darkey, supra note 2, at 142.
441. Ferrari, supra note 2, at 258-59 (citing Larry A. Dimatteo, An International
Contract Law Formula: The Informality of International Business Transactions
Plus the Internationalization of Contract Law Equals Unexpected Contractual
Liability, 23 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. 67, 79 (1997); Dimatteo, supra note 2, at
133).
442. See id. at 259 (citing Vivian Grosswald Curran, The Interpretive Challenge
to Uniformity, 15 J. L. & Com. 175, 177 (1995)):
Although one must agree that in order to obtain uniformity civil law
judges should start to 'approximate their common law counterparts in
increasing their reliance on [case law],' and common law judges should
increasingly take into account legal writing as well as legislative history,
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primarily because there is no "rigid hierarchical structure of the
various countries' court systems in which the 'national' stare decisis
doctrine is embedded."' Moreover, of course, there is also the
deeply embedded civilian aversion to judicial "law."
In practice, such consideration of foreign CISG cases happens
quite rarely. 4 This, in fact, is equally true with decisions from civil
law countries as well as common law countries." 5 Some scholars
have expressed surprise at this lack of cross-border citation of
authority, certainly in common law jurisdictions where stare decisis
is recognized, but even in civil law jurisdictions where it is widely
appreciated that court decisions do have persuasive value." 6 This
may not be, however, a startling result. There is, after all, a
qualitative difference in the way the various jurisdictions accord
decisions with precedential effect, and the variety of different nations
from which these decisions emerge creates a jurisprudential
dissonance which is difficult to resolve. Courts the world over have
undeniable "inertia[s] of habit" formed by their national biases,
which make them intellectually resistant to undertake different ways
of analyzing and adjudicating legal disputes." Moreover, courts are
unlikely to modify and innovate their methodologies until they are
obliged to do so, such as by a new legal structure or paradigm." 8
These are issues for courts from any jurisdiction, but it is illuminating
that the common law courts have issued CISG opinions in drastically
fewer disproportionate numbers. This development is "worrisome
for the harmonizing efforts of private international law," and could
one cannot attribute the value of binding precedent to uniform foreign case
law, much less advocate a doctrine of "supranational doctrine of stare
decisis."
443. Id. at 259-60. See also id. at 260:
[H]ow should one decide whether a specific court is, from a hierarchical
point of view, a lower court in respect to the court of a different country?
And where in the scheme of things would arbitral tribunals fit into the
hierarchy? Are they to be considered hierarchically superior to courts of
first instances, appellate courts or even supreme courts? And what about
the courts ofNon-Contracting States? Should their decisions be taken into
account at all?
444. See Michael Joachim Bonell & Fabio Liguori, The U.N. Convention on the
International Sale of Goods: A Critical Analysis of Current International Case
Law, 2 Uniform L. Rev./Revue de Droite Uniforme 385 (1997) (cited in Kilian,
supra note 2, at 226).
445. See Peter M. Gerhart, The Sales Convention in Courts: Uniformity,
Adaptability andAdoptability, in The International Sale ofGoods Revisited 77, 106
(Petar Sarcevic & Paul Volken eds., 2001).
446. Id. at 106-07.
447. See David Frisch, Commercial Common Law, the United Nations
Convention on the International Sale of Goods, and the Inertia ofHabit, 74 Tul. L.
Rev. 495, 522-23 (1999).
448. Id. at 540.
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potentially lead to the exclusion of common law jurisdictions from
future unifying efforts." 9
The national biases of the courts is a large problem. As stated,
one of the problems of according precedential effect to CISG
opinions is the respective desires of the various national courts to
establish their ideas as judicial authority, rather than being "beaten to
the punch" by foreign courts.45° Commentators hope that the allure
of unifying international law embodied by the CISG will ultimately
"dissipate the centrifugal force of domestic social and legal
traditions.""45  One other suggestion that has been made for the
purposes of increasing uniformity in interpretation of the CISG is the
creation of an international appellate court to hear appeals from CISG
"lower" court decisions, though the loss of sovereignty
accompanying such a measure is grounds for criticism.452 Until that
ameliorating reform, or some other measure, however, the
parochialism of domestic courts is a quandary: "Naturally, each
jurisdiction would like to have its CISGjudgments become authority,
and equally naturally, each 'opposing' jurisdiction would like to
prevent that.A
53
Another possibility for obtaining interpretative uniformity is
through recurring legislative enactments. As stated by Professor
Gerhart:
Inevitably.. . unification must be a legislative unification,
and this will require UNCITRAL to have a continuing
legislative presence that will allow refinement and
amendment of the Convention's provisions over time. If..
. the Convention is an act of public lawmaking (albeit in the
realm of private transactions), then new legislation is the only
legitimate way of changing aberrant outcomes, filling gaps in
a uniform way (when the gaps are not fairly covered by the
Convention's general principles), or extending the scope of
the Convention beyond that crafted in 1980. In other words,
449. See Kilian, supra note 2, at 234. It is also notable that, to date, the United
Kingdom is not a party to the CISG. Id.
450. Id. at 240.
451. Id. at 242 (quoting Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation,
146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 687, 790 (1998)).
452. Id. at 242-43 (citing Ronald A. Brand and Harry M. Flechtner, Arbitration
and Contract Formation in International Trade: First Interpretations of the U.N.
Sales Convention, 12 J.L. & Com. 239, 239 (1993)). See also Gerhart, supra note
445, at 111 (citing Louis Sohn, Proposalsforan International Tribunal to Interpret
Uniform Legal Texts, in Uniform Commercial Law in the Twenty-First Century:
Proceedings of the Congress of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law, May 18-22, 1992, New York; United Nations A/CN, 9/SER.D/1, sales
No. 94 V. 14, 50-54 (1995)).
453. Kilian, supra note 2, at 243.
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continued amendments of the Convention are necessary, and
those amendments can be done only through a legislative
process much like the one that gave rise to the Convention.
The evolution from the ULIS to the Convention can be seen
in just that light, with the Convention building on, and out of,
the experience of the ULIS in order to improve the
adoptability of the instrument. Similarly, in the United States
the current work to amend and improve the Uniform
Commercial Code shows the necessity of continued
legislative amendments to provide uniformity when
decentralized application leads to disparate results. 5
Murray has concluded that, in bringing together different legal
traditions for an attempt at uniform law such as the CISG, sometimes
"[tihe desire for enactability breeds compromise that may be
excessive." 4 5 He notes, however, quite correctly, that
CISG is a milestone, not.., because it is the ultimate modem
commercial code. . . . [Rather,] CISG is a monumental
contribution because it evidences a willingness of Nation
States throughout the world to seek uniformity in a critical
commercial context. The success of CISG could spawn other
and more sophisticated efforts at uniformity with critically
important effects well beyond international trade.456
Concluding that it is unrealistic to expect courts, in applying the
CISG, to study case law from all the jurisdictions of the contracting
states around the world, Murray has suggested the establishment of
an interpretative committee akin to the Permanent Editorial Board of
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
for the American Uniform Commercial Code, with the concomitant
publication of explanatory comments for aid in interpreting the CISG,
and the authority to render non-binding advisory opinions.457 This is
certainly another measure worthy of serious contemplation, but
whether this is a comprehensive solution, or merely a temporary,
ameliorative salve, is open to question. Ultimately, if the CISG is to
454. Gerhart, supra note 445, at 112-13.
455. Murray, supra note 1, at 371. In fairness, this quote is taken a bit out of
context. Murray was speaking primarily of the compromise position of allowing
parties to entirely exclude the CISG and/or to change the applicability of any of its
provisions. See id. ("CISG allows the parties to exclude its application entirely or
derogate from or vary the effect of its provisions.") (citing CISG art. 6).
Nevertheless, as illustrated by the thesis of this article, I believe that the more
substantive, fundamental compromises in content and methodology may also impair
the efficacy of the CISG.
456. Id. at 373.
457. Id. at 374-75.
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fail, it is likely because there were many compromises on certain
issues, and at other times intentional gaps in the CISG's coverage,
which the drafters felt were unavoidable, and that "the attitudinal
differences between approaches of common lawyers and civilians...
were just too fundamental to bridge."458
IV. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF
CONTRACT LAW AND THE PRAGMATIC EFFECTS OF
IMPLEMENTING A CIVILIAN RESOLUTION
The global community of scholars and legal professionals has not
yet fashioned the definitive contracts legislation to govern all
commercial transactions in all nations. Assuming that it wishes to do
so, what form can, or should, such legislation take? The CISG is an
important milestone in the historical development of such a code, but
it is hardly the ultimate modem commercial code, but rather only is
significant in that it indicates a willingness for states to eventually go
further with a more sophisticated code.459 Promulgating and enacting
such a sophisticated, comprehensive code is the next logical step.
The lessons learned from the implementation of the CISG, as well as
other internationalization efforts, should be put into practice as this
code is envisioned and drafted. Uniformity among nations is a
supreme goal, probably the paramount goal, of cross-border
commercial legislation.
A comprehensive code, rather than one with intentional gaps for
compromise purposes, is preferable, because the fewer gaps in the
code's coverage, the fewer opportunities there will be for divergent
judicial interpretation by different national courts, which lead in turn
to non-uniform contract law across the nations. Also, the best hope
for uniformity in a multinational context comes from the quality of
the legislation, rather than reliance on judicial interpretations. 4"° The
legislation must likely be the primary unifying factor to achieve the
much desired certainty and uniformity that international commerce
necessitates.
In all prior efforts at uniform international contract law, there has
been a tension between pacifying both civil law representatives and
common law representatives. The motivations for doing this are
obvious-respect and deference for the two traditions, and the sincere
conviction that one's legal system provides excellent and superior
rules and methodologies for achieving the greatest justice in disputes.
And yet one of the driving forces of globalization of contract law
458. Erauw & Flechtner, supra note 2, at 73.
459. See Murray, supra note 1, at 373.
460. Gerhart, supra note 445, at 112-13.
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should be the shedding of domestic biases for the sake of achieving
uniformity and certainty. And any concerns voiced over substantive
outcomes and justices in the face of compromises from domestic
legal precepts are quite likely highly exaggerated-in fact, the two
systems have many fundamental ideologies and precepts in
common.461 Indeed, "it is not to be doubted that both systems [civil
law and common law] tend, as they should, toward similar
conclusions. A complete and adequate study of the genesis of each
would show as kindred much that we might fancy to be
foreign . .,346 Litigation tends to be resolved in a similar manner
under either system."'
There is also the historical fact that codification and civilian
concepts are not, as some legal historians would posit, anathema to
the common law traditions, given the fact that there have been
multiple movements toward codification in the histories of both
England and the United States.4" Moreover, many scholars actually
observe an increasing convergence of the two systems-i.e., that
common law jurisdictions are increasingly becoming legislatively
"codified," and that civil law judiciaries are becoming increasingly
more active and tending closer to a system of precedent.465 Justice,
it would seem, is a fairly universal concept after all, and the
determinative differences between the civil law and the common law,
when viewed in a macro-jurisprudential sense, tend to be about
different procedural means to largely similar substantive ends. Thus,
given a healthy perspective on the tremendous amount that the two
systems have in common, resistance toward utilizing parts of a
foreign system should be reduced. What is being discussed, after all,
is not a revolutionary change in a nation's own domestic legal
system, but rather a pragmatic solution for a common international
law of contracts.
461. See Koch, supra note 28, at 47 ("While civil law and common law legal
cultures have some basic disagreements regarding interpretation, they share many
fundamental principles.").
462. Thibaudeau Rinfret, The Relations Between Civil Law and Common Law,
in The Code Napoleon and the Common Law World (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1956).
463. Id. at 384 (citing La Reception du Barreau Canadien a Paris 2).
464. See supra notes 194-230 and accompanying text.
465. Weiss, supra note 194, at 440-41 (citing John H. Merryman & David S.
Clark, Comparative Law: Western European and Latin American Legal Systems,
Cases and Materials 54 (1978); Arthur T. Von Mehren, Some Reflections on
Codification and Case Law in the Twenty-First Century, 31 U.C. Davis L. Rev.
659, 667 (1998)). Though there may indeed be some observable convergence
tendencies between the two systems, the differences pertaining as to code ideology
and the precedential effect of case decisions, likely makes any convergence
ultimately asymptotic at best.
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All of this having been said, there would seem to be much to
recommend preparing any future sophisticated international
commercial legislation in the form of an outright civil code with the
concomitant interpretational methodologies, rather than as a common
law statute, or as some type of diluted hybrid text. That is, to respond
to Professor Murray's observation that world courts need to be fitted
with "international lenses"" to correct their domestic myopia, I
suggest that we consider fitting them with civilian lenses, for
purposes of use during interpretation and application of a future
international civil commercial code. This conclusion is not reached
without much trepidation of the reaction in the common law
community, and it is done without any disdain for the common law
system, which is justifiably proud of its noble traditions and will
doubtlessly remain the legal methodology in the English-speaking
parts of the world, and elsewhere, for centuries to come. However,
there are many reasons why a civil law approach may well be the
more efficacious and pragmatic solution for the international
commercial community. A few of these reasons can be mentioned
briefly by way of introduction.
Initially, one of the problems of the CISG is that it is substantially
a neutral hybrid, and thereby, somewhat emasculated system.467 It is
neither a civil law code, nor a common law statute, and it has no
meaningful precepts providing guidance on how it should be
interpreted. As a result, courts have been struggling with the manner
in which this should be accomplished.46 Thus, fashioning any future
code as a civil law code, with the concomitant legal interpretational
methodology, will greatly reduce uncertainty in its application.
Making a civil law, international code comprehensive in coverage,
with vastly fewer gaps, will also dramatically reduce the
opportunities for courts, civil law and common law alike, to inject
judicial interpretational uncertainty into the international contract
jurisprudence.
Abandoning any rigid concept of stare decisis in the international
context is also a pragmatic reality-it is especially problematic, for
numerous reasons, to ask or expect domestic courts to review prior
foreign cases at all, let alone treat them as authoritative in the sense
of being positive law,469 and thus the civilian concept of not
466. See Murray, supra note 1, at 375.
467. This characterization is in no way meant in disrespect of the drafters and
advisers of the CISG, who are among the brightest minds in all of academia. Their
efforts at achieving a successful global consensus were nothing short of miraculous
and heroic-indeed, it would seem there would be no CISG at all if it were not for
their efforts and the hybridizing compromises they made.
468. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 1; Kilian, supra note 2.
469. See Murray, supra note 1, at 373-75.
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recognizing cases470 as such works much better, especially in the
backdrop of having a comprehensive civil law code. Finally, as has
been mentioned, international courts are not going to drop their habit
of adding "domestic gloss" to an international provision until there
is some structure which requires them to do so71 -an express civil
code would do just that. Old habits would have to be overcome, and
judicially uniform ones substituted in their place for purposes of
international contract law applied under a unifying civil law
commercial code.
One objection of common law lawyers-making them learn a
"new" system is not fair-is somewhat lessened in persuasiveness
because the CISG, after all, is supposed to have made them learn a
"new" system already. Under Article 7 of the CISG, interpretation
of its provisions is supposed to be of an autonomous, international,
and uniform nature, without regard for domestic legal rules.472 Thus,
we already have a system where new rules were supposed to be
learned-we just have not yet figured out what they are. With an
expressly civilian code, we would know, or could readily discover,
what such rules of interpretational methodology were. In fairness,
implementing a "global common law" would arguably affect many,
if not most, of the same above results that implementing a "global
civil law" does. Thus, some additional justifications for considering
an international civil law commercial code over other systems will be
presented.
A. An International Civil Law Code Will Have a Unifying Effect
on the Globalized Rule of Contract Law
Perhaps the supreme goal of current and future international
contract law is unity.473 Uniform rules of contract law across national
borders is a tremendous ally to the furtherance of international
commerce and trade. Diversity of contract laws across nations, by
contrast, is international trade's greatest enemy.474  Here, the
implementation of a civil code would seem an innovative, though
also traditional, method by which to achieve unification. This is so
because civil codes are distinctly unifying in nature.475 Indeed, one
of the greatest historical triumphs of civil codes is in their efficacy at
470. See supra notes 273-289 and accompanying text.
471. See Frisch, supra note 447, at 522-23.
472. CISG art. 7.
473. See, e.g., Ferrari, supra note 379, at 1.
474. Id.
475. See Lawson, supra note 29, at 51; see also Koch, supra note 28, at 30 ("[A]
code is an effective technique for centralization. The code-like use of the treaties
forming the E.U. demonstrates this unifying nature.").
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achieving a unification of once-divergent systems of law.476 This was
the effect of the Napoleonic Code in France, and certainly was also
true of Germany, and most other nations which enacted codes in the
last two centuries. 4  Civil codes have an effective unifying effect on
several different levels. First they have the effect of greatly unifying
the various sources of law.478 In revolutionary France, for instance,
different parts of the country were governed by Roman law,
customary law, canon law, and royal edicts-the Code Civil
superseded all of these various sources, giving France a uniform,
solitary source of law.479 Second, quite obviously, a civil code has
had the historical effect of unifying regions or territories which are
governed by different laws.48° In France, again used for illustration,
different sets of customary law governed different regions of the
country, such that determining the law in a given location was often
an impenetrable maze. 481' Thus, it is no secret that paramount among
the goals of the French revolutionaries, and other civilian codifiers
that came afterwards, was to reform the legal system such that there
came to exist "a single system of law-a law common to all
citizens."" The Napoleonic Code is commonly accepted to have had
all of these effects on the French system, as did other codes, such as
the German code and the Swiss code.483
Once the admittedly formidable geopolitical obstacles to enacting
a comprehensive civil law code of contract law are overcome, such
an international code would have much of the same unifying effects
on a supranational scale. Like revolutionary France, and other
illustrative nations in history, the world is now a virtual Babel of
differing systems-mostly variations on common law and civil law
traditions, to be sure, but nevertheless varied enough even in their
commercial and contract law alone so as to be a veritable enigma of
hopeless complexity and dissonance. Also, these differing systems
come, quite obviously, from different regions-namely, different
sovereign nations. An international civil law contracts code, once
accepted, would almost certainly have the unifying effect on
international contract law so craved by international businesspeople.
476. See, e.g., Cassin, supra note 173, at 46 ("Not even the most ardent
adversaries of codification have been able to deny that the Civil Code of 1804,
among its other noteworthy achievements, contrived to accomplish that unity of
laws demanded in almost all of the Cahiers drawn up in 1789 on the eve of the
Revolution.").
477. Id. at 50.
478. Id. at 46.
479. Id.
480. Id.
481. Id. at 46-47.
482. Id. at 47.
483. See generally id. at 46-54.
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Moreover, such a code, once enacted and applied on a regular basis
over time, would only cement its unifying effect,484 bringing the
nations together with regard to international contract law,
overcoming obstacles presented by the fiercest adversary of
international business persons-"nationality of law" 485-and
increasing encouragement for international trade.
Another characteristic of civil law codes-exhaustiveness and
comprehensiveness of coverage of subject matter486 -would also
have a unifying effect on the international law of contracts. A civil
law code is designed to be complete in its coverage of the regulated
area, containing sufficient legal principles to provide an answer for
any legal issue which could possibly arise as to matters within its
jurisdiction.4 " This coincides with the aim to minimize any "gaps"
in coverage. In so doing, virtually every substantive area of contract
law would be addressed in one or more civil code provisions,
minimizing the likelihood of erroneously divergent adjudications
from courts seeking to promulgate rules perceptibly uncodified and
thus in need of attention. By having all or most substantive areas
covered by applicable code provisions, the natural result would be
that the contract law of the nations, being comprehensively set forth
in a single, written code, would effectively be unified.
B. An International Civil Law Code Will Limit the Delegation of
the Sovereignty of Nations
One of the principal concerns under the CISG is the reluctance of
some courts to render decisions interpreting the CISG, or to cite to
any foreign decisions, for apprehension of the perceived or real
possibility of creation of foreign precedents on which courts must
rely in the future under some type of quasi-stare decisis. In such a
system, the case decisions themselves take on the force of law, as in
common law jurisdictions generally.488 This is troubling for any
regime of international law, because nations are still sovereigns, after
484. See id. at 48-49 ("If the preparation of the Civil Code (like that of the other
great French codes-Commerce, Civil Procedure, Criminal Law and Procedure)
was the crowning achievement of the evolution toward the unification of the laws,
its completion and its operation in practice had the equally important effect of
cementing national unity.").
485. Ferrari, supra note 379, at 2 & n.23 (citing Roy Goode, Reflections on the
Harmonization of Commercial Law, in Commercial and Consumer Law: National
and International Dimensions 3, 3 (Ross Cranston & Roy Goode eds., 1993))
("[t]he particular characteristic of [...] harmonization lies in its motivation, which
is to reduce the impact of national boundaries.").
486. See supra notes 255-259 and accompanying text.
487. Sereni, supra note 69, at 57.
488. See supra notes 57-73 and accompanying text.
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all, and there is a pronounced territoriality over the rule of law.489
This idea is bound up in the interrelationship between a system of
precedent, contract law, and international treaty and convention law.
A treaty, of course, is itself a contract between multiple nation
states. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a
treaty49° as "an international agreement concluded between States in
written form and governed by international law, whether embodied
in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and
whatever its particular designation."49 Rules of consent to be bound
govern in the sphere of international treaties and conventions, much
like they do in the realm of private contracts. A state, quite
obviously, must in fact consent to be bound before the terms and
provisions of the treaty are binding on it.492 Much like private
commercial parties in a negotiation, states undergo a process of
negotiation of the exact terms of the convention, and then the formal
execution of a final instrument.493 It is obviously very important to
the contracting states what the terms of the treaty are. It is possible
to amend treaties after they have been formalized, though this is
difficult to accomplish and would normally require a great deal of
subsequent negotiation.494
Consider, however, what in fact has happened under the CISG, if
one considers even a quasi-stare decisis to be in effect under that
convention. Nations, in 1980 and thereafter, after rigorous and
laborious internal discussions, and discussions with other states,
opted to subscribe to the convention for the sale of goods. The
terms-all 101 articles-instantly became law in those nations.495
The nation justifiably believes that acceptance of those 10 1 articles
(if the full CISG is accepted) is the extent to which its national
sovereignty over law in its borders is being delegated to the CISG
regime for international sales of goods. However, if a supranational
stare decisis is operational, neither the state's delegation of
489. See, e.g., Kilian, supra note 2, at 243 ("Naturally, each jurisdiction would
like to have its CISG judgments become authority, and, equally naturally, each
'opposing' jurisdiction would like to prevent that.").
490. A treaty and a convention are, for practical purposes, the same thing, so the
definition here of "treaty" shall suffice. See Fritz Enderlein & Dietrich Maskow,
Excerpt from International Sales Law, available at
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/enderlein-art90.html ("[T]here is no
difference between treaty, convention, charter, covenant, pact, concordat or
certified recommendation.").
491. Anthony Aust, Modem Treaty Law and Practice 14 (2000) (quoting Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 2(l)(a)).
492. Id. at 75-78.
493. See id. at 74 (regarding when a treaty is formally "concluded").
494. See id. at 212-23.
495. Ferrari, supra note 379, at 4-5.
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sovereignty, nor the "contractual consent" given by the state to the
convention in the first place, is concluded after the signing of the
convention. Rather, subsequent decisions of foreign courts
interpreting various provisions of the CISG obtain precedential effect
in that nation as they are decided. They become law. To take the
United States as an illustrative example, an adjudication in Hungary
would thereby obtain the force of precedential law in the United
States for purposes of the CISG, months or perhaps years after the
United States seemingly gave its otherwise final consent to the
convention and final delegation of sovereignty to its international
regime. The same effect on law would occur with decisions by
courts in Chile, Egypt, Lesotho, Syria, Zambia, Ghana, Singapore,
and Venezuela, to give a few examples of other CISG members.496
The United States' delegation of sovereignty would be extended
indefinitely, acceding to whatever precedential path the law in these
or any other states would take, a veritable "blank check" written on
American sovereignty, with no end in sight because of the effect that
subsequent nations' court decisions would have on the law of CISG
as applied to American businesses.
Any future international commercial code, civilian or otherwise,
is likely to be implemented in the form of another such treaty or
convention.4 97 Therefore, this issue of limiting the surrender of
sovereignty will continue to persist. The lessons of the CISG and
courts' reluctance to deal with it on occasion should be remedied.4 98
496. See The Convention for the International Sale of Goods: A Handbook of
Basic Materials 65-71 (Daniel Barstow Magraw & Reed R. Kathrein eds., 2d ed.
1990) (listing all signature member nations to the CISG).
497. It should be noted that many commentators believe that the true lex
mercatoria should be free of any connection to a sovereign or group of sovereigns,
but rather should be law "firee of any state." See, e.g., Global Law Without a State
(Gunther Teubner ed., 1997); Kilian, supra note 2, at 219-21. However, it is
unlikely that this view will prevail against the eventual creation of a sophisticated
commercial code. Since the days of the rise of the nation state, it has been widely
accepted that commerce and positive law should correspond together. See, e.g.,
Scheuerman, supra note 330 (citing Max Weber, Economy and Society 162
(Berkeley: University of Califomia 1978):
Liberal theorists from John Locke to Max Weber argued convincingly that
market economies tend to rest on a system of legality characterized by a
relatively substantial degree of formality, consistency, transparency, and
constancy; in Weber's famous phrase, an 'elective affinity' obtains
between modem capitalism and 'formally rational administration and law.
See also Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law 171-72 (1964) (cited in
Scheuerman, supra note 330) (opining that commercial activity ideally
occurs "within a framework set by the law," which Fuller described as a
structure where "adjudication must act through openly declared rule or
principle, and the grounds on which it acts must display some continuity
through time").
498. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 1; Kilian, supra note 2.
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An expressly civilian international commercial code, comprehensive in
coverage with no purposeful gaps, and with the concomitant explicit
repudiation of the application of stare decisis in applying its principles,
would be an effective remedy to the problem of unintended delegation
and surrender of national sovereignty in signing on to such a future
convention. States, much like private contracting parties, should
negotiate extensively with their fellow states over the exact content of
the substantive terms of the convention. The terms should be
promulgated in great detail, with comprehensiveness of coverage,
leaving no intended gaps, and the code should be structured to be
interpreted according to civilian principles. Such a convention having
been signed, the international contract law will be substantially, if not
theoretically, complete in broad principle. With a repudiation of stare
decisis, there would be no significant further derogation of national
sovereignty effected by the constant stream of court adjudications
emanating from other jurisdictions."' There may eventually be
subsequent modifications of the international legislation by mutual
agreement and new or modifying conventions, but they would not be
realized surreptitiously through the sovereign-derogating consequences
of a supranationally operating form of stare decisis. Rather, such
changes would be made through the formal requisites and procedures
of international treaty law."°
The desire for maintaining individual national sovereignty over
laws within its borders is not unique to common law nations, or civil
law nations, or nations of any other legal methodology. All nations
share this jealous guarding of sovereign monopolistic lawmaking
power-the surrender of national sovereignty over such power should
be minimized, and a civilian code with no stare decisis would go a long
way towards achieving this ideal. Stare decisis effect of foreign cases,
in fact, has the opposite effect and so it should be discarded in any
future international contract code.
C. The Conditions that Historically Have Led to Codification Are
Currently Present in the International Commercial Community
A significant reason to consider codification and the
implementation of civilian methodologies in future international
499. A caveat would be that, if sufficient numbers of decisions from a sufficient
number of jurisdictions reached a same or similar result as to a particular issues,
one could envision a type of supranationaljurisprudence constante springing forth
according to civilian principles under the new commercial code. See Von Mehren
& Gordley, supra note 31, at 1135 n.21. However, even with such a line of
decisions, under civilian principles a court would have the autonomy to decide
differently if it believed the law required it to do so. See Sereni, supra note 69, at
68.
500. See generally Aust, supra note 491, at 212-23.
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contract law is that the political and legal cultural status of the global
commercial community is such that the time may now be ripe for
codification. Dean Roscoe Pound, on the occasion of the 150th
anniversary of the enactment of the Napoleonic Code in France,
speculated on the eventual trend toward codification in Anglo-
American law.5' As a preface to doing so, he made several
observations about the historical readiness of jurisdictions for the
enactment of systematized codes as a way of formalizing the law in
such a jurisdiction. 2
Dean Pound stated that, historically, two categories of nations
have decided to adopt codes.503  The first category of codifying
jurisdictions are "those with well-developed systems that had
exhausted the possibilities of juristic development through the
traditional element and so needed a new basis for further juristic
development."5°4 Into this category, Pound historically placed
nations such as Rome in the days of Justinian when the Corpus Juris
Civilis was promulgated, Revolutionary France, Austria in the late
1700', and Germany in the late nineteenth century. 505 These nations
had long, proud legal histories, with an immeasurable wealth of
scholarly and juristic commentary, and jurisprudential development.
Their systems had ripened to the point at which there were not a great
deal of new and innovative doctrines being developed, but rather
gradually finer and finer refinements of pre-existing doctrines and
precepts.0 6
Pound's second, observed, historical category of codifying
nations is diametrically opposite of the first category-"those that
had their whole modem legal development ahead of them and needed
an immediate basis for development."50 7 As of the time of Pound's
writing in 1954, he placed 1896 Japan, 1930 China, and 1922 Soviet
Russia in this category.: ° At the time of his writing, and also sincethat time, many examples could be added, including Israel, °9
501. See generally Roscoe Pound, Codification in Anglo-American Law, in The
Code Napoleon and the Common Law World 267 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1956).
502. See id. at 275-78.
503. Id. at 277.
504. Id.
505. Id.
506. See id. at 275-77.
507. Id. at 277.
508. Id. at 277-78. As to Soviet Russia, however, Pound noted that their
inclusion was dubious, given that "Soviet law grew to be no more than pretentious
window dressing." Id. at 278 (citing Gsovski, Soviet Civil Law (1949); Roscoe
Pound, Soviet Civil Law: A Review, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 95, 96 (1951)).
509. See generally Benjamin Akzin, Codification in a New State, in The Code
Napoleon and the Common Law World 298 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1956)
(describing generally the considerations and processes of enacting a new legal
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Mongolia, modem Russia, and the various former Soviet bloc
nations. The reasons for the proclivity towards civil codes in these
nations would seem readily apparent. There is neither the time nor
desire to wait for years, decades, or even centuries for a complex
system of national case precedent to develop. Rather, new nations
such as these, while desiring to fashion a law for their own sovereign,
but yet to do so efficiently and immediately, more often choose to do
so by enacting comprehensive civil codes, usually modeling them
after the French or German code. By doing so, the new nation has a
ready-made system of law in place, which is unifying and complete
in nature, and which its courts can immediately begin applying.
Russia is certainly one of the most recent examples of this
phenomenon. 51°
Considering the two classes of nations observed by Pound which
have enacted codes, it is interesting to note that both categories are
at once simultaneously applicable to the present global commercial
community at large, in the context of considering what form any
future international contract legislation should take. On the one hand,
the great common law and civil law traditions have both had
centuries--even millennia-to develop, mature, ripen, and refine.
Indeed, the civil tradition dates back at least to the Corpus Juris
Civilis, and even to the Twelve Tables, over two millennia ago.5 1'
Even the common law system dates back to at least around the time
of the Norman invasion of Britain in 1066, or shortly thereafter.5"2
Although any empirical study of the rate at which new innovations
of the law and legal precepts occur is beyond the scope of this article,
it is undeniable that most nations, which are not relatively new, and
certainly the common law and civil law systems in general, are in a
period of vastly sophisticated maturity and well-developed ripeness.
This is not to say that there are not entirely new areas which are
legislated, as for example, new consumer protection provisions,
employment law areas, corporate governance, and the like. But, with
respect to the basic, well-defined areas of purely private law like
contracts, property, and torts, innovations which occur are, it would
seem, mostly nuanced refinements, rather than wholesale changes or
reforms. In this regard, the global community is comprised of highly
developed, mature systems, which are at least as ready as
revolutionary France or nineteenth century Germany for
codification-arguably much more so with the passage of an
system at the time of formation of the Israeli state in 1948).
510. See generally Jeffrey Waggoner, Comment, Discretion and Valor at the
Russian Constitutional Court: Adjudicating the Russian Constitutions in the Civil-
Law Tradition, 8 Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 189 (1997).
511. See supra notes 97-125 and accompanying text.
512. See supra notes 42-56 and accompanying text.
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additional century or two. So much so, in fact, that the substantive
outcomes of specific disputes in both systems tend to be similar, if
not identical.5"3 Hence, the laws of these systems are clearly capable
of overarching summarization, systematization, and classification
into a comprehensive code, and as such the first of Pound's
categories is descriptive of the current international status.
But the international community is describable by Pound's
second category as well. Any such future international law, one that
is a natural evolution from the embryonic prototype that the CISG is
surely destined to be viewed as in the future, will itself be a newly
created regime. It will, therefore, in that sense be analogous to the
states which Pound described as having their entire legal
development ahead of them, needing an "immediate basis for
development." '514 It will be a fresh start, with no meaningful past
history to assist in interpretation and application of the new code.
The international community will desire a commercial legal system
that is ready for immediate implementation-one that does not
require a complex labyrinth of global case precedent to develop. For
these reasons, a civil code to implement the new international
contract law regime comports with Pound's second observation of
states which have enacted codes and is a useful predictor for the logic
and likelihood of a civil code for the international commercial
community.
In Pound's article, he further noted that codes tended to be
historically demanded in four instances, which were not necessarily
mutually inclusive, but which, he observed, tended to occur in
concert:
(1) the traditional element of the law for the time being has
substantially exhausted its possibilities, so that a new basis is
required for ajuristic new start; or, instead, a basis is required
on which to build a body of law for a country with no juristic
past. (2) Where there is a juristic past, the law has become
unwieldy, full of archaisms, and uncertain. (3) The growing
point of the law has shifted to legislation, and an efficient
organ of legislation has developed. (4) There is need of one
law in a political society whose several subdivisions have
developed divergent local laws.515
513. Rinfret, supra note 462, at 383-84 ("[I]t is not to be doubted that both
systems [civil law and common law] tend, as they should, toward similar
conclusions. A complete and adequate study of the genesis of each would show as
kindred much that we might fancy to be foreign ... .
514. Pound, supra note 501, at 277.
515. Id. at 278.
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The first element listed is basically a restatement of Pound's
observation that two types of nations have adopted codes-those with
mature, well-developed systems of law and those with no system of law
at all.5 16  As discussed, the international community seems to
simultaneously embody both of these characteristics at once.5"7 The
second element in Pound's list is perhaps the most difficult and
complex one to evaluate in an international context, without a survey of
every maj or nation's legal system. It would seem undoubtedly true that
most nations have some of these characteristics in their own national
legal systems5 18-however, this would appear to be much less the case
in the instance of international contract law. In fact, because any
international contract legal system is still in its prototypical, formative
stages, it is arguable that there are as yet no such archaisms, as there is
no formal juristic past.
The third element of Pound's observations is more readily subject
to analysis. It is scarcely to be doubted that the modem era of law is in
large part an era of legislation. Of course, in the civil law jurisdictions
which have already codified their laws, this is already the case and has
been for one or more centuries.5"9 However, notably even in common
law jurisdictions, the trend for some time has been towards legislation
as the positive source of law as well as cases.52° Indeed, the era of
legislation in common law jurisdictions has been described by various
commentators as the "statutory era," and even an "orgy of
statutemaking," which, in the United States at least, has been argued by
some to "effectively occlude ... the common law horizon."52 While
the legislation in the United States and other common law jurisdictions
has undoubtedly not been of any type of civilian character for the most
part,522 the fact that legislation has exploded and is increasingly the
mode by which new positive law is developed, portends toward
eventual codification, or at least amenability to codification, in Pound's
view. So, too, does the fact that legislative bodies exist in all the major
nations for drafting and promulgating such legislation, as well as in the
international community. As to the latter, private bodies such as
516. See supra notes 501-510 and accompanying text.
517. See supra notes 511-515 and accompanying text.
518. See, e.g., Pound, supra note 501, at 289-90 (describing the "[i]rrationality
due to partial survival of obsolete precepts" in common law systems, such as
whether "contingent remainders could still be barred by merger").
519. See supra notes 231-259 and accompanying text.
520. See generally Madden, supra note 42.
521. Id. at 555-56 (citing Daniel A. Farber & Phillip P. Frickey, In the Shadow
of the Legislature: The Common Law in the Age of the New Public Law, 89 Mich.
L. Rev. 875 (1991); Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 169
(1982); Richard A. Cosgrove, Our Lady the Common Law: An Anglo-American
Community 1870-1930 at 39 (1987)).
522. A decided exception would be the Uniform Commercial Code.
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UNIDROIT and the CECL are effective organs for drafting prospective
international contract law which could be adopted formally by the
international community. On a more formal level, the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has shown itself
capable of fashioning a formidable body of international scholars and
legal professionals, eminently capable of complex negotiation, research,
and promulgation of internationally applicable commercial law, of
which CISG is the greatest example to date.523 Thus, Pound's third
element-that the tendency of law to be legislative, with a capable
legislative body, is clearly present in the current geopolitical climate.
Pound's fourth element524-a need of one law where different
groups have different laws-is clearly present in the current
international context. By definition, the global structure is comprised
of nearly 200 separate sovereign nations. " Though nearly all of them
practice some form of common law or civil law, they have innumerable
iterations, variations, and differing structures and precepts in their
distinct systems.526 For any global commercial law to be feasible,
practical, and effective, it is clear that some type of unifying,
systematizing, legislative text is warranted in order to bring these
varying legal systems together in one unified regime of international521
contract law. The need of such a law, given international trade's
"enemy" of differing legal systems in different nations,528 is scarcely to
be doubted. Hence, Pound's fourth element portends for the civilian
codification of international contract law as well.
D. Common Law Jurisdictions Are Increasingly Receptive to
Codification
It has been seen that there is a long history of movements toward
codification in England and later in the United States. 29 From the days
of Henry VIII, through Francis Bacon, and later Jeremy Bentham, there
has been agitation toward codification in England for centuries.53 °
Likewise, in the United States, similar agitation has been present, most
523. Gerhart, supra note 445, at 112-13.
524. As Pound noted, this element is not indispensable, since in fact Justinian's
Code was enacted in the context of a single state, the Roman Empire. See Pound,
supra note 501, at 278. Nevertheless, this element was paramount in the
development of codification in France, Germany, and Switzerland. Id.
525. According to the United Nations (U.N.) website, there are 191 member
nations in the U.N. See The United Nations, List of Member States, at
http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html (last visited April 1, 2005).
526. See supra notes 5-24 and accompanying text.
527. See Gerhart, supra note 445, at 112-13.
528. See Ferrari, supra note 379, at 2.
529. See supra notes 194-230 and accompanying text.
530. See supra notes 194-211 and accompanying text.
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notably on a historical basis with the efforts of David Dudley Field in
the nineteenth century, which actually did result in the codification of
most of New York's Rules of Civil Procedure, which later served as the
model for the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.53' But these
agitations toward codification are not mere historical anecdotes.
Indeed, the idea of English codification has not been irrevocably
discarded, and in 1961 one scholar predicted that "[i]t is difficult to
believe that the codification of English law will not become a live issue
within the next fifty years or so." '532 Indeed, Bentham would have
exulted in the fact that in 1965 an English Law Commission was created
and charged with the duty:
to take and keep under review all the law ... with a view to
its systematic development and reform, including in
particular the codification of such law, the elimination of
anomalies, the repeal of obsolete and unnecessary
enactments, the reduction of the number of separate
enactments and generally the simplification and
modernization of the law. 533
Though the extent of success of this commission is open to question,
as recently as 1990, a codified version of English contract law was
proposed-although it has not been adopted, this speaks to the
currency of the issue, even in England, the cradle of the common
law.5
34
In the United States, the recent trend has been even more
pronounced, with some actual positive enactments having come
about as a result of the agitation towards codification in this country.
The Restatements have been enacted by the American Law Institute,
as a means not to codify, but to "restate" the existing state of
common law precedents.5 5 The goal of a restatement is "to reduce
and reformulate systematically the governing legal principles of
various fields. 536 Restatements have now been drafted in the fields
of agency, conflict of laws, contracts, property, restitution, torts,
trusts, security, judgments, foreign relations, suretyship and guaranty,
531. See supra notes 212-230 and accompanying text.
532. Weiss, supra note 194, at 493 (quoting Rupert Cross, Precedent in English
Law 199 (1 st ed. 1961)) (noting, however, that "the chapter [in Cross] The Question
of Codification, from which this prediction is quoted, was dropped in the
subsequent three editions of 1968, 1972, and 1997).
533. Id. at 494 (citing Law Commissions Act, 1965, 13 & 14 Eliz. 2, ch. 22, §
3).
534. Id. at 496. The draft was promulgated by Harvey McGregor. See id.
(citing Harvey McGregor, Contract Code: Drawn Up on Behalf of the English Law
Commission (1993)).
535. Id. at 517-20.
536. Id. at 518.
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and laws to govern attorneys.537 Though the Restatements are not
legislation, they have come to have highly persuasive authority, and
are often adopted by judicial decision. 8  However, it is widely
perceived that the Restatements are, or could at point be, a precursor
to formal codification of American law.539
More formal efforts at codification and unification of American
law are seen in the advent of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).
The chief reporter for the original UCC was Karl Llewellyn, who was
greatly influenced by German civil law.54° In drafting the UCC,
Llewellyn strove for general rules, with the idea that some of the
adjudicative work would be left to the judiciary.54" ' In this regard, it
seems hard to ignore the civilian influence on Llewellyn.5  The
UCC was enacted, covering sales, leases, negotiable instruments,
bank deposits and collections, funds transfers, letters of credit, bulk
sales, documents of title, investment securities, and secured
transactions.543 It is the law, without substantial variation, in all fifty
of the American states, giving the United States a truly unified
national commercial law.5 " It is debatable whether the UCC
qualifies as a "codification" in the civilian sense, and certainly the
various judiciaries do not hesitate to interpret and apply it in a
common law tradition-however, it represents an interesting and
historic step in the organization, systematization, and clarification of
American law.545 It is a step that would have been unthinkable in
England four or five centuries earlier.
In addition to the trend towards codification, or at least "pre-
codification," in England and the United States, there is also the
observable trend away from strict adherence of stare decisis in these
537. Id. at 518.
538. Id. at519.
539. Id. See also Pound, supra note 501, at 281 ("These private restatements,
which are being widely followed by the courts, might well pave the way for
codification.") (citing Mitchell Franklin, The Historic Function of the American
Law Institute: Restatement as Transitional to Codification, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1367
(1934); Benjamin Cardozo, The American Law Institute, in Law and Literature 121
(1931); Arthur Goodhart, Law Reform in the United States, 1934 J. Soc'y Pub.
Tchrs. L. 19; Charles E. Clark, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 42 Yale
L.J. 643 (1933)).
540. Weiss, supra note 194, at 520 (citing James Whitman, Commercial Law
and the American Volk: A Note on Llewellyn's German Sources for the Uniform
Commercial Code, 97.Yale L.J. 156 (1987)).
541. Id. (citing Shael Herman, The Fate and the Future of Codification in
America, 40 Am. J. Legal Hist. 407, 429-32 (1996)).
542. Id. at 520-21.
543. Id. at 521.
544. Id.
545. See generally id. at 521-27.
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common law bastions.54 6 Consider the observations of Wigmore on
the subject over eighty years ago:
Is the judge to be bound by his precedent? This part of the
question ought not to trouble us overmuch. Stare decisis, as
an absolute dogma, has seemed to me an unreal fetich. The
French Civil Code expressly repudiates it; and, though French
and other Continental judges do follow precedents to some
extent, they do so presumably only to the extent that justice
requires it for safety's sake. Stare decisis is said to be
indispensable for securing certainty to the application of the
law. But the sufficient answer is that it has not in fact secured
it. Our judicial law is as uncertain as any law could well be.
We possess all the detriment of uncertainty, which stare
decisis was supposed to avoid, and also all the detriment of
ancient law-lumber, which stare decisis concededly
involves-the government of the living by the dead, as
Herbert Spencer has called it.547
There has certainly been no discernible reversal of this relaxation of
the traditional rule of stare decisis. The United States Supreme Court
has referred to stare decisis as not rising to the level of an "inexorable
command." '548 Hence, not only can one make the case that common
law jurisdictions have been gradually moving toward a system of
codification-a defining characteristic of civil law--one can also
make the case that common law jurisdictions have been moving away
from a strict adherence to precedent-a defining characteristic of the
common law (whose converse is a defining characteristic of the civil
law).
While the common law jurisdictions have shown a tendency
toward legislation and even codification, it would appear (though the
point is worthy of debate) that a converse trend has largely not
appeared in the civil law jurisdictions-that is, by and large, there has
not been as dramatic a shift by civilians away from codification
ideology and toward greater emphasis on case decisions as a source
546. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
547. John Henry Wigmore, Problems of Law 79 (1920).
548. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2483 (2003)
(quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2610 (1991))
("Stare decisis is not an inexorable command; rather, it 'is a principle of policy and
not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision."'). The Court noted,
however, that "when a Court is asked to overrule a precedent recognizing a
constitutional liberty interest, individual or societal reliance on the existence of that
liberty cautions with particular strength against reversing course." Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 577, 123 S. Ct. at 2483 (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855-56, 112 S. Ct. 2791,2809 (1992)). The Court cautioned
that "[i]iberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt." Id.
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of positive law. In fact, on the continent, the European Parliament
has encouraged the development of efforts toward eventually
implementing a unified, European civil code.549 And over thirty-five
years ago, European scholars began noting the appeal of such a code,
as well as the ability to effectuate one.55 This is the purpose of the
Principles of European Contract Law, which have been drafted by
European scholars with that end goal in mind.55'
Because England-the mother of the common law-is part of this
Europe-the cradle of Roman civil law-the question inevitably
arises as to whether a European civil code is hopelessly doomed to
fail. 552  It is ironic to note, with England's role in Europe in
perspective, that notwithstanding that the historical reason for
English "common law" was to make the law uniform throughout the
kingdom, it now has a converse effect given the European continent's
otherwise near unanimous application of civil law methodology.
Some scholars, citing "the historical resistance of common-law
tradition to the idea of codification," state that a European civil code
is unfeasible and undesirable.553 This argument has been met by
other scholars, who state that the perceived historical opposition is
not as great as may be conventionally believed, given the historical
receptiveness to codification in common law jurisdictions which
belies the popular notion that such jurisdictions are hostile to it. 554 It
549. Weiss, supra note 194, at 442-43 (citing Parliament Resolution on Action
to Bring Into Line the Private Law of the Member States of 5/26/1989, 1989 O.J.
(C 158) 400; Parliament Resolution on the Harmonisation of Certain Sectors of the
Private Law of the Member States of 5/6/1994, 1994 O.J. (C 205) 518).
550. Id. at 442-43 (citing Alexander G. Chloros, Principle, Reason, andPolicy
in the Development of European Law, 17 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 849 (1968); Walter
Hallstein, Angleichung des Privat-und Prozebrechts in der europdischen
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 28 RabelsZ 211 (1964)).
551. Id. at444.
552. Id. at 446-47.
553. Id. at 447. Weiss quotes Pierre Legrand, Codification and the Politics of
Exclusion: A Challenge for Comparativists, 31 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 799, 805
(1998):
[T]o promote a civil code for the whole of the European Continent, given
the historical resistance of the common-law tradition to the idea of
codification, is necessarily to affirm performatively what is otherwise
denied, that is, to assimilate the agents within one legal tradition to a
different way of speaking and acting and to different moral preferences
that, because they are culturally embedded, are arguably incompatible and
incommensurable with their horizon of expectations.
Id. at 447 n.39. He also cites Pierre Legrand, Against a European Civil Code, 60
Mod. L. Rev. 44, 56-59 (1997), which he says argues "for 'polyjurality' instead of
codification and calling it arrogant to promote the adoption of a European civil
code." Id.
554. Id. at 447 ("The historical perspective illustrates that a European civil code
would not artificially graft codification onto a legal environment to which such an
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would thus appear that the trend among the jurisdictions of the world
is from a system of positive case law toward a ripening and
systematizing system of statutes. In this regard also, then, it would
seem that a civil law type of code is the more likely natural result of
the geopolitical trends in legal thought, than a converse result away
from codification.
E. Other Practical Considerations Portend Eventual Codification
At least a couple of other pragmatic observations can be made
about the prospects for codification of a future international contract
law regime. For one, the ratios of nations and populations practicing
civil law on the one hand, and common law on the other, is worthy
of comparison. It will be recalled that, according to statistics cited
earlier, Common Law (exclusive of any Civil Law), whether in
"pure" or "mixed" form, is utilized by some fifty-one nations, or
26.7% of all nations of the world. These nations account for 34.8 1%
of the world's population.555 On the other hand, Civil Law (exclusive
of any Common Law), whether in "pure" or "mixed" form, is utilized
by some 115 nations, or 60.2 1% of all nations of the world. 56 These
nations account for 59.0 1% of the world's population.55 7 Thus, it is
readily seen that some form of civil law is practiced by well over
twice the number of jurisdictions than those which practice some
form of common law. In terms of population, the numbers are
slightly closer, but civil law is still practiced by nearly twice the
population as populations which practice civil law. This discrepancy
is even greater when it is considered that India-which has a
disproportionate share of the common law population figures-is
counted in this "common law" group of statistics, even though it is
quite a mixed system and is heavily codified though it retains
basically a common law underpinning.5
Moreover, it is difficult to overestimate the geopolitical influence
of the dominantly civilian character of the ever-expanding European
Union, which seems headed inexorably toward a supranational
European code.559 The effect of such a code on the rest of the world,
once put into practice and governing the commercial enterprises of
idea is by nature anomalous, antagonistic, or alien, and it thus disproves the
historical argument against a European codification."). See also supra notes
204-240 and accompanying text.
555. See Ottawa Website, supra note 6; see also supra note 18 and
accompanying text.
556. See Ottawa Website, supra note 6.
557. See id.; see also supra note 19 and accompanying text.
558. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 194, at 483-86.
559. See Lando, supra note 384, at 1019.
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Europe, will be inestimable. There is also the reality that,
notwithstanding the diversity of participants in drafting such
international contract texts as the UNIDROIT Principles and the
Principles of European Contract Law, these have a decidedly
civilian-rather than common law-flavor.5
61
Given the inclination of the sheer numbers in favor of civil law
practicing jurisdictions, it seems at least plausible to suggest
that-presuming that a future international contract law regime will
be likely either inclined toward a civil law ideology or a common law
ideology, which are the two dominant methods of the
world-promulgating such a future code in the form of a civilian one
will have a profound effect on the fewest number ofjurisdictions and
populations. That is, simply put, it is arguably more pragmatic and
politically expedient for the common law minority of the world to
concede to the majority of the civil law majority of the world, in the
limited context of a future international contract law legislation. This
is especially compelling in light of the other facts militating in favor
of an international civil law contracts code, as discussed herein.
Again, in response to any indignant reaction that such an
imposition on common law practitioners is an unfair requirement that
they learn a system which is foreign to their domestic one, the answer
is that
the CISG has already theoretically obligated them to do so.561
Arguably, since there is a wealth of literature on the methodologies
and interpretational processes of the civil law system, whereas there
is utter confusion as to how to interpret and apply the CISG, this
actually lessens the burden on the common lawyers. That civil law
practitioners may be technically advantaged by such a development
is hard to contest, but the overall considerations would seem to weigh
in this direction, rather than having nearly two-thirds of the world's
nations and populations reverse two millennia of history with the
civil law system dating to the Romans, in order to emulate that proud,
grand-but, comparatively recent by historical standards-system of
case precedent invented by the English in the eleventh and twelfth
centuries which is the common law.
A final consideration which will be offered is the impact which
could be contemplated if any t"6pe of international stare decisis were
to be formally implemented. Such a system would likely be
immobilizing. As has already been observed by Professor Murray, it
560. See UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, in G.
Gregory Letterman, UNIDROIT's Rules in Practice: Standard International
Contracts and Applicable Rules 66-67 (2001); Lando, supra note 384, at 1019.
561. See CISG art. 7; see also Cook, supra note 2 (describing the CISG as a
"mandate to abandon ethnocentricity").
562. See supra notes 440-443 and accompanying text.
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is unlikely now that domestic courts tend to even bother themselves
with seeking our foreign precedent on the CISG for example, let alone
accord it precedential weight as positive law. 5e3 In the United States
alone, the amount of precedent has become staggering. Dean Pound,
in his 1954 article on the prospects for codification in Anglo-American
law, commented that one of the recurrent problem areas in the United
States common law system was the "[w]aste of labor entailed by the
unwieldy form of the law.' ' 5' He stated that the problem is not in
understanding what the rules are, but in knowing how to locate the
rules given the voluminous reporting of cases.565 Relating the "heavy
labor" of sitting on the bench, Dean Pound reported that, as long ago
as 1885, in a sample of seventy-nine case decisions reported in a single
volume of New York case law, 449 precedential cases were cited in the
seventy-nine published opinions. 56 The courts in these cases gleaned
the 449 cases utilized from 5,300 cases cited by the litigants."' One
judge commented that the volume of case law is a "frightful calamity
which threatens us, of being buried alive, not in the catacombs, but in
the labyrinths of the law.' '  This was a statement not made in the
present day-it was made by Justice Story in 1821 .569 As of 1872,
2,000 volumes of judicial decisions were reported in the United
States.57° In 1954, Justice Frankfurter noted that that the United
Supreme Court alone had published over twice the decisions that had
existed from all courts at time of Justice Story's anxious hand-
wringing over the volume of case law.57' And indeed, since Justice
Frankfurter's day, the case law has continued to explode. Whereas the
West reporting system for all United States federal cases (the Federal
Reporter) had issued some approximately 500 volumes at the time of
Justice Frankfurter's observations, well more than double that amount
have since been issued, in only about two-thirds of the time.572 And
563. See Murray, supra note 1, at 373.
564. Pound, supra note 501, at 289.
565. Id.
566. Id.
567. Id.
568. Lawson, supra note 29, at ix (citing Joseph Story, Address to the Suffolk
Bar, September 4, 1821, 1 Am. Jurist 1, 31 (1829)).
569. Id. Justice Story, it will be recalled, was an early American codification
proponent. See Weiss, supra note 194, at 501 (citing Joseph Story, Progress of
Jurisprudence, in The Miscellaneous Writings of Joseph Story 213-14, 237-39
(1852)).
570. Id.
571. Id. (citing Felix Frankfurter, Foreword, 2 Am. J. Comp. L. 1, 2 (1954)).
572. The first series of Federal Reporter began with volume 1 in 1880, and
ended with volume 300 in 1924. Federal Reporter, Second Series, began with
volume I in 1924, and ended with volume 999 in 1993, which was also when
volume 1, Federal Reporter, 3rd series, began. The third series currently stands, as
of about August 1, 2004, at around 375 volumes. Hence, whereas only about 500
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this is without regard for the length of the volumes. This, and other
factors, led Cambridge professor Arthur Goodhart to remark as long
ago as 1931:
[Iln no distant time the American doctrine will approximate to
that of the civil law. This will be due in large part to five
reasons: (1) the uncontrollable flood of American decisions, (2)
the predominant position of constitutional questions in
American law, (3) the American need for flexibility in legal
development, (4) the method of teaching in the American law
schools, and (5) the restatement of the law by the American
Law Institute.
Whereas the United States may be somewhat unique amongst the
world's jurisdictions in litigiousness and prolificity of judicial
opinions, the point remains that, multiplying and extrapolating this
phenomenon by many countries over, the amount of international case
decisions would have the potential to become simply overwhelming,
for purposes of recitation as authority in international cases. For these
pragmatic reasons also, the idea of a supranational stare decisis is not
promising, setting aside the deeply ingrained hostility in civil law
nations to treatment of cases as positive law.5 74 Rather, it would seem
that encapsulating all positive international contract law into a single
civil code, without the requirement of resorting to foreign cases, would
be much simpler and much more straightforward towards a unifying
international regime of contract law.
V. CONCLUSION
There is an irresistible, seemingly irreversible trend toward the
international unification of contract law.575  The efforts of
UNIDROIT, the CECL, UNCITRAL, and other bodies testify to this,
as does the monumentally important landmark CISG.5 76 The growing
needs of sophisticated cross-border commerce and multinational
enterprises, not to mention borderless innovations such as the
federal West volumes had been published at the time of Justice Frankfurter's
statements in 1954 over a span of seventy-four years, an additional approximately
1,175 volumes have been issued since then in the span of fifty years.
573. JeffreyT. Renz, Stare Decisis in Montana, 65 Mont. L. Rev. 41, 87 n.171
(quoting Arthur L. Goodhart, Essays in Jurisprudence and the Common Law 65
(1931)).
574. See Koch, supra note 28, at 56 (noting that though in the future global
system cases will have some effect, "it is doubtful that case law will ever attain
stare decisis effect.").
575. See supra notes 339-343 and accompanying text.
576. See supra notes 384-414 and accompanying text.
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Internet, testify to the necessity for such a law. 577 There is as yet,
however, a global uncertainty as to what form or shape a future,
evolved international contract law regime will take. The CISG, and
other prior global legislative efforts, have taken pains at compromise
between the two dominant legal systems of the world-the common
law and the civil law. Both have proud and distinguished histories,
and each has much to recommend it. The dominant characteristic of
the common law is the precedential effect of cases as sources of
positive law,5"8 whereas statutes have a merely supplemental effect.
5 79
The dominant characteristic of the civil law in its modern stage seems
to be the embodiment of the majority of private law (including
contract law) in a unitary code, which is the sole source of positive
law.58° Cases are not law, and thus stare decisis is largely rejected in
civil law systems.581 Though much convergence can arguably be
observed between the two systems over the past two centuries, it is
unlikely that they will ever fully naturally merge into a single legal
identity, but will likely be asymptotic at best.
Compromises effected in the enactment of prior supranational
commercial law regimes such as the CISG have resulted in excessive
dilution of the principles of both systems, as reflected in the CISG.582
Courts and practitioners in many jurisdictions have shunned the
CISG, at least in part because there is a vast amount of confusion as
to how to go about applying it in the "international manner" which is
expressly required, without resort to the interpretational
methodologies of one or the other of the great systems of law-the
civil law or the common law.583 Hence, to this observer, unless
someone creates an ingenious "third way" of engineering a legal
system-unlikely since the present two dominant systems have taken
millennia to develop-it seems inevitable that the world will turn to
one of them or the other, while doubtlessly being influenced by both.
The thesis of this article has been, to the extent that the
development of future regimes of international contract law
ultimately depend for their enactment and reality on a choice between
adopting a predominantly common law model or a predominantly
civil law model, that ultimately adopting a civil law model is the
most geopolitically inevitable, most efficacious, most unifying, most
politically expedient, and most pragmatic solution. The civil law is
577. See supra notes 327-343 and accompanying text.
578. See supra notes 57-73 and accompanying text.
579. See supra notes 74-83 and accompanying text.
580. See supra notes 231-259 and accompanying text.
581. See supra notes 273-289 and accompanying text.
582. See Murray, supra note 1, at 371.
583. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 1; Kilian, supra note 2; Cook, supra note 2.
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distinctively unifying.584 It would involve much less surrender of
sovereignty by nations, given the elimination of open-ended
extraterritorial development of the law that a supranational stare
decisis would involve 58 ' The geopolitical conditions of the
international community would appear ripe for codification. 86 The
trends in common law jurisdictions, especially the United States,
have been toward more legislation and potential codification, as
especially evidenced by the Restatements and the Uniform
Commercial Code, and away from stare decisis; while the trend in
civil law jurisdictions has remained more stable-there is no
significantly observable trend in such jurisdictions toward a system
of stare decisis 87 Indeed, the nations on the European continent
have been busily drafting and planning implementation of a
continent-wide applicable European civil code."'
Finally, from a pragmatic perspective, the sheer number of
jurisdictions and populations militate in favor of at least a plausible
argument for treating the civil law as the "majority" and the common
law as the "minority. '  There is, moreover, the seemingly
immobilizing effect that a formal, supranational stare decisis would
have on the tribunals of all nations. 9 Though the political obstacles
are admittedly quite formidable, a civil law, international, contract
code may well be the best solution at a workable, certain, and
unifying regime of global contract law, which would have the desired
effects of reducing obstacles to global trade and commerce, thereby
increasing the standards of living of all peoples.
584. See supra notes 473-487 and accompanying text.
585. See supra notes 488-500 and accompanying text.
586. See supra notes 501-528 and accompanying text.
587. See supra notes 529-554 and accompanying text.
588. See supra notes 549-553 and accompanying text.
589. See supra notes 555-560 and accompanying text.
590. See supra notes 561-573 and accompanying text.
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